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STRATEGIC CONSENSUS, POWER AND NETWORKS
Organizations are embedded in a network of relationships and make sense of their
business environment through the cognitive frames of their employees and executives who
constantly experience battles for power. This dissertation integrates strategic management
research with organizational behavior to illuminate managerial cognition, intra-organizational
power and interfirm networks.  
The collection of the studies presented in the present dissertation provides further
insights into measurement of cognition, consensus formation process, optimal power
differences, and social network theory with assumptions grounded on social cognition,
behavioral decision theory, psychology and organizational behavior. These studies offered
a new method to measure, visualize and aggregate individual cognition to group and
between group level with a strong emphasis on multiple dimensions of cognition, shed
light on micro-processes on consensus formation in relation to within-group power
differences and psychological safety, a novel model of strategic decision making, and a
new behavioral construct that refined existing theories from a behavioral perspective.
Each study on its own laid down responses to core research questions of behavioral
strategy. Consequently, this dissertation extends strategic management along behavioral
lines and equips scholars and practitioners with novel methods and theoretical insights
with respect to cognition, power and networks.
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Chapter 1 
 
A PRELUDE TO BEHAVIORAL STRATEGY 
 
hy do some firms perform better than others? This question remains to be the 
most fundamental question of strategic management (Nelson, 1991). Among the 
common answers provided by various strategic management theories are the 
market factors and market power, resource advantages, institutional setting, and innovation 
and entrepreneurial practices (Powell et al., 2011). These theories furthermore emphasize 
efficient market equilibrium states with rational agents (Gavetti, 2012). As Lenvinthal (2011: 
1521) rightly states “[b]usiness strategy is not a ‘tic-tac-toe’ environment in which explicit 
optimum of the real strategic context can be derived”. Rather, decision makers with all their 
flesh and blood see the world through their respective cognitive lenses and interact with 
powerful others together embedded in a network of relationships. With the help of concerted 
use of several methods and theoretical lenses, this dissertation contributes to strategic 
management by illuminating research on managerial and organizational cognition, intra-
organizational power, and interfirm networks from the perspective of behavioral strategy. 
Firms in search of the best strategic alternatives and thus improved performance  are only 
boundedly rational in their decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), are steered by emotions 
(Huy, 2012), aspirations (Baum et al., 2005), power differences (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 
1992) and cognitive frames (Reger and Huff, 1993) when making sense of their business 
environment (Weick, 1995a). Germane to this view, behavioral strategy, a bourgeoning area 
of research, calls strategy scholars for deepening our understanding of firms by connecting 
micro-processes such as cognition and behavior with strategic outcomes (Huy, 2012; Powell 
et al., 2011). Powell, Lovallo and Fox (2011) have recently defined behavioral strategy as 
follows:  
W 
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“Behavioral strategy merges cognitive and social psychology 
with strategic management theory and practice. Behavioral 
strategy aims to bring realistic assumptions about human 
cognition, emotions, and social behavior to the strategic 
management of organizations and, thereby, to enrich strategy 
theory, empirical research, and real-world practice.” (Powell et 
al., 2011: 1371) 
The ultimate purpose of behavioral strategy research, as indicated in the definition, is to 
build more integrative theories which better capture why some organizational phenomena 
occur (Sutton and Staw, 1995). Behavioral strategy can provide insightful explanations to 
important research questions pertaining to strategic management by using more realistic 
assumptions grounded on cognition, behavioral decision theory, psychology and 
organizational behavior. Consequently, it can advance the strategic management field 
forward. In that regard, this dissertation underscores the role of the behavioral perspective in 
strategic management research as well as in managerial practice, and attempts to refine 
canonical conclusions and theories along behavioral lines. Furthermore, it also contributes to 
behavioral strategy research by proposing tools and conceptualizations that can be readily 
utilized by scholars and practitioners. 
Each study in the dissertation separately deals with one or more core research problems 
of behavioral strategy, which are summarized by Powell et al. (2011). First research problem 
highlights the need to link individual cognition with group and organizational behavior and 
outcomes. Any well formulated strategy can be cashed in as improved performance only 
when implemented successfully. It is the teams, employees and managers with various 
cognitive understandings of and preferences toward the strategy whose effort is needed to 
execute the strategy. Therefore, behavioral strategy calls for further research into 
understanding of strategic cognition in individual, team and between-teams levels, and 
cognitive processes that translate the cognition into strategic action. In this dissertation I 
respond to this research problem by proposing a method that enables scholars and 
practitioners to assess cognition simultaneously in different units of analysis, delineate its 
dimensions, and test longitudinal and cross-sectional differences in cognition. 
Second core research problem of behavioral strategy calls for uncovering psychological 
foundations of strategic management. These micro-foundations allow behavioral strategy 
Chapter 1 
13 
research to reformulate existing theories in strategic management along the behavioral lines. 
As discussed earlier, an equilibrium mindset with rational and atomic agents has dominated 
the field. Although this perspective has been criticized by behavioral theorists (e.g., Gavetti, 
2012; Levinthal, 2011; Powell et al., 2011), behavioral refinements of strategic management 
theories are yet to come. Such an endeavor has the prospect of marrying grounded theory 
with strategy practice as well (Powell et al., 2011). In that regard, in this dissertation I 
illuminate social psychological underpinnings of strategic consensus formation among 
members of organizational groups, and network partner selection in interfirm networks.  
A deeper understanding of complex strategic decisions constitutes the third core research 
problem of behavioral strategy. Firms’ Top Management Teams (TMT) try to maximize their 
organizations’ profits which requires finding the optimal solution to the multidimensional 
problem of, for example, determining the amount of R&D spending, the degree of 
penetration to new markets, the allocation of budget to marketing activities, etc. Each TMT 
member has his/her own understanding and preference of what the best solution might be. 
In addition to being boundedly rational, these individual cognitive frames influence the 
strategic decisions while social psychological mechanisms such as conflict and battles for 
power take place at the same time (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Eisenhardt and 
Zbaracki, 1992; Finkelstein, 1992). Behavioral strategy can provide necessary theoretical 
lenses and methodological tools to investigate executives’ strategic decision-making process 
and associate it with organizational outcomes. For this purpose, the present dissertation 
offers a novel conceptualization of power and power differences followed by a 
characterization and modeling of strategic decision-making.  
Fourth, behavioral strategy needs to provide prescriptive advice to carry out managerial 
practices and redesign the organizational elements to ensure effective strategic decision-
making. Findings of behavioral strategy research can offer necessary tools to dig into the 
minds of the strategists and extract individual and team cognition, and shed light on the 
processes and mechanisms that facilitate or hamper group functioning. Consequently, 
organizations which apply these findings in practice may benefit superior organizational 
outcomes. Similarly, findings of the present dissertation help practitioners to assess cognition 
more comprehensively, guide designing strategic interventions seeking to increase strategic 
consensus throughout the organization more efficiently, recommend how to distribute power 
within organizational groups and how to select and arrange relationships with network 
A Prelude to Behavioral Strategy 
14 
partners.  
This PhD dissertation advances strategic management by addressing all four core 
research questions of behavioral strategy that are identified by Powell et al. (2011). It 
contributes also to behavioral strategy research by providing novel methods, 
conceptualizations and models for cognition, power, strategic decision-making and networks. 
To do so, I employed a multitude of research methods ranging from organizational surveys 
to agent-based simulations, and utilized several theoretical lenses mainly from cognitive and 
social psychology. By using a behavioral lens, my objective is to provide a fine-tuned analysis 
of strategic consensus, intra-organizational power, and interfirm networks within the strategic 
management context. More specifically, this dissertation provides a new method to assess, 
visualize and link individual cognition to team and between-teams level with a strong 
emphasis on what cognition is consisted of, who attends to and what the extent of the 
sharedness is; investigates micro-processes such as power differences and psychological 
safety that produce shared cognition in relation to within-group; provides a novel model of 
strategic decision-making with respect to within-group power differences; and introduces a 
new behavioral construct that reformulates existing network theories along behavioral lines. 
I take off on my quest in behavioral strategy by proposing a state-of-art method to 
comprehensively study employees’ cognitive understanding of organizational goals. The 
method which is presented in Chapter 2 allowed me to have a multidimensional and 
multilevel view on strategic consensus which led in Chapter 3 to the study of investigating 
consensus formation in relation to power differences and psychological safety within 
organizational groupsChapter 4 employed a novel agent-based simulations technique to find 
out whether groups with high or low power differences perform better. Chapter 5 refines 
research in interfirm networks along a behavioral line. Last but not least, Chapter 6 concludes 
with future directions ahead of research on behavioral strategy.  
Before going into the details of each study, in the following section, I present a brief 
summary of each chapter in this dissertation with an emphasis on theoretical and practical 
contributions.  
Probing into the Minds’ of Employees and Teams 
The cognitive school of strategic management (Mintzberg et al., 2009) states that strategy 
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formulation and implementation takes place in the hearts and minds of the organizational 
members. Each individual in the organization possesses an opinion on the strategy —in the 
form of preferences, mental models, schemas, and cognitive frames. These individual 
cognitive forms enable individuals to make sense of their environment and generate action 
(Kellermanns et al., 2008). One implication of the cognitive perspective is that employees will 
exert effort on executing the organizational strategy as long as their cognition is aligned with 
the strategy. This perspective also highlights the importance of shared cognition within a 
team. In the light of shared mental model theory (Mathieu et al., 2008), it is argued that 
individuals’ formation of shared understanding of the organizational goals, i.e. strategic 
consensus, facilitates communication (Kellermanns et al., 2008) and coordination of actions 
and creation of synergies (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993) within a group. Furthermore, 
consensus between groups around the organizational strategy lowers the pursuit of subunit 
goals over organizational objectives through multilevel alignment between groups (Ketokivi 
and Castañer, 2004). Higher strategic consensus is argued to improve strategy 
implementation (Noble, 1999; Rapert et al., 2002), and to be associated positively with group 
and organizational performance (Kellermanns et al., 2011; Mathieu et al., 2008).  
In their review of cognitive school of strategic management Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and 
Lampel (2009: 182) posit that “this school is characterized more by its potential than by its 
contributions.  The central idea is valid … but strategic management has yet to gain 
sufficiently from cognitive psychology.” We contend that the reason for strategic 
management not realizing the full potential of cognitive school is the lack of available 
methodological tools and guidelines. The main challenge is to elicit employees’ view on the 
strategy and aggregate it to team and between team levels where scholars and practitioners 
can visualize and quantify cognition within and between groups while capturing also the 
variations in the degree and more specific content of it.  
Chapter 2 proposes a set of complementary techniques titled as ‘strategic consensus 
mapping’ that is able to quantify, test and visualize multiple facets of strategic cognition 
(strategic consensus in particular) in a novel and systematic manner. Thereby, this study 
directly addresses behavioral strategy’s first and fourth core research questions that 
emphasize a comprehensive investigation of cognition and managerial relevance, respectively. 
This study recognizes the role of individual cognition in strategic management and provides a 
solution to the aggregation problem of linking individual cognition with team cognition and 
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overall alignment across teams towards the organization’s strategy. The methods are 
complemented with a set of easy to grasp and intuitive visualizations of within- and between-
groups understanding of shared cognition. The method is easy to absorb and easy to 
implement by academics as well as practitioners of strategic management. Furthermore, the 
methods have the ability to test longitudinal changes in cognition which is particularly 
relevant and important, because strategic interventions deliberately aimed at enhancing 
consensus are widely practiced in business yet seldom if ever quantitatively evaluated for their 
effectiveness (Hodgkinson et al., 2006; Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008b). 
Strategic consensus mapping opened a window for a finer grained assessment of strategic 
consensus. Chapter 3 seizes this opportunity to shed light on consensus formation process in 
relation to within team power differences and psychological safety. 
Psychological Underpinnings of Consensus Formation Process 
Despite the common positive perception of strategic consensus, i.e., the shared cognition over 
organizational goals, on team and organizational outcomes (Kellermanns et al., 2005; 
Kellermanns et al., 2011), equivocal findings in the literature exist. To illustrate, while some 
researchers found a positive relationship between strategic consensus and performance (e.g., 
Bourgeois, 1980; Homburg et al., 1999; Knight et al., 1999; Rapert et al., 2002), others provided 
evidence in the opposite direction (e.g., Bourgeois III, 1985; West and Meyer, 1998), yet again 
some others did not find any relationship at all (e.g., West Jr and Schwenk, 1996; Wooldridge 
and Floyd, 1990). 
These conflicting findings induced us to develop more into the strategic consensus 
formation process. As in every social setting (Anderson et al., 2008), power differences emerge 
inevitably within organizational teams. Indeed, the power school of strategic management 
(Mintzberg et al., 2009) identifies organizations and strategy making practice as the realm of 
power battles (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). Amid power battles, employees’ preferences 
and understanding of the strategy is constantly forged by the powerful. In addition, the work 
environment and culture on how to cope with power differences determine employees’ 
reaction on power holders’ influence attempts. An investigation of consensus formation with 
respect to power differences and psychological safety requires integrating the research in social 
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psychology, group processes and shared mental models in line with the second core research 
question of behavioral strategy which underline psychological foundations and micro-
processes. Chapter 3 draws attention to the hitherto neglected question of strategic consensus 
formation. I identify power disparity and psychological safety within a team as antecedents of 
strategic consensus, and focus on the lower and middle level organizational teams. Results 
from 143 teams in two separate organizations showed that higher power disparity is associated 
with lower strategic consensus within a team. As a result of interplay between psychological 
safety and power disparity, the findings also revealed that high consensus may emerge through 
imposition of the powerful team member where others do not feel psychologically safe to 
speak up, or through discussion of equally powerful team members in a psychologically safe 
team environment. I further discuss that these two high consensus conditions are likely to lead 
to discrepant team outcomes explaining the earlier conflicting findings in strategic consensus 
research. 
This study emphasizes how power differences lead to higher or lower levels of strategic 
consensus. Then, a fundamental question arises: How should power be distributed? Next 
study answers this question of optimal power distribution within strategic decision-making 
context. 
Power Differences in Strategic Decision-making 
Existing power differences within organizations determine the strategic directions of 
organizations (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; Finkelstein, 1992). Several researchers have 
demonstrated that power distribution affects organizational change and adaptation (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1977), causes the battles of strategic choice (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992), 
influences information flows and political behavior (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988), and 
impacts knowledge absorption processes (Todorova and Durisin, 2007) and organizational 
learning (Lawrence et al., 2005). Despite the consensus on the importance of power in 
organizations (Morrison, 2010), it is often contested whether steep power differences are 
beneficial or not. Indeed, research on power is divided between two main research camps 
(i.e., functionalist and conflict theories of power) which report completely opposing findings. 
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In Chapter 4, I attempt to resolve the tension between functionalist and conflict theories 
of power by highlighting whether power is assigned with respect to past performance or not. 
Additionally, I propose a multidimensional conceptualization of power such that power is 
defined simultaneously as a relational capacity, behaviors emanating from this capacity, and 
exercise of power in the form of influence. The study goes beyond the formal organizational 
design perspective where power is confined to formal and stable hierarchies, and allows for 
informal power structures and evolutionary dynamics. Through agent-based simulations, the 
results suggest that the choice between power structures with low, high, and moderate power 
disparity depends on whether power is assigned endogenously with respect to individuals’ 
past performance or not. 
Do teams with steep power differences outperform the teams where power is evenly 
distributed? Chapter 4 responds to this grand question within the strategic decision-making 
context. I model the strategic search by integrating social psychology, social impact theory 
and strategic decision-making “to produce a social psychology of behavioral strategy” with 
respect to power differences (Powell et al., 2011: 1376). Thereby, I address to behavioral 
strategy’s third core research problem which underscores behavioral understanding of 
strategic decision-making.  
Behavioral Reformulation of Network Embeddedness Theory 
Having a finer-grained understanding of organizational behavior, behavioral strategy 
ultimately targets generating integrative theories (Powell et al., 2011: 1371). This objective 
implies revisting existing theories and enriching them using a behavioral lens. Accordingly, 
the last study of my dissertation revisits embeddedness theory —a leading theory in inter-
organizational network research (Kilduff and Brass, 2010) — and refines its predictions by 
discerning behaviors of organizations in selecting network partners. 
Firms are interconnected within a social structure of ongoing relationships which 
facilitates, govern or hamper their economic exchanges. Which partners to select from the set 
of available candidates is, therefore, an important decision because the new partner 
influences the resources to be accessed, quality signaled to outside, and success of the firm 
(Jensen and Roy, 2008; Uzzi, 1996). Majority of studies in network partner selection describe 
and defend a purely rational firm which chooses its network partners only if the prospective 
Chapter 1 
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partner possesses complementary resources (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati and 
Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny, 2001), reduces uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004), proposes 
performance aspirations (Baum et al., 2005) or allows signaling higher quality to the others 
(Podolny, 2001).   
Yet, according to behavioral theory of the firm, firms are not pure profit maximizers 
(Powell et al., 2011); instead, they are “intendedly rational but imperfectly so” (Gavetti, 2012; 
Lawler, 2001: 324). Indeed, emotions, sentiment, and intrinsic attraction in social exchange 
between network partners are also prevalent in affecting firms’ decisions (Blau, 1964; 
Homans, 1961; Lawler and Yoon, 1998; Lawler, 2001). This chapter looks at partner 
selection decision using behavioral decision theory and revisits the popular conclusion of 
embeddedness theory which recommends firms to balance embedded and arm’s length ties. 
This study, hence, addresses second and third core research problems of behavioral strategy 
which calls for revealing psychological underpinnings of strategic management theories and 
of strategic decision-making.  
Chapter 5 extends the structuralist view of networks by considering firms’ behavioral 
characteristics. It introduces a new behavioral construct, network orientation, defining it as 
the motives for choosing network partners, and conceptualizes it as a stable behavioral 
characteristic of firms. Using the behavioral lens of network orientation, I revisit a strategy 
recommendation from network embeddedness theory: that firms cultivate a mix of arm’s-
length and embedded relationships within their network structure. Survey data on firm-bank 
lending relationships collected from 4240 U.S. firms with fewer than 500 employees validate 
this recommendation, but only for firms that chose their partners based on transactional 
motives. In contrast, such a mix of ties was detrimental to firms that selected their partners 
with relational motives. I also documented that these relationally motivated firms accrued 
lower opportunity costs from their network relationships than did firms with transactional 
motives.  
 
In conclusion, this dissertation addresses and sheds light on core research questions of 
behavioral strategy, which underscore cognition in individual and aggregate levels, a deeper 
understanding of strategic decision-making, behavioral foundations of strategic management 
theories, and managerial impact of behavioral strategy. Four studies laid out in the present 
dissertation offer unique theoretical and managerial insights on cognition, power and 
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networks. Yet this dissertation is neither the final destination for behavioral strategy nor 
panacea for all of its core research problems. There is a rather long, yet highly promising 
road ahead for behavioral strategy. After I present details of each study in the following 
chapters, I elaborate further on the future research directions for behavioral strategy. 
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Chapter 2 
 
TESTING AND VISUALIZING STRATEGIC 
CONSENSUS WITHIN AND BETWEEN TEAMS 
 
Introduction 
trategic consensus, which refers to ‘the shared understanding of strategic priorities 
among managers at the top, middle, and/or operating levels of the organization’ 
(Kellermanns et al., 2005: 721), has been recognized as an important concept in the 
literature pertaining to strategy formation and implementation processes (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996; Markoczy, 2001) and continues to attract attention from scholars seeking to 
develop a deeper understanding of the concept (Gonzalez-Benito et al., 2012). Several scholars 
have suggested the need for a multidimensional investigation of consensus (Hodgkinson and 
Johnson, 1994; Kellermanns et al., 2005; Markoczy, 2001; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989). These 
authors note that in addition to determining the degree of consensus, it is important to 
determine the strategic objectives on which individuals agree and identify which individuals 
within a team are in agreement or disagreement with respect to these objectives. The authors 
also highlight the importance of studying the consensus between interdependent 
organizational units in addition to examining within-group consensus. However, the dominant 
focus in strategic consensus research is the degree of within-group consensus (Gonzalez-
Benito et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2005; Kellermanns et al., 2008), and the research 
therefore addresses only a subset of the issues related to strategic consensus.  
S 
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We contend that the dearth of appropriate methods for capturing the multiple dimensions 
of strategic consensus at various levels and time periods is an obstacle to comprehensive 
analysis and integrative theory building. To address this important issue, the current study 
presents Strategic Consensus Mapping (SCM), a set of complementary procedures for probing 
multiple dimensions of strategic consensus and testing the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
differences within and between groups. SCM can be used to visualize and quantify consensus 
within and between groups while capturing the specific content of this consensus and 
variations in the degree of consensus. In addition, SCM can enable researchers to assess 
whether observed longitudinal and cross-sectional differences in consensus are statistically 
significant. We illustrate the features of our method in a field study, which we also use to test 
whether observed changes in consensus in a top management team following a strategic 
intervention are statistically significant. The ability to test such changes in consensus is 
particularly important not only from the perspective of theory development but also because 
strategic interventions aimed at enhancing consensus are widely practiced in business but are 
seldom (if ever) quantitatively evaluated for their effectiveness (Hodgkinson et al., 2006; 
Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008b).  
Thus, the contribution of the current study is threefold. First, SCM offers researchers the 
opportunity to study strategic consensus in an integrative manner that (i) allows for the 
quantification of multiple dimensions of consensus, (ii) enables the analysis of consensus at 
different levels, and (iii) visualizes consensus in an intuitive and clear fashion. Second, SCM 
answers the calls within the consensus literature for techniques that can facilitate the analysis 
of consensus between groups (Kellermanns et al., 2005). Third, SCM allows researchers to test 
the significance of differences in consensus both over time and in cross-sections of groups, 
thus responding to the call in the literature for appropriate measurement systems to determine 
the effectiveness of strategic interventions (Hodgkinson et al., 2006; Hodgkinson and Healey, 
2008b). 
In managerial and organizational cognition research, several scholars have also suggested 
that the available tools for investigating cognition must be refined to facilitate deeper analysis, 
which requires rigorous scientific scrutiny (Hodgkinson, 2002; Kaplan, 2011; Walsh, 1995). 
For instance, Mohammed and colleagues (2000: 128) argue that ‘confusion over how to 
measure group-level cognitive structures has hindered empirical work on team mental 
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models.’ Therefore, SCM not only has the potential to uniquely advance the theory regarding 
strategic consensus but has the ability to contribute to the broader field of managerial and 
organizational cognition.  
Understanding Consensus as a Multi-Faceted Concept 
As Floyd and Wooldridge (1992: 27) propose, ‘successful [strategy] execution means managers 
acting on a common set of strategic priorities,’ which requires a consensus regarding those 
priorities. A higher degree of strategic consensus1 within a group may facilitate the 
communication and coordination of action (Kellermanns et al., 2008), create synergies 
(Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993), and improve group and organizational performance 
(Kellermanns et al., 2011; Mathieu et al., 2008). Although it has been noted that high levels of 
consensus may hamper certain processes, such as change and innovation (Priem, 1990), the 
issue under consideration in this study is not whether or when strategic consensus has positive 
effects but how strategic consensus can be comprehensively studied in a manner that enables 
integrative theory building while generating helpful implications for managerial practice. 
Nevertheless, we anticipate that the study of the consequences of strategic consensus would 
benefit from a more integrative approach to strategic consensus.  
The degree of within-group consensus has been the most frequently investigated facet of 
strategic consensus (Kellermanns et al., 2005; 2011; Markoczy, 2001). Although we would not 
dispute the importance of these research efforts, we contend that focusing solely on the 
degree of consensus within groups does not suffice for integrative theory building. For 
instance, given that organizations can be characterized as networks of interdependent groups 
(e.g., Kramer, 1991), an exclusive research focus on the degree of within-group consensus may 
produce biased results when two teams display similar levels of consensus with regard to 
different content. Therefore, within-group consensus cannot be assumed to be an acceptable 
proxy for between-group consensus without reference to the content of the consensus. In 
                                                          
1 Although the focus of this paper was on strategic consensus, different forms of shared cognition in the strategy and 
organization theory literature are also mentioned: Team/task shared mental models, strategic consensus, shared 
vision, goal congruence, shared task representations, etc. The methodology proposed in this paper, however, can 
easily be applied to those variations of shared cognition provided that the data are collected in a similar vein to ours. 
Similar to consensus, such an application can provide a comprehensive multidimensional understanding of these 
various forms. 
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fact, the degree of consensus within a group, what the consensus concerns (i.e., the content of 
the consensus), where it is located within the organization (i.e., the locus of the consensus), 
and who and how many people participate in it (i.e., the scope of the consensus) should all be 
determinants of a comprehensive strategic consensus theory. 
The content of consensus is the strategic priorities on which people actually agree. An 
organization whose aim is to increase consensus regarding a new strategic direction will not be 
satisfied if a high degree of consensus is achieved regarding a different strategic direction. 
Similarly, a scholar who fails to discern differences in the content of strategic consensus may 
confront the risk of drawing misguided conclusions. The locus of consensus is where the 
consensus is located within an organization and which members/groups are involved in this 
consensus. Consensus concerning strategic priorities may also develop among members of 
other groups outside of the top management team (TMT) to form coalitions to advocate their 
common interests (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). A consensus that is confined to a TMT 
may have markedly different effects than a consensus that includes other organizational 
actors. Thus, practitioners and researchers alike may benefit from knowing where the locus of 
consensus is or whether multiple loci exist within an organization if they seek to identify the 
organization’s dominant coalition (Hickson et al., 1971) and logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). 
The scope of consensus, which refers to the number of people who have developed this shared 
understanding, is significant because building consensus and commitment among a wide range 
of organizational members can improve strategy implementation (Wooldridge and Floyd, 
1989). The scope of consensus involves more than the total number of organizational 
members who are in agreement. The scope also indicates who is aligned with the dominant 
logic and shows which actors can be positioned as change agents in the communication of 
organizational strategy beyond the reach of the TMT.  
In addition, it is important to determine the extent to which different organizational units 
agree on strategic priorities because strong alignment between groups is needed to achieve 
organizational objectives (Kellermanns et al., 2005). For instance, Ketokivi and Castañer 
(2004) show that shared understanding throughout different levels of an organization 
eliminates the pursuit of subunit goals over organizational objectives. Therefore, because 
strategy implementation is not limited to any organizational group, it is important to study 
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strategic consensus at multiple levels of analysis —not only within organizational groups but 
also between groups and for the organization at large.  
One implied component of this analysis of differences in consensus is the value of 
detecting changes in consensus over time, for instance, to evaluate the effectiveness of an 
intervention that is used to foster strategic consensus. This analysis requires the testing of 
(longitudinal) differences in consensus within and between groups. A longitudinal assessment 
of consensus can also reveal when strategy implementation benefits most from strategic 
consensus (Kilduff et al., 2000) and can provide further insight into the mechanisms of the 
consensus formation process (Markoczy, 2001). 
Because of these theoretical and managerial benefits of a multidimensional, multilevel, and 
longitudinal understanding of consensus, several scholars have called for a comprehensive 
assessment of consensus along the lines that we discuss here (e.g., Hodgkinson and Johnson, 
1994; Kellermanns et al., 2005; Markoczy, 2001; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989). However, no 
empirical research has sufficiently answered this call; we suspect that this lack largely exists 
because of a lack of methodological tools for this type of integrative approach to strategic 
consensus. This lack of an integrative method hinders the accumulation of findings across 
studies (Kellermanns et al., 2011; Resick et al., 2010) and the development of overarching 
theories (cf. Kellermanns et al., 2005; Mohammed et al., 2000; 2010).  
Thus, further theory development in strategic consensus could clearly benefit substantially 
from a comprehensive method such as SCM because SCM allows researchers to assess the 
multifaceted, multilevel, and longitudinal aspects of strategic consensus in a comprehensive 
manner. First, SCM scales individual understandings of strategy to group- and between-group 
levels. Second, SCM captures within-group similarities and differences in strategic 
understanding both by identifying where consensus exists and by indicating its content. 
Following this process, a multilevel mapping of the locus and scope of strategic consensus can 
be generated. Third, SCM achieves multilevel, multidimensional, and longitudinal integration 
using a complementary set of methods based on the same raw data, such that the output of 
one method serves as an input for another method. Therefore, the distinction between within- 
and between-group consensus is not confounded by differences in measurement. 
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By combining different dimensions and levels of consensus using coherent methods, SCM 
bridges the gap between individual cognition and collective behavior at group levels and 
between-group levels (Powell et al., 2011). Researchers can thereby gain the unique 
opportunity to explain which mechanisms form consensus, when this consensus occurs and 
why certain behaviors and outcomes arise at individual and collective levels (Powell et al., 
2011). Finally, this type of fine-grained analysis of strategic consensus within and between 
groups can also enable more focused and targeted strategic interventions that increase 
consensus and facilitate the strategic alignment of organizational units. In the following 
section, we compare SCM with current methods that are used not only in strategic consensus 
research but also in the broader area of managerial and organizational cognition. In contrast 
with SCM, the current methods enable the examination of only certain facets of consensus; 
such methods cannot provide the broader range of information that is required to build a 
more comprehensive theory of consensus. 
Strategic Cognition Research 
Both in research on strategic consensus and within the larger body of managerial and 
organizational cognition research in which consensus is rooted, scholars have developed a 
variety of techniques to study consensus and various types of cognitive structures at the 
individual, team, organizational, and industry levels of analysis. Most of these measures have 
been developed to apply to a certain theoretical frame or context, and they offer valuable 
insights in that respect. We reviewed the broader body of work on managerial and 
organizational cognition to assess the extent to which various methods can be applied to the 
strategic consensus realm for a comprehensive assessment of consensus. This review is 
important because it allowed us to build on and position our study within the larger 
managerial and organizational cognition domain. As we outline below, our overview supports 
our conclusion that prior studies do not offer a method that simultaneously captures the 
content and structure of consensus across multiple levels of analysis. 
We focused our selection on methods that are mentioned in review articles by 
Hodgkinson and Healey (2008a), Mohammed and colleagues (2000), and Walsh (1995). We 
also considered more recent articles that refer to these methods. We sought methods that 
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were able to capture multilevel, multidimensional and/or longitudinal analysis of cognition 
and selected a representative article for each method that examined some form of shared 
cognition at a particular collective level. We assessed each method’s potential to be developed 
into extensions to multiple levels and dimensions (i.e., we did not limit our review to the 
current uses of the methods but considered their potential for broader applications). In Table 
1, we present a summary of this assessment.  
 
 
This table indicates whether a method is multidimensional with respect to its ability to 
simultaneously capture the degree, content, locus, and scope of cognition. The table also 
shows whether a method allows for analysis at multiple levels to indicate its ability to link 
individual-level cognition with cognition at the group, between-group, and/or (inter-
Example
Elicitation Measurement Analysis
D
egree
C
ontent
Locus
Scope
Individual
G
roup
O
rganization
Industry
Team mental models
Edwards et al.  (2006) Pairwise similarity 
ratings 
Closeness (C) 
index
Pathfinder ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ
Mathieu et al.  (2000) Pairwise similarity 
ratings
QAP correlations Ucinet ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ
Blackburn and Cumming (1982) Pairwise similarity 
ratings
Mean similarity 
ratings
MDS ݱ ݱ ݱ
Walsh et al. (1988) Card sorting Average squared 
Euclidean distance
MDS ݱ ݱ† ݱ
Hodgkinson (1997; 2005) Repertory grid Euclidean 
distances
MDS ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ
Daniels et al. (1995; 2002) Card-sorting, 
repertory grid, rating 
of maps' similarity 
Mean/standard 
deviation of 
similarity ratings
Hierarchical cluster 
analysis, PCA
ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ
DeSarbo et al. (2009) Financial measures MDS ݱ† ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ
Causal maps
Carley (1997) Open-ended 
questions
Sum of overlapping 
concepts
Text-based causal 
mapping
ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ
Markoczy  (2001), Clarkson and 
Hodgkinson (2005)
Pairwise 
comparisons, causal 
maps
Average/standard 
deviation of 
pairwise distances
Interactive causal 
mapping
ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ
Bowman and Ambrosini (1997) Rating Standard deviation PCA ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ
Strategic Consensus Mapping Ranking/ rating α  (within group), 
r  (between group)
PCA, MDS, 
permutation testing
ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ† ݱ ݱ ݱ
Joint-space 
representation
Significance 
testing
Work unit similarities
Belief structures
Competitor cognition
Strategic groups
L
ongitudinal
Strategic consensus
† The method is compatible for such extensions in multiple levels and dimensions although it is not presented in the related study.
Methods Dimensions Analysis Level
Table 1: Comparison of methods in managerial and organizational cognition research. 
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)organizational levels. A method enables longitudinal analysis when it can detect changes in 
cognition over time, and significance testing when it allows statistically testing both 
longitudinal changes and cross-sectional differences in cognition. In addition to its ability to 
test cross-sectional and longitudinal differences, a method’s depth of visual representation is 
also assessed in the table. Finally, a method allows for joint space representation when it can 
visualize individual and collective cognition together with the content of cognition and offers 
a more thorough, content-based understanding of consensus among group members.  
Table 1 depicts the rich diversity in managerial and organizational cognition research in 
terms of the subject of cognition, including competitors (e.g., Daniels et al., 1995), strategic 
priorities (e.g., Bowman and Ambrosini, 1997), and team mental models (e.g., Mathieu et al., 
2000). A similar diversity is also observed in the unit of analysis chosen, which range from 
individuals, groups, or organizations to entire industries. For example, one stream of cognition 
research focuses on managerial perceptions of similarities and differences among competing 
firms in an industry to identify strategic groups (e.g., DeSarbo et al., 2009), whereas another 
research stream investigates individuals’ collective cognition of team-related factors and 
processes as an antecedent of team effectiveness (e.g., Edwards et al., 2006; Mathieu et al., 
2000). 
To capture different types of cognitive beliefs and structures, researchers have successfully 
employed a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods to elicit, measure, and compare the 
cognitive frames of managers, groups, and organizations. For example, principal component 
analysis (PCA) and hierarchical cluster analysis have been used to quantitatively analyze 
managers’ understanding of their competitive environments (e.g., Daniels et al., 1995; 2002), 
and multidimensional scaling (MDS) and similarity tree techniques have been employed to 
analyze managers’ and other stakeholders’ mental representations of competitors (e.g., 
Hodgkinson et al., 1991; Hodgkinson, 1997). Some of these studies collected data using 
elicitation techniques, such as repertory grids, card sorting tasks, and cognitive maps (e.g., 
Clarkson and Hodgkinson, 2005; Daniels et al., 2002; Hodgkinson et al., 2004). 
Despite the wide range of available techniques, Table 1 confirms our observation that an 
integrative approach, as required in the study of consensus (Kellermanns et al., 2005; 2011), 
has not yet been developed in the larger domain of cognition. The existing methods primarily 
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capture degree and content dimensions of consensus across a limited number of 
organizational levels. A detailed analysis of consensus via in-depth visualization, longitudinal 
investigation, and significance testing is seldom possible. Table 1indicates that causal mapping 
has advantages over other previous methods in that it captures multiple dimensions of 
consensus and allows for pairwise testing of cross-sectional and longitudinal differences in 
consensus. However, SCM moves beyond causal mapping by systematically analyzing 
consensus between groups and facilitating the in-depth visualization of consensus both within 
and between groups. 
To develop overarching theories of how individuals and groups combine their 
understanding and determine which antecedents and outcomes are associated with these 
processes, as Powell et al. (2011) argue, one must be able to link individual- and group-level 
cognition, make comparisons between groups, and reveal the overall alignment within an 
organization. In addition, although we recognize that certain methods are superior for 
particular purposes, the proliferation of methods has increased the difficulty of knowledge 
accumulation (Kellermanns et al., 2011; Resick et al., 2010). SCM addresses the much-needed 
consolidation of methods and can enable researchers in strategic consensus and in subfields of 
managerial and organizational cognition to build integrative theory with a systematic 
assessment of cognition, as we explain subsequently in the discussion section. 
Strategic Consensus Mapping 
SCM relies on data that quantify how individuals (i.e., members of work groups, teams, 
business units, organizations, or industries) assess strategic priorities – for instance, by rating 
or rank ordering (potential) strategic objectives as they may be presented in a survey (cf. the 
assessment of strategic consensus typically found in strategic management research; 
Kellermanns et al., 2011). SCM involves a set of methodological procedures that aim to 
capture the facets of strategic consensus that are discussed in the previous sections. These 
procedures are introduced here in the order in which they should be executed.  
First, the vector model for unfolding (VMU) is employed to measure the degree of within-
group strategic consensus and to visualize its content. Second, from the results of this VMU, 
two new measures are derived to operationalize the degree of within- and between-group 
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consensus. Third, these quantified measures of within- and between-group consensus are used 
to visualize the between-group consensus using MDS. Finally, the statistical significance of the 
observed differences in within- and/or between-group strategic consensus, both cross-
sectional and longitudinal, are assessed using permutation tests.  
Visualizing the degree and the content of within-group strategic consensus 
To simultaneously obtain a visual mapping of the content and a measure of the degree of 
strategic consensus, SCM employs a vector model for unfolding (Borg and Groenen, 2005). 
This approach is the same as the use of principal component analysis (PCA) with the 
transposed data matrix, which positions respondents in the columns (as variables) and strategy 
items (i.e., strategic goals) in the rows (as cases). This procedure provides a joint-space 
presentation that jointly plots the strategy items in relation to the preferences of respondents 
regarding these items for all members of a team. In multivariate analysis, the VMU is a widely 
used statistical dimension reduction technique that summarizes a data set using one or more 
uncorrelated underlying latent variables to account for a maximum amount of the variance 
among the respondents. Below, we explain the specifications of the VMU in greater detail and 
demonstrate some of its features using an example.  
Let H be the data matrix with m rows (strategy items) and n columns (respondents). H 
must be standardized such that all of the columns have a zero mean and a variance of 1. 
Consequently, the VMU in p dimensions is equivalent to minimizing the sum of the squared 
errors 
2E  for H and the low dimensional representation XA'; that is, 
¦  ij ijVMU eL 22'),( XAHAX , 
where X is an m×p matrix of the object scores for the m rows of the first p components and 
where A is an n×p matrix of component loadings. X is standardized to be orthogonal and has 
a column variance of 1, and the component loadings matrix A contains the correlations of the 
n respondents with p components X. That is, the VMU reduces the dimensionality of the data 
to p dimensions, the object scores in X contain the coordinates for each strategy item in these 
p dimensions, and the component loadings in A are the correlations between the object scores 
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for each strategy item and the original variables.  
The VMU facilitates the identification of a p-dimensional space that contains (i) a 
configuration of m objects that represent the strategy items (the content of the strategy, which 
is shown as object points on the map) and (ii) a p-dimensional configuration of n vectors that 
represents the respondents within the group such that the projections of all object points on 
each vector correspond to the individual preferences of each respondent regarding the 
strategy items in the data set. In two-dimensional space, the results of the VMU can be 
depicted using a biplot in which the rows of X (the object scores of the strategy items) are 
represented as points and the rows of A (the component loadings of the respondents) are 
represented as vectors (Gower and Hand, 1996). Figure 1 illustrates several visual features that 
are associated with the resulting biplot representation of the VMU solution. The raw data 
matrix for this example is presented in the Appendix. 
First, the cosine of the angle between two respondents is an approximation of their 
pairwise correlation (Linting et al., 2007; Rodgers and Nicewander, 1988). This interpretation 
is based on the eighth way of interpreting correlations proposed by Rodgers and Nicewander 
(1988). The authors argue that this approach is the easiest method of interpreting the 
magnitude of correlations and add that ‘[t]his inside-out space that allows [a correlation] to be 
represented as the cosine of an angle is relatively neglected as an interpretational tool’ 
(Rodgers and Nicewander, 1988: 63). Respondents with small angles between their vectors 
have a similar opinion of the strategy items in question. For example in Figure 1, the goal 
prioritization of respondent ‘TMT1’ is similar to that of ‘TMT4’ but different from that of 
‘TMT8’. This feature can also be useful in operationalizing dyadic strategic consensus (e.g., 
dyadic goal importance congruence in Colbert et al., 2008).  
Second, the spread of all of the vectors in the biplot demonstrates the degree of within-
group strategic consensus. There is a high degree of within-group strategic consensus if the 
vectors are grouped as a narrow bundle. By contrast, a wide distribution of vectors of the 
respondents in opposing directions indicates a low degree of within-group consensus. 
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Figure 1: Example of a VMU biplot 
Third, the VMU (a PCA of the transposed data matrix) biplot both provides a comparison 
of individuals and indicates their goals. Furthermore, the orthogonal projection of a strategy 
item onto a respondent’s vector indicates the respondent’s ranking for that particular strategy 
item. If the item is projected onto the vector farthest, then the respondent highly prioritizes 
these items, whereas strategic items that are projected in the opposite direction are not 
prioritized by the respondent. We illustrate the projections of the strategy items onto the 
vector that represents respondent ‘TMT7’ using dashed lines in Figure 1. The figure shows 
that respondent ‘TMT7’ assesses ‘Expert Staff’ as the most important, as this goal has the 
farthest projection onto the vector that represents respondent ‘TMT7’. ‘Expert Staff’ is 
followed by ‘Certification’ and ‘Reliable Network’. Because ‘Innovativeness’ embodies the 
farthest projection in the opposite direction, it can be inferred that ‘TMT7’ valued that 
strategy item the least. Therefore, within-group strategic consensus is visualized in a manner 
that captures the ‘content’ and ‘locus’ (within-group) facets of the multi-faceted definition of 
consensus proposed by Markoczy (2001).  
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Fourth, the VMU enables quantification of the opinions of groups, which can facilitate the 
comparison of strategic consensus across groups. The dimensions in the regular VMU are 
chosen to maximize the reconstructed variance, which is orthogonal to higher dimensions. 
However, the total variance that is explained by the two dimensions does not change with the 
rotation of these two dimensions, such that this freedom of rotation can be used to ensure 
that the average (vector) of component loadings coincides with the first dimension. As a 
result, the first dimension can be interpreted as the prototypical group member who best represents 
the overall group opinion. Therefore, the projections of strategy items onto the first axis 
represent the overall view of the group based on this prototypical group member. In Figure 1, 
when we make projections of the strategic goals onto the first dimension to attain the overall 
view of the group, we observe that the prototypical group member prioritizes ‘Expert Staff’ 
the highest, followed by ‘Certified Work Process’ and ‘Reliable Networks’, whereas 
‘Innovativeness’ has the lowest priority. In addition, the number of people who are close to 
the prototypical group member represents the scope of within-group consensus. 
Finally, the length of a vector indicates how well a respondent is represented, such that a 
length of 1 indicates perfect fit (Gower and Hand, 1996). To interpret the projections onto 
short vectors (indicating that low variance is accounted for) would be unwise (Linting et al., 
2007). Accounting for low variance must be interpreted as an indication of diverse opinions in 
a group and thus as indicating low consensus. The first two dimensions of the VMU solution 
are generally adequate to explain a large portion of the variance if the number of variables and 
respondents is not overly high. In the example in Figure 1, all of the respondents fit well into 
two dimensions because nearly all of the respondents have vectors with a length that is close 
to one. Indeed, 79.5 percent of the variance in this example is explained by the first two 
dimensions.  
Quantifying the degree of within-group strategic consensus 
In this section, we present a new measure for assessing the degree of strategic consensus 
within groups. This measure uses the VMU component loadings of the group members, 
therefore complementing our visualization of the content and degree of consensus. A new α 
measure of the degree of within-group strategic consensus is defined by the following: 
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where αjs is the sth component loading for respondent j (j = 1, …, n). This α measure considers 
the first two principal components in accordance with the visualization in the previous 
subsection. The measure can be geometrically interpreted as the length of the average 
component loading vectors of the first and the second dimensions. 
α takes values between 0 and 1. If all of the members of the group have very similar views 
regarding the strategy items and their vectors thus are close to each other in a narrow bundle, 
then the α measure will be close to 1. However, if there is a wide spread of vectors, such as a 
set of rays evenly distributed on a circle, then the average component loadings will be close to 
zero, and the α measure will be very low. In Figure 1, the α value is 0.55, indicating a moderate 
degree of within-group strategic consensus. 
Quantifying the degree of between-group strategic consensus 
When a firm wishes to strategically align people in the organization, developing a consensus 
regarding the strategic priorities within each group is important, but ensuring a shared 
understanding of strategy across groups is also essential. Kellermanns et al. (2005) suggest the 
use of a correlation-based approach to measure consensus across groups, especially when 
managers from several levels are part of a study. Therefore, we propose a correlational 
measure of the degree of between-group consensus that is derived from the within-group 
VMU object scores of the strategy items. Because the first principal axis can be interpreted as 
the prototypical member of the group who represents the aggregate measure of the entire 
group’s overall opinion, the correlation between the prototypical members of two groups 
captures the between-group consensus for these two groups.  
The measure that we propose, r(A, B), is operationalized as the correlation of the object 
scores of the strategy items on the first principal component for two groups (A and B). 
Clearly, an r(A, B) of 1 indicates the perfect overlap of the two groups regarding the strategy 
items; r(A, B) ≈ 0 represents no strategic consensus between the two groups; and r(A, B) ≈ -1 
reveals two opposite notions of the strategy in the two groups.  
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This measure can also be used to measure the overall strategic alignment in an 
organization when all groups in the organization have been surveyed using an aggregated 
index of the degree of between-group strategic consensus for all possible pairs of groups 
within the organization. This roverall value can be operationalized as the normalized sum of the 
squared r-measures for all pairs such that the index ranges between 0 and 1. Therefore, roverall 
indicates the overall degree of strategic consensus between all groups in a given organization. 
The roverall index can also be used to compare the strategic alignment between different 
organizations. 
Visualizing the degree and locus of between-group strategic consensus 
In addition to our within-group consensus visualization that captures the content and the 
locus of within-group consensus, we propose a visualization technique for between-group 
strategic consensus. The between-group visualization is a map that represents all of the groups 
in the organization in a two-dimensional space according to their respective levels of between-
group consensus. The visualization demonstrates which groups are located close together and 
share a strategic understanding, thus enabling us to determine the locus of consensus across 
the groups. 
To obtain a mapping for between-group consensus,  classical multidimensional scaling 
(MDS) is used, which has been proposed as a means of analyzing people’s judgments 
regarding the similarity of the members of a set of objects (Torgerson, 1952). This technique 
has also been used to visualize intra- and intergroup similarities and differences in cognitive 
representations (see, e.g., Hodgkinson, 1997; 2005, for applications of three-way MDS; and 
Markoczy and Goldberg, 1995, for two-way MDS applications)2. The main objective of MDS 
                                                          
2 MDS and related approaches have enjoyed considerable use in the analysis and comparison of intra- and intergroup 
cognitive representations. One potentially fruitful three-way approach, known as Procrustean Individual Differences 
Scaling (PINDIS), enables researchers to examine the extent and locus of consensus (and difference) among 
individuals and groups in terms of the relative weighting of particular dimensions and/or stimuli. In strategic 
management, Hodgkinson (2005) uses PINDIS to investigate the extent and locus of strategic consensus regarding 
actors’ mental models of competition in a study of residential real estate agents’ perspectives on competitor 
definitions. Like SCM, Hodgkinson’s (2005) complementary use of PINDIS based on the same raw data does not 
confound measures by differences in measurement. Although Hodgkinson’s one-mode (stimuli × stimuli), three-
way (stimuli × dimensions × participants) Procrustean approach assists in the comparison of k multiple two- or 
higher-dimensional configurations that can be obtained through multiple MDS solutions (one per team), we prefer 
the two-way (stimuli × participants) approach that is presented in this article because it enables more 
straightforward comparisons without the need to first collapse one of the modes to derive a separate MDS 
configuration for each team. In adopting the latter approach, we would lose the ability to present both the strategic 
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is to represent given measures of dissimilarity for all pairs of objects as distances between pairs 
of points in a low-dimensional space, such that the distances correspond as closely as possible 
to the proximities.  
As a measure of the dissimilarities between two groups, one minus the correlations 
between two groups’ object scores is used for the strategy items (i.e., the r measures for all 
possible pairs of groups; see Borg and Groenen, 2005). Geometrically, this measure of 
dissimilarity is appealing because it is equal to the squared Euclidean distances between the 
end points of the vectors of the prototypical managers. Alternatively, other dissimilarity 
measures, such as Euclidean distances, city-block and Minkowski measures, can be employed. 
MDS finds an optimal representation of the between-group r measures using distance in two-
dimensional space.3 Each group is represented as a point, and the distances between the 
points represent the between-group consensus. Groups that more similarly value the strategy 
items are thus grouped closer together on the MDS map, whereas groups with opposing views 
are placed further from one another. 
To provide a broader perspective on strategic consensus across organizational groups, we 
added some features to the between-group consensus maps. First, each group is not 
represented by a single point in the two-dimensional space, as in any MDS plot, but by a 
bubble whose size represents the current degree of within-group consensus (that is, the α 
measure) and by an outer circle surrounding the bubble, which indicates the potential 
maximum size of the bubble (and, thus, the size when there is perfect consensus within the 
group, α = 1). Second, in our representations, we preferred to position the TMT at the center 
of the MDS plots. Note that depending on the focal research question, other groups or 
stakeholders (e.g., trade unions, consumers, shareholders, and external regulators) may be 
chosen as the reference group. Third, to make the mappings more comparable and insightful 
                                                                                                                                                  
goals and the team members within a single plot (i.e., a joint-space representation). Furthermore, in separating the 
representation of strategic goals from the representation of team members, as is the case in three-way scaling 
procedures, we would also lose the representation of the prototypical team member for each team, which in turn 
forms the basis of the MDS analysis that is used to compare the various teams.  
3 For dissimilarities that are Euclidean embeddable, such as 1 – r, in classical MDS, the produced distances between 
points always underestimate the dissimilarity. Consequently, the resulting MDS plot is conservative and produces a 
lower bound for the dissimilarity or an upper bound for the correlation between two groups. Other forms of MDS 
exist (such as least-squares MDS, which minimises stress) that provide a two-sided approximation of the 
dissimilarities. However, when the number of groups is not high, the solutions tend not to differ substantially. If the 
number of groups is high (e.g., in an industry-wide application), then we suggest first performing a classical MDS 
and then using it as the initial configuration for a least-squares MDS (for instance, using the SMACOF algorithm in 
SPSS Proxscal, see Borg and Groenen, 2005). 
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with respect to the distances between the groups, we added ten circles that correspond to 
correlations with the TMT ranging from 0.9 to 0. 
Assessing the statistical significance of differences in strategic consensus 
To test changes in strategic consensus over time (e.g., before and after a strategic intervention) 
or differences in strategic consensus between groups, one must determine the statistical 
significance of the difference in the degree of consensus. To conduct significance tests of such 
differences, the respective Ddiff or rdiff values must be defined. For instance, if we are interested 
in determining whether there has been a significant change in the within-group consensus of a 
group over time, then the null hypothesis is Ddiff = 0, where Ddiff =Dpost – Dpre. Similarly, if we 
are interested in determining whether group A exhibits greater within-group consensus than 
group B, then the null hypothesis becomes Ddiff ≤ 0, where Ddiff = DA – DB, and the alternative 
hypothesis is that Ddiff > 0.  
To our knowledge, the only study that proposes a method for comparing consensus across 
groups is that of Pasisz and Hurtz (2009), who suggest that a series of F tests be used to 
compare within-group agreement across two or more groups. However, their procedure is 
parametric and thus may be sensitive to deviations from normal distribution (Markowski and 
Markowski, 1990). Our methods are not constrained by such assumptions, because the VMU 
method is a non-parametric technique without a statistical error model. As the within- and 
between-group consensus measures are functions of the VMU results, they do not entail any 
distributional assumptions. This statement also applies to the distributions of Ddiff or rdiff, for 
which no standard statistical theory is available. Therefore, the use of the permutation test as a 
nonparametric method of hypothesis testing is more appropriate given our method.4 
The permutation test yields the distribution of any test statistic for two groups under the 
null hypothesis that there is no difference between the two groups by rearranging the labels of 
                                                          
4 Hodgkinson (1998) warns against another problem associated with significance tests of MDS-related outputs and 
distances derived from proximities: the observations may be conditionally dependent. However, given that the D 
and r statistics are derived from pairs of VMU solutions rather than from MDS in our analyses, conditional 
dependency is not an issue. Nevertheless, our use of permutation tests is consistent with the work of Jones (1983), 
who recommends the use of non-parametric tests to mitigate conditional dependency problems. We would like to 
thank one of the reviewers for clarifying this issue. 
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the observed data (Good, 2000). The permutation test compares the Ddiff and rdiff values of the 
true groups with the Ddiff and rdiff values that are obtained from a large number of data sets 
(e.g., N = 1000) in which the grouping information is destroyed and individuals are randomly 
assigned to one of the groups (Hesterberg et al., 2005). To ensure that the group size remains 
constant, the array indicating the group number of the individuals is randomly permuted, and 
new random group memberships are assigned for each permutation data set. To determine the 
significance, the p-value of the observed Ddiff and rdiff are determined by their percentiles with 
respect to the permutation distribution. If the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected, then 
the observed Ddiff or rdiff is significant at the level of the p-value. 
Application of Strategic Consensus Mapping in a Field Study 
To illustrate SCM, we collected data from a large Western European firm in the service 
industry. The company was composed of a top management team (TMT) and nine functional 
departments, each of which had several sub-departments. The head of each department 
directed a management team composed of four to ten managers, who, in turn, each supervised 
at least one sub-department. The TMT of the company included the managing director and 
the heads of the nine functional departments. To assess the strategic alignment of the 
organizational units, we focused on the management teams of these nine departments and the 
TMT. In the subsequent departmental analyses, TMT members were also included in their 
respective departments.  
Rather than employing generic strategic goal statements, the TMT provided us with 
strategic goals specific to this company. These goal statements indicate strategic ends (where 
the company wished to go) and strategic means (how it planned to get there), employing a 
distinction that is commonly used in strategic consensus research (Kellermanns et al., 2005; 
2011). We presented these strategic goals to 72 top and middle managers in the organization 
with the following instructions: ‘Please rank the following strategic goals of your company 
from most important to least important in order of their importance to you’. Given that the 
strategic priorities in the current paper were provided by the TMT and subsequently simply 
ranked by the respondents, the researcher intervention in the elicitation was limited, and the 
task performed by the respondents was relatively simple. We received 64 responses; a 
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response rate of 89 percent. Males constituted 63 percent of our respondents, and 56 percent 
had master’s degrees (the remainder had bachelor’s degrees or comparable college degrees). 
The average work experience of the respondents was 18.6 years, and their average time in 
their current positions was 3.37 years.  
We observed higher variance in the consensus regarding strategic means, which thus 
became our focus. To preserve the confidentiality of the respondents, some of the company-
specific department names were relabeled, and the names of the respondents were 
anonymized. Furthermore, we used only shortened versions of the seven strategic means of 
the company: ‘Innovativeness’, ‘Regulation Framework’, ‘Reliable Network’, ‘Safety’, ‘Expert 
Staff’, ‘Organization Structure’, and ‘Certification’. 
Here, we present the results in a different order than in the methodology section. The 
firm-wide results are presented first, followed by the results for the different levels of the 
organization (the team and individual levels). We suggest that this approach to presenting the 
results provides a better understanding of the organization and enables more efficient 
interpretations of consensus and firm-level alignment, although the order in which the results 
are produced is as described in the previous section. 
Locus and degree of between-group strategic consensus 
Figure 2 shows the MDS plot that visualizes the strategic alignment of all of the organizational 
units in the organization. The distances between the bubbles represent the degree of 
consensus between the organizational units: a smaller distance implies greater consensus 
between the groups. The TMT is placed at the center of the plot to make it easier to identify 
the locus of the consensus. Figure 2 shows that the Sales, Strategy, and IT Departments had a 
high level of shared understanding with the TMT with regard to the strategic means, as all of 
these departments are positioned close to the TMT, whereas the views of the Operations and 
Business Development Departments were much less aligned with those of the TMT as they 
are located farther away. The degree of between-group consensus also showed these 
relationships: for instance, r(TMT, Sales) = 0.86 and r(TMT, Operations) = 0.41. 
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The bubbles in Figure 2 represent the degree of within-group consensus of each 
department, and the circles around the bubbles indicate the potential size of a bubble when 
there is full consensus within the group regarding the importance of all of the strategic means 
within the group (α = 1). The Sales, Communication, and IT Departments have relatively 
larger bubbles (the α measures are 0.81, 0.79, and 0.73, respectively), whereas the Operations, 
TMT, and Finance Departments have smaller bubbles (the α measures are 0.53, 0.54, and 0.56, 
respectively). 
The degree of within-group consensus must be interpreted together with the distance of 
the departments to the center. Together, these two measures indicate the locus of consensus 
in the organization. If the organizational units that have high degrees of within-group 
consensus are clustered farther from the TMT, then the locus of the consensus in the 
organization is not the TMT. Similarly, the number of groups that are close to this locus 
Figure 2: MDS solution depicting the locus and degree of between-group consensus 
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indicates the scope of the consensus within the organization. InFigure 2, it is interesting to 
note that the TMT has a relatively low degree of within-group consensus and that some of the 
departments with high degrees of within-group consensus are clustered away from the TMT, 
which indicates that the locus of consensus was not the TMT’s view of the strategic means. 
Each department had a unique view of the optimal means of reaching organizational goals, 
and these views differed from the TMT’s perceptions, especially for teams such as Business 
Development and Operations. 
Content and degree of within-group strategic consensus 
To investigate the disparate views that have generated the shifted locus, we had to examine 
each management team more closely. The VMU step in our methods provided the biplots for 
each team that enabled us to observe the views of each team member regarding the strategic 
means. The biplot of the TMT is provided in Figure 1 as an example. Figure 3 illustrates the 
biplots of two teams, one closer to and one farther from the TMT: Sales and Operations, 
respectively5. 
 
                                                          
5 We investigated the stability of the results of the VMU (i.e., we determined whether slight changes in the data would 
lead to drastically different representations) using the bootstrap method (Efron and Tibshirani, 1997) for resampling. 
The results did not reveal any violations of the stability criteria. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for 
highlighting this point. 
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Figure 3: VMU biplots representing the degree and content of strategic consensus 
within the Sales (top) and Operations (bottom) departments 
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When we examined the individual sales and operations managers in Figure 3, we observed 
that the respondent vectors for the Sales Department are grouped as a narrower bundle than 
those for the Operations department; this result showed that the degree of within-group 
consensus in Sales (α = 0.81) is greater than that of Operations (α = 0.53). Consequently, we 
concluded that the members of the Sales Department held more similar views regarding the 
relative importance of the strategic means than did the members of the Operations 
Department. 
In Figure 3, the large spread of the vectors in the Operations Department resulted from 
differences in the individual preferences of the department members. For instance, person 
‘Op4’ prioritized ‘Regulation’, ‘Reliable Network’ and ‘Innovativeness’ as the most important 
strategic means, whereas person ‘Op3’ considered these three strategic means to be the least 
important and rather considered ‘Safety’, ‘Organization Structure’ and ‘Certification’ to be the 
most important. However, some team members had similar views, such as ‘Op3’ and TMT5’ 
because the angle between their vectors is small. Finally, the vectors of respondents ‘TMT5’ 
and ‘Op5’ are slightly shorter than the remainder, all of which have a length of approximately 
1. This observation indicated that their preferences are less adequately represented in the 
biplot compared with the preferences of the others. Indeed, two dimensions accounted for 66 
percent of the variance, which indicated that the preferences of some members are not 
perfectly represented in these dimensions. In Figure 3, the members of the Sales Department 
exhibited greater shared understanding regarding strategic means, and all are represented 
adequately in the biplot, with lengths that are close to 1; 90 percent of the variance was 
accounted for by the biplot. 
Assessing the statistical significance of differences in between-group strategic 
consensus 
Both the biplot and the α measures indicated that Sales had a greater degree of within-group 
strategic consensus than Operations. However, we did not know whether this difference is 
statistically significant. We employed permutation testing to determine the statistical 
significance of the difference with the null hypothesis that there was no difference in the 
degree of within-group strategic consensus across the Sales and Operations Departments; that 
is, H0 equals αdiff = 0. After 9,999 permutations, the observed difference of αdiff = 0.83 - 0.53 = 
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0.28 was at the 98th percentile, implying that p = 0.02. Therefore, the null hypothesis that there 
was no difference between the Sales and Operations Departments with regard to their within-
group strategic consensus could be rejected at the five percent level.  
Additional evidence of the validity of our α measure was obtained when we compared our 
results with those obtained using other common consensus measures, such as standard 
deviations, squared Euclidean distances, and correlations (see Kellermanns et al., 2011 for 
details). Table 2 shows that the results remain qualitatively the same. 
Table 2: Permutation tests for comparison of within-group consensus between Sales 
and Operations departments 
Measures Sales Operations Difference p-value 
α 0.81 0.53 0.29 0.020 
Standard deviations -1.22 -1.81 0.59 0.009 
Squared Euclidean distance -23.60 -47.07 23.47 0.024 
Correlations 0.586 0.16 0.42 0.024 
A permutation test can also be used to test whether two groups have different levels of 
correlation with the TMT: for example, rdiff = r(TMT, Sales) – r(TMT, Operations). The 
results showed that this difference was significant at the 10 percent level (p = 0.08) but not at 
the five percent level. We concluded that there was some (albeit not strong) evidence that the 
Sales Department was indeed more aligned with the TMT than was the Operations 
Department. Figure 2 also suggests that Sales is more aligned with the TMT than is 
Operations.  
Assessing the effectiveness of the strategic intervention 
The above findings were presented to the TMT of the company, and we found that the visual 
features of our method increased the comprehensibility of our results for the managers. These 
managers were especially surprised by the low within-group consensus of their own team, the 
TMT, concerning the strategic means. Consequently, the TMT decided to organize a semi-
structured half-day strategic intervention facilitated by a professional consultant and an 
academic. The intervention was intended to enhance the team members’ shared understanding 
of the strategic means of the firm. 
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After this strategic intervention, we re-evaluated the prioritizations of TMT members to 
measure the effectiveness of the strategic intervention and illustrated this particular application 
of SCM. The results showed that the degree of within-group consensus of the TMT increased 
after the intervention (Dpost = 0.81; Dpre = 0.55). Consequently, we tested the null hypothesis 
that there was no difference between the pretest and the posttest with regard to the degree of 
consensus against the alternative that the consensus increased. The results showed that the 
degree of consensus increased significantly at the five percent level (p = 0.04). 
The content of the consensus is shown in Figure 4, which can be compared to the biplot 
in Figure 1. There was greater consensus regarding the high value of ‘Reliable Network’ and 
‘Expert Staff’, and the TMT members agreed on the lower importance of ‘Innovativeness’. By 
clarifying these results, SCM indicated that the strategic intervention was effective in 
increasing the degree of consensus within the TMT regarding the desired content.  
Clearly, more rigorous research designs than that presented here (which is used for 
illustrative purposes only) are required to comprehensively assess the effectiveness of strategic 
interventions. For instance, a more appropriate design would be a two-group pretest-posttest 
design that compares the effects of an intervention in contrast with the outcome in a control 
group (e.g., Cook and Campbell, 1979). 
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Figure 4: VMU biplot of TMT after the strategic intervention 
Discussion 
In the preceding sections, we proposed a set of complementary techniques that can be 
referred to as Strategic Consensus Mapping. Our aim of SCM was to quantify the degree of 
consensus both within groups and between groups and to visually represent the content of the 
consensus within groups. The method also made it possible to test whether longitudinal or 
cross-sectional differences in the degree of within- and between-group consensus were 
significant. The use of SCM was illustrated in a field study that also included a strategic 
intervention to respond to the call to advance the methodological tools that are used to test 
the effectiveness of strategic interventions (Hodgkinson et al., 2006; Hodgkinson and Healey, 
2008b). 
Each step in the SCM process was complementary in that the output of one procedure 
became an input for the subsequent procedure. First, the vector model for unfolding (VMU) 
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generated a within-group visualization of the degree and content of the consensus, quantified 
the degree of within-group consensus, and identified the prototypical group member. This 
information became an input for the between-group consensus measure. The between-group 
measure then served as an input for the multidimensional scaling procedure, which visualized 
the degree and locus of the between-group consensus. The final step, the permutation testing, 
utilized the difference between the within- and between-group measures to assess the 
significance of differences in strategic consensus. 
The core contribution of SCM is the enhanced potential that it provides for researchers in 
strategic management to conduct more fine-grained and extended analyses of strategic 
consensus within and between groups. In this manner, the method complements earlier 
conceptual arguments regarding the multifaceted nature of strategic consensus (e.g., 
Hodgkinson and Johnson, 1994; Kellermanns et al., 2005; Markoczy, 2001; Wooldridge and 
Floyd, 1989) by providing the methodological tools that are needed for empirical studies in 
this area. With the tools in place to operationalize the different facets of strategic consensus, 
future research can explore the antecedents of consensus formation, the link between 
different dimensions of within-group consensus and group performance, and the effect of 
between-group alignment on organizational performance. In addition, future research can 
derive visualizations of consensus and statistical tests of differences in consensus in an 
integrative approach that relies on the same raw input and thus does not confound aspects of 
consensus with the specifics of their measurement. In sum, SCM contributes to the 
development of our understanding of the role of strategic consensus in the strategy process. 
Clearly, SCM was developed for the study of strategic consensus. However, the method 
may be applied to the study of shared cognition, which has also called for an integrative 
approach (Hodgkinson, 1997; 2002; Kaplan, 2011; Mohammed et al., 2000; Walsh, 1995). 
Walsh (1995: 308), for instance, argues that ‘the fundamental empirical task facing 
management (cognition) researchers is to identify the content and structure of a knowledge 
structure at both the individual and supra-individual levels of analysis.’ Highlighting the need 
for unified approaches (Hodgkinson, 2002; Kaplan, 2011; Walsh, 1995), Hodgkinson (1997) 
extends Walsh’s argument regarding the need for multidimensional and multilevel analysis to 
include longitudinal comparisons of individual and group cognition. He (1997: 930) notes that 
‘…one of the most challenging and complex set of issues facing researchers concerned with 
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the investigation of cognitive aspects of strategic management is related to the problem of 
how actors’ mental models should be compared with one another, a problem which intensifies 
with increased numbers of research participants and levels of analysis. In the case of 
longitudinal studies, concerned with the cognitive assessment of multiple actors, the time 
dimension gives rise to even greater complexity.’  
Similarly, research on intergroup relationships in organizations (van Knippenberg, 2003) 
may benefit from the use of SCM to visually represent shared understanding across 
interdependent organizational groups in areas other than strategic priorities. Likewise, in an 
inter-organizational context, SCM may assist researchers in identifying and visualizing strategic 
groups, and the within-group consensus measure may provide a proxy for the degree of 
strategic-group identity, which refers to the mutual understanding among the members of an 
intra-industry group regarding the central, enduring, and distinctive characteristics of the 
group (Peteraf and Shanley, 1997). SCM’s contribution to these streams of cognition research 
lies in its ability to equip scholars to assess cognition simultaneously at different levels of 
analysis by decomposing different dimensions of cognition and testing longitudinal and cross-
sectional differences in cognition. 
On a different note, ordinal data must be treated with care when SCM is used. In such 
cases, ‘ordinary’ VMU should be replaced by categorical principal component analysis 
(CatPCA) in the transposed data matrix. The two techniques provide similar outputs, and the 
overall differences between CatPCA and PCA are negligible, but CatPCA is the more 
appropriate technique for use with ordinal data (Linting et al., 2007). In addition, the two 
fundamental tools that are used in SCM, the VMU and MDS are based on the idea of 
representing multivariate data in lower dimensions. By their nature, these procedures involve 
searching for low-dimensional representations that show the most important information 
rather than providing all information. The advantage of such an approach is that noise and 
unimportant relationships tend to be removed from the representation. However, these 
processes may not provide important information that is visible only in higher dimensions. 
This issue may be particularly relevant to VMU solutions that are obtained for many strategy 
items or groups with many members. A large number of strategy items is unlikely in strategic 
consensus research, but a large number of group members may occur when large 
organizations with many organizational units are studied. In these cases, the two-dimensional 
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MDS solution that indicates the similarity between the groups becomes more of a 
compromise as the number of groups grows. However, poorly fitting groups can be easily 
detected based on the MDS diagnostics. The between-group measures and their significance 
can provide valuable support for an MDS map in these cases. Other options would be to 
apply more conventional MDS techniques to explore higher dimensional models; to derive 
separate subgroup models; or to rely on other established techniques, such as similarity tree 
analysis and hierarchical clustering (cf. Hodgkinson, 2005). 
Managerial implications 
This study has important implications for both practitioners considering the use of strategy 
workshops and those investigating consensus within their companies and/or groups. 
Companies invest significant resources in strategic interventions, but the effectiveness of these 
interventions is seldom, if ever, assessed (Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008b). SCM can be used 
to evaluate whether a particular strategic intervention has been effective. In addition to 
indicating the effectiveness of strategic interventions, the results of SCM can serve as a 
diagnostic tool that indicates where and on which issues a lack of strategic consensus exists. 
Thus, SCM can provide the starting point for an intervention that is intended to increase 
consensus.  
In the analysis of strategic consensus within organizations, between-group visualization 
provides an intuitive, clear means of determining the strategic alignment of teams, which then 
enables firms to take action accordingly, similar to the manner in which within-group 
visualizations can assist firms in identifying the strategic content on which the members of a 
group agree or disagree. This information can then be used to better inform employees of 
strategies via newsletters or workshops. The ability to identify these issues enables 
organizations to generate policies that increase strategic consensus in a more targeted, cost-
effective, and productive manner. 
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Conclusion 
Strategic consensus has become a prominent concept in strategy process and strategy 
implementation research. The strategic consensus mapping (SCM) technique proposed here is 
closely aligned with the conceptual analysis of strategic consensus and will assist researchers in 
breaking new ground through more fine-grained and extended analyses of the multifaceted 
and multilevel nature of strategic consensus. Thus, the current work extends a clear invitation 
to researchers in strategic management to adopt this new approach in the study of strategic 
consensus. 
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Appendix 
Table A 1: Data matrix underpinning the VMU biplot reported in Figure 1. Higher 
numbers indicate higher prioritization 
 Respondent 
Strategic Priority TMT1 TMT2 TMT3 TMT4 TMT5 TMT6 TMT7 TMT8 TMT9 
Safety 1 2 3 2 5 6 4 7 5 
Certification 4 1 4 3 6 5 5 2 7 
Expert staff 7 6 7 7 7 4 7 3 6 
Regulation 6 7 5 6 1 2 3 1 2 
Reliable network 5 3 6 5 3 7 6 6 3 
Organization structure 3 5 2 4 4 3 1 4 4 
Innovativeness 2 4 1 1 2 1 2 5 1 
 
Table A 2: Distance matrix between departments used for MDS solution in Figure 2 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. TMT 1.00          
2. Strategy 0.72 1.00         
3. HR 0.71 0.78 1.00        
4. Sales 0.86 0.96 0.81 1.00       
5. Operations 0.41 0.74 0.84 0.62 1.00      
6. Finance 0.74 0.82 0.88 0.80 0.82 1.00     
7. IT 0.79 0.91 0.95 0.94 0.76 0.85 1.00    
8.Business Development -0.03 0.33 0.58 0.27 0.60 0.30 0.46 1.00   
9. Communication 0.77 0.88 0.95 0.87 0.87 0.96 0.94 0.40 1.00  
10. Safety 0.86 0.71 0.87 0.78 0.72 0.90 0.81 0.31 0.91 1.00 
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HOW IS STRATEGIC CONSENSUS FORMED? 
THE ROLE OF POWER DISPARITY AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SAFETY 
 
Introduction 
rganizations more and more rely on teams to achieve organizational goals (Cohen 
and Bailey, 1997; Greer et al., 2011; Mathieu et al., 2008). Several areas of research 
emphasize creation of shared understanding over team and organizational goals, 
tasks, and processes (see Mathieu et al., 2008 for a review). For example, at lower levels of an 
organization, shared mental models, “an organized understanding or mental representation of 
knowledge that is shared by team members” (Mathieu et al., 2008: 38), are shown to be related 
to team effectiveness (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). Meanwhile at the higher echelons, 
strategic consensus, the shared understanding of organizational goals (Kellermanns et al., 
2005), is found to be associated with the strategic actions, interpretation of the strategic issues, 
and organizational performance (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Iaquinto and Fredrickson, 1997; 
Kellermanns et al., 2011; Thomas et al., 1993). The underlying reasoning at both levels are very 
similar: when team members share similar views of goals and/or task relevant processes and 
outcomes (i.e. technology, task, importance of strategic priorities), they are more likely to 
understand one another’s perspectives, to communicate more easily, to integrate distributed 
knowledge, and to coordinate more effectively which, in turn, will improve team and 
organizational performance (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Cronin and Weingart, 2007; 
Kellermanns et al., 2005). 
O 
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Depending on the content and context of the shared understanding, scholars have used 
various similar terms to coin shared understanding such as team mental model (Mohammed et 
al., 2000), collective cognitive map (Axelrod, 1976), dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 
1986), goal congruence (Colbert et al., 2008), collective cognition (Mathieu et al., 2008), and 
strategic consensus (Kellermanns et al., 2005). Here we focus on a particular form of shared 
understanding: strategic consensus. Kellermanns et al., (2005: 721) defines strategic consensus 
as “the shared understanding of strategic priorities among managers at the top, middle, and/or 
operating levels of the organization”. Strategic consensus has been particularly highlighted in 
the organizational context in terms of its positive relation with team and organizational 
performance as well as the strategy implementation (see Kellermanns et al., 2005 for a review; 
and Kellermanns et al., 2011 for a recent meta-analysis). Similarly, Cronin and Weingart (2007) 
argue that unless teammates have similar prioritization of goals, they will work toward 
different directions which results in poor information processing, coordination failures, 
conflict, and thus poor team performance. 
Associating the degree of shared understanding to organizational and team outcomes has 
been the main premise in the research. Yet, little emphasis has been placed on the processes 
leading to its formation. Earlier research examining formation of consensus, however, 
predominantly focused on which mechanisms and decision schemes result in sharedness. To 
illustrate, Priem, Harrison and Muir (1995), Sandberg and Ragan (1986), and Schwenk and 
Cosier (1993) compared different mechanisms such as consensus seeking, dialectic inquiry and 
devil’s advocacy in terms of their effectiveness to build consensus. As an exception, Knight et 
al. (1999) look at the relationship between the group diversity and consensus within Top 
Management Teams (TMT). Similarly, social decision schemes in small groups research 
analyzes which decision schemes can represent the team shared understanding the best (see 
Laughlin, 2011; Tindale et al., 2003 for reviews) rather than uncovering the processes leading 
to consensus.  
We present a model of consensus formation in the lower and middle levels organizational 
teams incorporating the within-group power differences, psychological safety and the interplay 
between them. Our main premise is that degree of consensus is not an exogenous 
characteristic of teams, instead team members form consensus through their interactions. And 
their interactions are affected by existing power differences and interpersonal risk taking 
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within the team. Do teams with evenly distributed power (i.e., low power disparity) 
accumulate higher shared understanding than the teams having power concentrated in one 
member (i.e., high power disparity)? How does group members’ psychological safety interact 
with power differences and lead to consensus? To answer these questions, we integrate the 
research in social psychology, group processes and shared mental models. With the help of 
data collected from 143 teams in two organizations that operate in distinct industries, we 
found that groups where there was low power disparity at the same time group members felt 
safe to disagree with groups’ decisions had higher degree of strategic consensus.  
The contribution of this study is three fold. First, we show that as a result of the interplay 
between psychological safety and power disparity “different” consensuses with the same 
degree may emerge which are likely to lead to discrepant outcomes. That is, we contend that 
higher consensus can be achieved either by imposition of the powerful member where team 
members do not feel safe to speak up, or by interactive dialogue and discussion of equally 
powered members in a safe environment. This finding provides not only a deeper 
understanding of consensus formation, but also may explain why some of the previous 
researchers found conflicting results when investigating the relationship between consensus 
and performance (see Kellermanns et al., 2005; 2011 for reviews). To illustrate, some 
researchers found a positive relationship between strategic consensus and performance (e.g., 
Bourgeois, 1980; Homburg et al., 1999; Knight et al., 1999; Rapert et al., 2002), whereas others 
found evidence on the opposite direction (e.g., Bourgeois III, 1985; West and Meyer, 1998) 
and again some others did not find any relationship at all (e.g., West Jr and Schwenk, 1996; 
Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990). Second, we illuminate the effect of group dynamics in 
consensus creation in an organizational setting by extending the strategic consensus research 
beyond the upper echelons view, and contribute to the growing body of research in strategic 
consensus which takes the middle and lower levels into account (Wooldridge et al., 2008). Our 
third contribution is to the research in power. By empirically showing psychological safety as a 
boundary condition for power disparity, this paper integrates approach/inhibition theory and 
conflict theory of power which propose opposing views on power disparity-consensus 
relationship.  
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Power Disparity in Strategic Consensus Formation 
Strategic consensus research has mainly focused on top management teams within the context 
of strategy formulation while other organizational actors who execute the strategy are often 
neglected (Kellermanns et al., 2005; Wooldridge et al., 2008). In the light of shared mental 
models theory, researchers found that individuals’ formation of consensus over the 
organization’s strategic priorities reduces the pursuit of subunit goals over the organizational 
goals (Ketokivi and Castañer, 2004) where they can coordinate their actions and join forces to 
create synergies (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). Hence, a high degree of consensus over the 
strategy leads to a smoother implementation of the strategy (Kellermanns et al., 2011; Rapert et 
al., 2002). Consequently, the advantages attributed to having a higher degree of strategic 
consensus may be important not only for the TMT, but also for other organizational groups in 
the lower and middle levels since they are the ones who implement the strategic goals. Thus, 
strategic consensus is needed not only within the TMT but also within other organizational 
groups (Guth and MacMillan, 1986; Kellermanns et al., 2005; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989; 
Wooldridge et al., 2008).  
As in every social setting (Anderson et al., 2008), power differences emerge inevitably 
within those lower and middle level organizational teams as well. Power holders in those 
teams influence and forge perceptions, cognitions and preferences of other members (Lukes, 
1974; Magee and Galinsky, 2008). Hence, we propose that existing power differences within a 
team is expected to influence the team’s consensus over the strategic goals of the organization 
(cf. Pitcher and Smith, 2001). Despite its prominence, to our knowledge, the effect of power 
distribution on consensus formation has been much less answered (Pitcher and Smith, 2001).  
Note that our interest lies more in the effect of power on others’ strategic preferences. 
Therefore, we focus on the realization of power and use here the definition of power as the 
ability to influence others to bring about desired outcomes (Magee and Galinsky, 2008; 
Overbeck and Park, 2006; Pfeffer, 1981). Power disparity is then defined as ‘the differences in 
the concentration of power among group members’ (Greer and van Kleef, 2010: 1032). 
According to this definition, power disparity reaches its highest level when power is 
concentrated in the hands of only one group member (Harrison and Klein, 2007). 
When power disparity is low, there are not steep power differences within the group. Each 
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group member has the opportunity to influence the group decisions. Such an opportunity to 
influence motivates individuals to contribute, effectively integrate the distributed knowledge, 
collaboratively search for new knowledge, and engage in group learning (Bunderson, 2003; 
Edmondson, 2002; Rulke and Galaskiewicz, 2000). For example, in her thorough case study 
of 12 organizational teams, Edmondson (2002) observed that teams reflect and act on group 
decision only when power differences are absent or at the minimum level. Furthermore, in 
groups with low power disparity, teams’ decisions are steered by the expertise rather than 
social category differences (Bunderson, 2003; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Pitcher and 
Smith, 2001).  
In contrast, teams where power disparity is high witness power battles. To illustrate, 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) report for top management teams with high power disparity 
(i.e. when CEO’s power is absolute compared to others) that the CEO employs his/her 
attention more on strengthening the control and preserving the information while others are 
more inclined towards silence and acquiescence. That is, team members seem to comply with 
the CEO as a result of her/his influence, but do not identify with or internalize the decisions 
to implement (Kelman, 1958). Rather, team member pursue secret agendas and self-interest 
serving goals that substitute organizational goals (Edmondson, 2002; Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988; Pitcher and Smith, 2001). Moreover, such high power disparity situations 
lead group members to employ metaphors and abstract language which avoids 
misunderstandings and disagreements to be resolved (Edmondson, 2002).  
In sum, several areas of research underscore the relation between the power disparity and 
group processes. For example, research on distributed leadership (e.g. Mehra et al., 2006), 
social cognition (e.g. Bunderson, 2003), and team learning (Bunderson and Reagans, 2011; e.g. 
Edmondson, 1999; 2002) argue that steeper power differences within a group undermine 
group functioning through higher competition, conflict and political behavior, and lower team 
learning, trust, and collaboration (Anderson and Brown, 2010; Bourgeois, 1980; Greer and van 
Kleef, 2010; Harrison and Klein, 2007; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005). Because higher power 
disparity inhibits a group’s capabilities of participation, information sharing, learning and 
helping behavior, we pose that it in turn can negatively affect reaching consensus. 
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Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, higher power disparity is associated with a lower 
degree of strategic consensus within a group. 
Psychological Safety: Bridging Power Disparity and Strategic Consensus 
In addition to the power differences within a group, group processes also play an important 
role in formation of consensus (Mathieu et al., 2008). For instance, Knight et al. (1999) showed 
that agreement seeking group behavior is associated with higher group consensus while 
interpersonal conflict lowers consensus. We propose psychological safety, “a shared belief that 
the team is safe for interpersonal risk taking” (Edmondson, 1999: 354), in explicating strategic 
consensus formation and in moderating the relationship between power disparity and 
consensus.  
A recurring communication and discussion facilitates the creation of shared understanding 
of strategic priorities within a group. For example, Rapert et al. (2002) found that increased 
communication results in higher consensus between the CEO and marketing head. Similarly, 
Ketokivi & Castañer (2004) showed that communication of goals aligned the subunit interests 
with those of the organization. For such healthy communication between group members to 
occur, it is necessary that employees feel safe to speak up. Research performed by 
Edmondson (1999; 2002; 2003) and anecdotal evidence provided by Bourgeois & Eisenhardt 
(1988) underline that in groups with high psychological safety, group members are more 
inclined towards interaction and exchange of information and knowledge. Low psychological 
safety, then, may undermine the consensus formation. We therefore hypothesize the following 
 
Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, higher psychological safety is associated with a 
higher degree of strategic consensus within the group.  
 
Several studies have emphasized the interplay between power disparity and psychological 
safety (e.g. Anderson and Brown, 2010; Edmondson, 1999; 2002; 2003; Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988). For example, Edmondson (2003) observed that learning and 
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implementation of a new medical practice was higher when the surgeons who reduced the 
power differences and promote speaking up in the operating room. Yet the empirical 
investigation of this interplay in consensus formation is missing. 
According to Walsh (1995: 290) “the struggle for power in an organization is often a 
struggle to impose and legitimate a self-serving meaning for other”. Similarly 
approach/inhibition theory in social psychology (Keltner et al., 2003) argue that high power 
individuals are more likely to influence others and less likely to be influenced, whereas 
attitudes and opinions of low power individuals are affected by the individuals with high 
power (Brinol et al., 2007; Galinsky et al., 2008).  
The power holder’s influence may be alleviated when the group members can generate 
resistance against and disagree with the power holder. This is possible if there is a high level of 
psychological safety. When an individual is exposed to influence attempts, s/he can resist 
against these attempts within her/his potential. Having a safe environment within the group 
allows individuals to unleash their capacity to resist. If individuals feel safe to speak up, they 
can produce counter arguments to what is being dictated by the power holders.  
When power is concentrated in the hands of only one individual (i.e., high power 
disparity), the power holder will influence others’ understanding. If there is not a sufficient 
amount of psychological safety within the group, this influence will not be challenged or 
experience any resistance from other group members. As a result, a high degree of consensus 
will be formed such that its content is constructed around the opinion of the power holder. 
Social decision schemes theory, for instance, postulated that group consensus is formed 
around the preferences of “cognitively central” members (Kameda et al., 1997; Tindale et al., 
2003).   
When the power disparity is low and group members feel safe to voice their opinions, it is 
the quality of arguments which influences the consensus formation rather than the power 
battles. In this line, Edmondson (2002) observed explicit learning of group members toward 
organizational goals for the groups where the group feels psychologically safe and power 
disparity is absent or mitigated. When psychological safety is high, we contend that higher 
power disparity is associated with lower consensus due to increased resistance to the influence 
attempts or conflict stemming from the power battles. Hence, we propose the following 
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Hypothesis 3: All else being equal, psychological safety moderates the relationship 
between strategic consensus and power disparity. That is, when psychological safety is 
high, power disparity is negatively related to consensus. On the other hand, higher 
power disparity is positively related to consensus when there is low psychological 
safety.  
 
We analyze the consensus formation in relation to psychological safety and power 
disparity for middle and lower organizational groups. By doing so, we respond to the calls in 
the strategic consensus literature for taking lower organizational levels into account as well as 
integrating small-group research within a strategic context. In the following subsection, we 
explicate the methods we utilized to investigate the proposed hypotheses.   
Method 
Research on strategic consensus highlighted that the outcomes of strategic consensus might 
differ with respect to the dynamism or stability of the industry in which an organization 
operates (Kellermanns et al., 2005; 2011; Priem, 1990). Consequently, we collected data from 
two Dutch companies which operate in two separate industries. Organization 1 is a utilities 
company which operates in a rather stable environment. The industry is highly regulated and 
due to high entry costs the competition is limited. Conversely, Organization 2 is an IT 
solutions and consulting firm experiencing highly changing industry dynamics and 
competition.  The sample in Organization 1 included 110 teams (871 employees). The average 
age was 45.6 years, and 23% of the employees were female. The average group contained 7.91 
(SD = 5.35) members. Organization 2 is composed of 43 teams (402 employees). The average 
age of employees was 40.9 years and 15.5% were female. The average group was composed of 
7.47 (SD = 4.87) members.  
The research in strategic consensus suggests framing the content of consensus in terms of 
strategic priorities when the middle and lower levels are in the focus (Kellermanns et al., 2005; 
2011). Through a series of meetings, the strategic priorities of each organization were 
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provided by their TMTs. These priorities are not presented here due to the confidentiality 
reasons. Note that since the TMTs in each company actually involved in the formulation of 
the strategic priorities on which strategic consensus will later be measured, we excluded the 
TMTs from further analyses. This is also consistent with our middle and lower levels 
perspective. 
Supplementary archival data including employees’ age, gender, tenure from both 
organizations, and salary scale only from the first organization were retrieved through the 
company records. The rest of the data were collected via an online survey. In both 
organizations, the survey was announced by the CEOs, and by the researchers one week after 
the CEOs’ communication. Participation in the study was voluntary. Both on the invitation 
emails and the survey’s first page, anonymity and confidentiality of responses were 
emphasized. The response rate was 74% in Organization 1 and 82% in Organization 2. 
Independent samples t-test revealed no difference between respondents and non-respondents 
with respect to age, gender and tenure in both organizations, and salary scale in the first 
organization. In addition to TMTs in both organizations, six groups in Organization 1 and 
two in Organization 2 were dropped because only one group member responded to the survey 
resulting in a sample of 143 teams.  
Measures 
This study relies on existing measures which are employed with five-point Likert-type scales 
unless noted otherwise.  
Degree of consensus. Each respondent was asked to rate the strategic priorities to the 
importance s/he attaches to each priority. The degree of consensus is then calculated by 
average standard deviation across the group members. Scores are multiplied by -1 so that a 
higher value indicates a higher consensus. This methodology is widely applied in the 
consensus literature (e.g. Bourgeois, 1980; Colbert et al., 2008; Dess, 1987). Further analyses 
using another commonly used measure of consensus, average squared Euclidean distances, 
and the α measure introduced in Chapter 2 yielded qualitatively similar results.   
Power Disparity. In a high power disparity team, only one or a few team members influence 
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team decisions, whereas in a team with low power disparity, all or most team members has the 
opportunity to exert influence (Bunderson, 2003). As suggested by Harrison and Klein (2007), 
we measured power disparity by the coefficient of variation of individual power scores within 
a group. To calculate the individual power of each member within the group, we relied on the 
statements provided by multiple group members. Respondents were given a roster of co-
workers in their groups and asked to answer the following question: “Please rate the influence 
of your group members listed below regarding the decisions related to your group”. The scale 
varied from ‘Not influential at all’ to ‘Very Influential’. The scores provided by all group 
members were averaged to derive the individual power of each member. Such an 
operationalization of individual power in terms of influence is frequently applied in the 
literature (see, e.g. Anderson et al., 2008; Greer et al., 2011; Venkataramani and Tangirala, 
2010). We discuss the reliability of the measure and an alternative operationalization in the 
next section. 
Psychological Safety. We used five items adapted from Edmondson (1999) to measure 
psychological safety within the group. A sample item reads as “It is safe for me to speak up 
during my interaction with my team”. 
Control variables. As well as being an individual characteristic, power has long being 
recognized as a cultural element (Hofstede, 1986). Therefore, we control for power distance 
orientation of the group as the willingness to accept inequalities of power in society. Power 
distance orientation is measured by seven items adapted from Kirkman et al. (2009). A sample 
item reads as ‘In work-related matters, supervisors have a right to expect obedience from their 
subordinates’.  
Salancik & Pfeffer (1974: 472) argue that interdependency of the activities imposes 
additional limitations on individuals’ “contest for power and resources”. Furthermore, the 
evidence from network theory shows that network density of a group enables more 
information flow and shared meanings (Zaheer et al., 2010). Thus, we controlled for task 
interdependence using a network perspective. Respondents were asked the following question 
that was adapted from Ibarra (1993), ‘Please indicate the names of your colleagues from 
whom you depend on for materials, means, information, etc. in order to carry out your work 
adequately’. Task interdependence within group is then measured as network density of the 
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group using Ucinet 6. 
The goal-transformation hypothesis of identification argues that group identification 
makes personal and collective goals interchangeable (Van Vugt and De Cremer, 1999). Via 
five items adapted from Mael & Ashforth (1992), we controlled also for the level of group 
identification. A sample item is ‘When I talk about my team, I usually say we rather than they’. 
Greer & Van Kleef (2010) noted that battles for power vary in low and high power teams. 
High power teams such as managerial teams (e.g., TMTs) are more sensitive to inequities in 
power (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Greer and van Kleef, 2010; Greer et al., 2011; Siegel 
and Hambrick, 2005). That is, group interaction may likely to occur differently within the 
factory-line teams which are composed of the entry level employees than the managerial teams. 
Therefore, we controlled if a team is composed only of managers or not.  
Preliminary Analyses 
Regarding the decision to pool the data that were collected from Organization 1 and 2, we 
performed Chow break test which tests whether regression coefficients differ between two 
samples. The test results did not reveal any significant differences of coefficients between 
these organizations (F(8,127)= .57, p = ns.). Therefore, we pooled the samples from 
Organization 1 and 2.  
Convergent and discriminating validity. Cronbach alpha values for psychological safety 
and team identification were higher than the conventional cut-off point of .75. However, for 
power distance orientation Cronbach alpha value was .57. Despite the low Cronbach alpha 
value, we kept power distance orientation since it was validated and used by earlier studies 
(e.g., Kirkman et al., 2009).  
We used confirmatory factor analysis to assess the discriminating and convergent validity 
of psychological safety, power distance orientation and team identification scales. We first 
tested a model in which all items loaded on the three corresponding latent constructs. The 
overall fit of the model to the data was adequate (χ2 = 395.07, p < .001, SRMSR = 0.07, 
RMSEA = .06 [.05, .08], CFI = .88). The factor loading of each item was significant at .001 
level indicating the convergent validity. Furthermore, chi-square difference tests indicated that 
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this model was a better fit than the alternative models where the following variables were 
combined: (a) psychological safety and power distance orientation (∆χ2(2) = 314.16, p < .001), 
(b) all the three variables as a single factor (∆χ2(3) = 613.35, p < .001), indicating the 
discriminating validity for those variables.  
Interrater agreement and reliability. All of the variables were conceptualized at group level. 
Power distance orientation, psychological safety and team identification were measured via 
individual responses. In order to justify aggregation of the individual responses to the group 
level, we calculated the interrater agreement coefficient (rwg). rwg values were .90 for power 
distance orientation, .92 for team identification and .90 for psychological safety suggesting that 
team members strongly agreed in their ratings of these variables.  
In addition, we would expect variation between-groups difference and within-group 
similarity in the ratings of psychological safety, team identification, and power distance 
orientation. We calculated the interclass correlation coefficients (ICC[1] and ICC [2], Bliese, 
2000) to confirm these expectations.  One-way analyses of variance suggested that the team 
member ratings of these constructs differed significantly between teams for psychological 
safety (p < .001) and team identification (p < .05), but not for power distance orientation. The 
ICC(1) was .06 for  team identification, .09 for psychological safety and .02 for power distance 
orientation. The reliability of the group means was examined by calculating the ICC(2) 
coefficients. The ICC(2) values were .27 for team identification, .36 for psychological safety, 
and .13 for power distance orientation. Together with rwg values, these results support the 
aggregation of individual team member responses to create team-level variables.  
The measurement of power through influence rather than relying on the individuals’ 
formal positions stems from our definition of power as the ability to influence. We contend 
that one’s influence on others’ strategic preferences may not be limited to hierarchical level 
although they may be related (Ibarra, 1993). Finkelstein (1992) reported positive and 
significant correlation between objective and subjective measures of individual power. Pay 
differences are often reported as objective measures of status and power in organizations 
(Anderson and Brown, 2010; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005). Therefore, we took the salary scales 
obtained from the Organization 1 as an objective proxy for individual power. Consistent with 
Finkelstein (1992), we found that salary scales are highly correlated with individuals’ ratings of 
Chapter 3 
65 
their peers (r = 0.55). These observations suggest that our measure is a good 
operationalization of individual power. 
Individual power was measured via a single item asking all the other group members to 
rate an individual’s influence. Such a dependence on a single item is common in the literature 
(see Anderson et al., 2008; Venkataramani and Tangirala, 2010). Additionally, the research 
shows that team members in general have a shared perception over their group members’ 
influence (Anderson and Brown, 2010). This is supported also in our data with an average 
interrater reliability index (rwg) of .94, and interclass correlations of ICC(1) = .37 and ICC(2) = 
.81.  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlations between model variables 
 
Common method bias. Our dependent variable, degree of strategic consensus, and one of 
the independent variables, power disparity, is measured by the ratings collected from multiple 
respondents. Therefore, we do not suspect common method bias in our analyses. 
Nevertheless, we checked for the common method bias using Harmon’s single factor test 
which is composed investigation of unrotated factor analysis (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). 
The common factor had an eigenvalue of 2.6 accounting for only 32.5% of the variance which 
is far below the recommended 50% threshold (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). Rest of the 
loadings with an eigenvalue above 1 accounted for an additional 29.1% of the variance. These 
results provide support against the common method bias.  
Multicollinearity. Means, standard deviations, and pair-wise correlations are reported in 
Table 3. Strategic consensus was significantly correlated with team identification and 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Strategic consensus -0.62 0.13 1
2 Power disparity 0.67 0.25 -0.133 1
3 Psychological safety 3.95 0.33 -0.009 0.025 1
4 Power distance orientation 2.44 0.24 -0.07 0.063 -0.046 1
5 Managerial team 0.17 0.38 0.166* -0.057 0.259** -0.227** 1
6 Team identification 3.67 0.32 0.263** -0.002 0.178* -0.084 0.348** 1
7 Interdependence 0.2 0.2 -0.071 0.2* 0.328** -0.075 0.218** 0.245** 1
8 0.28 0.45 -0.138 0.282** 0.263** 0.32** -0.127 -0.198* 0.173* 1
 ** ** **  * *  
Company
N = 143, * p < .05   ** p < .01 (two-tailed)
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managerial teams have higher consensus over strategic priorities. High correlations among the 
main variables of interest are not observed signaling that multicollinearity is not a potential 
problem.  
Results 
The hypotheses were tested using multiple regressions where all the continuous independent 
variables were standardized within each organization to eliminate the effects of organizational 
membership (Anderson et al., 2008) and to increase the interpretability (Hayes and Matthes, 
2009). Variance Inflation Factor indexes were far below commonly used cut off value of 10 
revealing no multicollinearity problems.  
Table 4: Results of Multiple Regression Analyses on Strategic Consensus 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
  Beta S.E. Beta S.E 
Power distance orientation -0.033  0.012 -0.043  0.011 
Managerial team 0.082  0.031 0.067  0.029 
Team identification 0.269** 0.012 0.288** 0.011 
Interdependence -0.16  0.012 -0.124  0.011 
Company 0.003  0.028 0.057  0.026 
          
Power disparity -0.095  0.011 -0.191* 0.011 
Psychological safety -0.017  0.012 0.032  0.011 
Interaction     -0.398** 0.008 
          
R2 0.114    0.258   
Adjusted R2 0.068    0.214   
Change in R2 0.114*   0.144**   
Overall F 2.482    5.822   
Df 7,135   8,134   
Maximum VIF 1.441    1.462   
† p < .1 * p < .05.   **p < .01, Standardized coefficients are reported. 
Regression results are presented in Table 4. In Hypothesis 1, we argued a negative 
association between power disparity and the degree of strategic consensus. This hypothesis 
was supported because the coefficient is significantly negative when the interaction is included 
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(see Preacher et al., 2006). We can conclude that the higher power disparity among group 
members is the lower consensus they are going to have with their team mates. On the other 
hand, relationship between psychological safety and strategic consensus at the mean power 
disparity was positive but not statistically significant. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
In support of our moderation hypothesis (i.e., Hypothesis 3), explanatory power of the 
regression significantly increased when the interaction term was included. Furthermore, the 
coefficient for the interaction effect was negative and significant. We found significant 
evidence for the moderating effect of psychological safety on the relationship between power 
disparity and strategic consensus. This finding provides support for Hypothesis 3.  
Figure 5: Interaction Effect between Power Disparity and Psychological Safety 
 
The interaction is visualized in Figure 5. When psychological safety is high in the group, an 
uneven distribution of power resulted in lower amount of consensus. On the other hand, 
under low psychological safety condition, higher power disparity led to higher degree of 
strategic consensus which is in line with the propositions of approach/inhibition theory. 
Moreover, the interaction was analyzed by simple slope tests according to the guidelines and 
tools provided by Hayes & Matthes (2009). For the simple slope one standard deviation above 
the mean was significant for high (β = -.493, p < .001), but not for the low psychological 
safety condition (β = .113, p = ns.).  
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Discussion 
The research agrees on the importance of strategic consensus in the strategy and small group 
literatures (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Markoczy, 2001; Mathieu et al., 2008). Yet, 
empirical investigation of how consensus is formed has been limited to mechanisms and 
schemes, rather than understanding the processes leading to consensus. The first contribution 
of this study is to respond to this lacuna. The data from 143 teams in two organizations 
operating in distinct industries underlined that power disparity is negatively associated with the 
amount of consensus. Additionally, we documented that the effect of power disparity and 
strategic consensus is contingent on the level of psychological safety.  
An immediate theoretical implication emanating from the findings of this study is that 
different types of consensuses can emerge, depending on the level of psychological safety and 
power disparity. We find that higher consensus can be achieved either when power is 
concentrated and group members do not feel psychologically safe, or when power is evenly 
distributed and group members feel safe. Strategic consensus formed due to enforcement of a 
powerful member in low psychological safety condition is likely to be different than the 
consensus formed as a result of open discussion of strategic priorities between equally 
powered individuals in a safe environment. That is, different levels of safety and power 
disparity may result in different consensuses with the same degree, yet they may have 
discrepant outcomes.  
Theoretical implications of this difference may explain equivocal findings in the literature 
regarding the consensus-performance relationship. To illustrate, some researchers found 
positive relationship between strategic consensus and performance (e.g., Bourgeois, 1980; 
Homburg et al., 1999; Knight et al., 1999; Rapert et al., 2002), whereas others found evidence 
on the opposite direction (e.g., Bourgeois III, 1985; West and Meyer, 1998) and again some 
others did not find any relationship at all (e.g., West Jr and Schwenk, 1996; Wooldridge and 
Floyd, 1990). Indeed, those inconsistent findings are predicated on the non-linearity of the 
consensus and performance relationship by Priem (1990) and Kellermanns et al. (2005), who 
both call for taking additional moderators into account. Moreover, the managerial implications 
of this difference may direct organizations to consider power disparity and the amount of 
psychological safety before attempting to construct strategic consensus, say via strategic 
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interventions.  
Second, we extended the strategic consensus literature to the lower and middle 
organizational levels. This literature has been predominantly circumscribed to top 
management teams (Gonzalez-Benito et al., 2012). For successful implementation of the 
strategy, several researchers have pointed out vitality of having consensus across the 
organizational levels (Kellermanns et al., 2005; Macmillan, 1989; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989; 
2008). We contribute to this direction of research by shedding light on consensus formation in 
the lower and middle levels. 
Third, this study suggests theoretical implications for the research in power by proposing 
psychological safety as a significant boundary condition in studying power disparity within a 
group. Qualitative studies and reviews frequently discussed the relationship between power 
disparity and psychological safety (e.g., Anderson and Brown, 2010; Edmondson, 1999; 2002; 
2003; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). We conceptualized psychological safety as a means to 
resist power holders’ influence attempts. Our empirical investigation showed that 
psychological safety is a significant moderator for power disparity. This finding can explain 
conflicting proposals in the literature posed by the conflict and functionalist theories of 
power. Additionally, the findings highlight psychological safety as a potential mitigating factor 
of power disparity’s detrimental effects (see Bunderson and Reagans, 2010). 
Limitations and Future Research 
One of the limitations of this study is its limited conceptualization of power as realized power 
in terms of influence. Conversely, Greer and Van Kleef (2010) formulated power with one’s 
formal hierarchical position. Our measure of informal power was significantly correlated with 
formal power, and this correlation was consistent with the similar studies (e.g., Finkelstein, 
1992). We do not argue whether researchers should favor one dimension of power over 
another. We rather call for future studies with a multidimensional conceptualization of power 
such that both informal and formal power bases as well as the realization of power as ability 
to influence are investigated simultaneously.  
Second, this study focused on the groups only in two organizations both of which operate 
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in the same country. In order to ascertain the generalizability of the findings, replications in 
different settings and culturally different organizations are needed.  Third, French & Raven 
(French and Raven, 1959: 150) investigate ‘power in terms of influence, and influence in terms 
of psychological change’. However, the data in this paper were cross-sectional. Thus, another 
limitation is that casual inferences can only be seen as suggestive. Future studies with 
longitudinal data are encouraged to observe the change in different time periods and attribute 
it to the power differences.  
Last but not least, this study showed that different types of consensuses with the same 
degree may emerge due to the differences in psychological safety and power disparity within 
the group, and suggested that their outcomes may likely to differ. Future studies can test this 
prediction via a mediated moderation model where the consensus-performance link is 
investigated in the light of psychological safety and power disparity as antecedents. 
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Chapter 4 
 
POWER STRUCTURES AND ADAPTATION: 
HOW TO DISTRIBUTE POWER WITHIN A 
GROUP 
 
Introduction  
pper echelons of organizations (i.e., top management teams) continuously search for 
the optimal strategy that solve the multidimensional problem of increasing 
organization’s performance by determining amount of R&D spending, degree of 
penetration to new markets, allocation of budget to marketing activities, etc. Each top 
management team (TMT) member has his/her own understanding of what the best strategy is. 
In their search for the optimal strategy, members are affected by their own previous findings 
and those found by other group members. Additionally, they can influence others in the team 
by exercising power. Consequently, existing power differences in upper echelons determine 
the strategic directions of organizations (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; Finkelstein, 1992). 
While power differences prevail in higher echelons, it is often contested whether steep 
power differences or egalitarian distributions of power offer higher organizational 
performance. On the one hand, the functionalist theory of power argues that teams with 
steeper hierarchies perform better (e.g., Lammers and Galinsky, 2009; Magee and Galinsky, 
2008; Parsons, 1964) because a steep hierarchy creates a structure where the roles are clearer, 
uncertainty is reduced, and a race for promotion creates a psychologically rewarding 
environment (Halevy et al., 2011). Recently, He and Huang (2011) found that organizations 
with steeply stratified boards perform better than organizations with egalitarian boards. On 
U 
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the other hand, conflict theory of power argue the contrary such that steep power differences 
within a group undermine group functioning through higher competition, conflict and 
political behavior, and lower team learning, trust, psychological safety and collaboration 
(Anderson and Brown, 2010; Edmondson, 2002; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Greer and 
van Kleef, 2010; Harrison and Klein, 2007; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005). For instance, Siegel 
and Hambrick (2005: 262) report that “CEO autocracy is a common precursor to corporate 
failure.” 
While both perspectives undoubtedly have merit, they fail to provide a dynamic 
understanding of power. Although structure of power differences (i.e., level of disparity) is 
likely to be more stable over time (Pfeffer, 1981), individuals’ relative power may change. 
Simply, individuals can be promoted or fired causing a reallocation of power within the 
existing power structures. Furthermore, individuals deliberately attempt to change their power 
positions (van Dijke and Poppe, 2003), or external shocks such as implementation of a new 
information system may also lead to redistribution of power (Jasperson et al., 2002). While a 
dynamic perspecive can capture the reality better, it also bridges discrepant theories of power 
(i.e., functionalist and conflict theories). We propose that the relationship between power 
disparity and performance is contingent on whether power is static or individuals gain power 
according to their competence.  
This proposition requires a comprehensive definition of power that also includes its 
evolutionary dynamics. To do so, we first provide a comprehensive conceptualization of 
power which simultaneously integrates the various dimensions of power identified in the 
literature. Second, we go beyond the static understanding of power which has been dominant 
in both conflict and functionalist theories. Instead, we introduce endogenous power 
assignment where individuals’ power may change dynamically according to their past 
performance. A dynamic understanding requires longitudinal and controlled observations of 
both power and performance where nonlinear and complex interactions emerge throughout 
the group process of finding the best strategy. As often employed in such complex theory 
building studies (Davis et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 2007), we employ agent-based simulations.  
The advantage of our framework supported with agent-based simulations is its ability to 
discern differences in power that arise from positioning within formal and informal structures 
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and to attribute these distinctions to longitudinal change in an individual’s power attribute. 
Consequently, we make a number of contributions to power research. First, we reconcile and 
provide a finer-grained comparison of functionalist and conflict theories of power. Our 
findings demonstrate that comparisons between functionalist and conflict theories of power 
very much depend on whether power is assigned endogenously with respect to past 
performance. Second, we propose a conceptualization and an analytical operationalization that 
brings distinct but intertwined dimensions of power together. This enables scholars to 
advance the power research from a multidimensional perspective which has so far remained 
fragmented (Astley and Sachdeva, 1984). Third, we contribute to the organizations and 
strategy literature that utilize agent-based simulations. We advance earlier studies that defined 
power and power disparity in terms of formal authority (i.e., hierarchical position) and 
considered power as a static concept (e.g., Mihm et al., 2010; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; 
Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005). Our multidimensional conceptualization of power captures both 
formal and informal power as well as the cases where individuals’ power is endogenously 
changed with their past performance. While doing so, we propose a simulation technique that 
can model a group search for the best solution in line with three traditional paradigms of 
strategic decision making -the paradigms of bounded rationality, power, and garbage can (see, 
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992). 
Conceptualizing and Modeling Power 
Determining the most suitable configuration of power differences that helps the TMT 
members in their ‘intellective task’ (Laughlin 1980) of finding the best strategic solution and 
adapting to its environment is the core research question of the present paper. To investigate 
this research question, we model the TMT’s strategic search by integrating social psychology, 
social impact theory and strategic decision making “to produce a social psychology of 
behavioral strategy” with respect to power differences (Powell et al., 2011: 1376). Note that 
our aim is not to derive an aggregated decision of the group as in social decision scheme 
theory (Laughlin and Adamopoulos, 1980; e.g., Laughlin, 2011; Tindale et al., 2003), but model 
the group’s search for finding optimal strategic solutions. In the following subsection, we 
begin constructing our model by conceptualizing power, examining the dimensions of power, 
and investigating the performance of various power structures. 
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Conceptualizing of power 
Research on power is fragmented (Astley and Sachdeva, 1984), and conceptualizations of 
power range from the institutional, resource-based, and outcome-based perspectives of power 
to the interpretive, neo-structural, radical (such as Lukesian, Gramschian or Habermasian), 
and Foucaultian views of power (Clegg, 1989; Clegg et al., 2006). This variation makes it 
difficult to provide a single comprehensive definition that incorporates different perspectives 
on power simultaneously (Fiske and Berdahl, 2007; Göhler, 2009). Despite this variety, most 
conceptualizations include one or more of the following dimensions: power as a relational 
individual capacity, behaviors emanating from having low or high power, and exercise of 
power as influence on others (Göhler, 2009; Lawler and Proell, 2009). 
First, the researchers who conceptualize power as a capacity define power as the capability 
to do or achieve desired outcomes (Berdahl and Martorana, 2006; Brinol et al., 2007; Keltner et 
al., 2003; Overbeck and Park, 2006). This capacity can be due to multiple power bases such as 
control over resources (Emerson, 1962), network position (Astley and Sachdeva, 1984), or 
hierarchical position (see French and Raven, 1959 for an early discussion on power bases). 
Second, other researchers are interested in the behavioral mechanisms that stem from the 
power an individual has. For instance, studies on approach/inhibition theory pointed out that 
“high-power individuals talk more, interrupt more, are more likely to speak out of turn, and 
are more directive of others’ verbal contributions than lower-power individuals” (Keltner et al., 
2003: 277). This research concludes that powerful individuals exert more force to influence 
low power members within the group and stay immune to influence attempts (Brinol et al., 
2007; Galinsky et al., 2003; Halevy et al., 2011; Magee and Galinsky, 2008). Third, some 
scholars are interested in the exercise of power. Power then is defined as the ability to influence 
other people within the group to bring about desired outcomes (French and Raven, 1959; 
Magee and Galinsky, 2008; Pfeffer, 1981; Yukl et al., 1996).  
The view of power as ‘ability-to-influence’ is associated with a rather causal and mechanic 
relationship within the social power structure such that power is exercised as a force to change 
people’s cognitive and/or physical positions in the desired direction. For instance, French & 
Raven (1959: 150) define “power in terms of influence, and influence in terms of 
psychological change”. For Weber (1978: 53), however, power is a potential that needs to be 
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translated into influence, that is “power is the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance”. The causal 
relationship from power as a capability to its realization as influence is a vicious question: 
“[power] first has to exist before it can be exercised; but is it really power if it is not exercised 
over others?” (Göhler, 2009: 31). Therefore, we consider these dimensions of power as three 
separate but intertwined dimensions to conceptualize power.  
Formalizing power 
In this subsection, we formally model all three dimensions (i.e., capacity, behavior, and 
exercise) of an individual’s power. Our aim is to derive the cognitive movement of an 
individual. This movement is due to the forces s/he is exposed to stemming from the power 
differences within the group.  
Formal and computational approaches in strategy and organization research have 
benefited from models from natural sciences (e.g., NK modeling which is based on 
evolutionary biology). Similar to those studies that emphasize allegories between physics and 
organization science (e.g. McCarthy et al., 2010: 606), we employ Newtonian mechanics to 
conceptualize power. For similar conceptualizations of power based on Newtonian mechanics 
see March (1966), Lewin (1951) and French (1956). Such an approach furnishes the necessary 
tools to capture all three dimensions of power simultaneously in a dynamic manner. More 
importantly, this choice is in line with the conceptualizations of early scholars in power 
research such as Hobbes, Locke, and Dahl who use the analogy between power and 
mechanical forces (Clegg, 1989). 
For example, according to Hobbes, power is an “extension and elaboration of metaphors 
drawn from Galilean mechanics”, and similarly Locke illustrates power in terms of mechanics 
exemplified by the motion of billiard balls (Clegg, 1989: 41). Dahl (1963: 7) argues that power 
is “very similar to those on which the idea of force rests in mechanics”. These ideas are still 
traceable in the contemporary discussions of power. For instance, to Foucault (1990: 92) 
power is the “multiplicity of social force relations” where an individual is oppressed by the 
forces of social discourse and practices; at the same time s/he resists these forces within 
her/his potential. Moreover, Kanter (1979: 66) argues that “power in organizations is 
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analogous in simple terms to physical power”. Built upon these views, we model power in 
terms of Newtonian Laws. This approach enables us to cover the three dimensions of power: 
An individual’s power as her/his capacity is represented by the mass of the individual, and the 
behavior as result of this capacity is expressed as the attraction and resistance in terms of 
Newtonian forces. Then, exercise of power can be expressed as the change on an individual’s 
position. 
Let an individual j be located at a point with its coordinates given by D × 1 vector xj where 
D is the dimensionality of the cognitive space that defines the domain of all solutions in which 
individuals search for the best solution. S/he has a mass mj (power as capacity). The individual 
exerts a force in relation to her/his power on another individual at xi whose mass is mi 
(behaviors using the power capacity). This force acts along xi and xj and causes a change in the 
position of i such that the individual at xi is accelerated toward the individual at xj (exercised 
power). That is, the power embedded in the size of the mass is exercised through the 
gravitational force and brings out the desired change in the other individual’s position. This 
force is proportional to the product of their mass and inverse proportional to the distance 
between individuals. This principle is known as Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation. In 
mathematical terms, the size of the force fij acting on individual i by j is 
 
௜݂௝ = ܩ
݉௜ ௝݉
ฮ࢞௝ − ࢞௜ฮ
ଶ ,       (1) 
where ฮ࢞௝ − ࢞௜ฮ
ଶ
 is the squared Euclidean distance between points xi and xj, and G is the 
constant of proportionality that can be set without loss of generality to 1 in our context. The 
force, ௜݂௝ , on individual i due to j points from xi toward xj. The direction of the force is given 
by 
 
࢛௜௝ =
࢞௝ − ࢞௜
ฮ࢞௝ − ࢞௜ฮ
 .       (2) 
Then, the directed force vector, ࢌ௜௝ , is obtained by multiplying (1) and (2), that is, 
 
ࢌ௜௝ = ௜݂௝࢛௜௝ =
݉௜ ௝݉
ฮ࢞௝ − ࢞௜ฮ
ଶ
࢞௝ − ࢞௜
ฮ࢞௝ − ࢞௜ฮ
=
݉௜ ௝݉
ฮ࢞௝ − ࢞௜ฮ
ଷ ൫࢞௝ − ࢞௜൯.       (3) 
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In a group of N individuals, an individual’s movements is accelerated or decelerated toward 
the total force exerted on him/her by N − 1 individuals in the group. Within a system of N-
individuals interacting only under mutual gravitation, the total force on an individual is 
expressed as 
 
ࢌ௜ = ෍ ࢌ௜௝ = ෍
݉௜ ௝݉
ฮ࢞௝ − ࢞௜ฮ
ଷ ൫࢞௝ − ࢞௜൯
ே
௝ୀଵ
௝ஷ௜
 .
ࡺ
࢐ୀ૚
࢐ஷ࢏
       (4) 
Acceleration as a result of the total force exerted on an individual is derived by utilizing 
Newton’s Second Law of Motion. It states that the sum of the forces on an individual is equal 
to the product of his/her mass times his/her acceleration. For the individual i, using (3) and 
(4) yields  
 
݉௜ࢇ௜ = ෍
݉௜ ௝݉
ฮ࢞௝ − ࢞௜ฮ
ଷ ൫࢞௝ − ࢞௜൯ =
ே
௝ୀଵ
௝ஷ௜
݉௜ ෍
௝݉
ฮ࢞௝ − ࢞௜ฮ
ଷ ൫࢞௝ − ࢞௜൯
ே
௝ୀଵ
௝ஷ௜
       (5) 
 with 1 ≤ ݅ ≤ ܰ. Dividing both sides by ݉௜ gives the acceleration 
  
ࢇ௜ = ෍
௝݉
ฮ࢞௝ − ࢞௜ฮ
ଷ ൫࢞௝ − ࢞௜൯ .
ே
௝ୀଵ
௝ஷ௜
       (6) 
Going back to the example of a TMT trying to find best solutions that maximize the 
profits, (6) states that a TMT member is attracted more toward cognitively closer and 
powerful members than to distant individuals with low power. The Newtonian approach to 
dynamic behavior in (6) can also be found in social decision schemes and social influence 
literatures. To illustrate, according to Latane’s (1981: 344) first principle of social impact, the 
amount of impact experienced by an individual due to others is proportional to the power of a 
given influence source, its closeness, and the number of sources which is basically a 
restatement of (6). Similarly, social decision schemes theory also argues that the closer an 
individual’s position to another, the more s/he will be influenced (Tindale et al., 2003).  
Although we conceptualized the movement of individuals in cognitive space, recent 
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empirical studies argue that (6) is a relevant abstraction also in spatial space. For example, 
Koene et al. (2002) showed that leaders’ influence is attenuated with increasing spatial 
separation. Note that the movement of an individual in (6) is defined in continuous space. The 
influencing and influenced individuals can meet at another in-between point which may have a 
different performance outcome. As a result, this formulation still leaves room for the 
discovery of new solutions as a result of group interaction.  
The formalization of power outlined above is closely aligned with early conceptualizations 
of power, and is able to capture the multidimensional nature of power. To put this 
formalization and conceptualization to work, we define a set of power models. These models 
are categorized not only with respect to their disparity level, but also if power is assigned 
endogenously or not. This important feature extends earlier research on power which has 
been circumscribed to a static understanding of power. Using agent-based simulations, we aim 
to compare these models and to provide further insights into question of within-group 
distribution of power as posed by functionalist and conflict theories of power.  
Models of power differences 
This study investigates the performance of various power distribution scenarios within a 
group categorized according to the level of disparity and how power is appointed. Power 
disparity is “the differences in the concentration of power among group members” (Greer and 
van Kleef, 2010: 1032; Harrison and Klein, 2007). Additionally, we consider whether power is 
assigned exogenously or endogenously. A power model called exogenous if power is assigned to 
an individual ex-ante and does not change over time. A power model is endogenous if the initial 
power changes from one time period to another based on an individual’s relative performance 
in the previous period. Table 5 summarizes the six power disparity models, ranging from the 
egalitarian to the autocratic model.  
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In the egalitarian model, each individual in the group has low power and the power structure 
is stable over time. The level of power disparity is low, and power assignment is exogenous. This 
model is similar to what Clegg et al. (2006) call a collectivist democracy where there is no social 
control or authoritarian hierarchy. Examples of this structure include voluntary associations and 
peer problem solving groups.  
In the autocratic power model, which is called as “monocratic” by Weber (1978: 272), there is 
a single individual with high power, the ‘powerholder’, and rest of the group members have low 
power. Power is concentrated at a central body. As in the egalitarian model, power is 
exogenously assigned ex ante and does not change with time. Yet, disparity is high. Eisenhardt 
and Bourgeois (1988) document examples of this model with firms in the US microcomputer 
industry led by autocratic CEOs. 
In the evolutionary model, each individual’s power is assigned to his/her performance relative 
to others. In this model, power is not distributed according to a formal rank or position, nor is it 
concentrated in one individual, but formally equal individuals are stratified according to their 
expertise on a special topic. The evolutionary model is also called as neo-Weberian bureaucracy 
(Clegg et al., 2006) or collegial organization (Lazega, 2001). Examples of this model include law, 
architecture, and advertisement firms. The evolutionary model defines the power of individuals 
endogenously and dynamically with the following formulation: At time ݐ ∈ {1, … , ܶ}, let  ߰(࢞௜௧) 
be the performance (fitness) of individual i located at ࢞௜௧ , max௝ ߰(࢞௝௧) be the best performance, 
and min௝ ߰(࢞௝௧) be the worst performance of the group. Furthermore, let ݉௛௜௚௛  and ݉௟௢௪  
indicate predetermined mass sizes of the individuals with the highest and lowest power. Then, 
the power of individual i is endogenously assigned as  
 
݉௜
௧ାଵ =
߰(࢞௜
௧) − min
௝
߰൫࢞௝
௧൯
max
௝
߰൫࢞௝
௧൯ − min
௝
߰൫࢞௝
௧൯
(݉௛௜௚௛ − ݉௟௢௪) + ݉௟௢௪ ,       ∀݅, ݆ ∈ {1, … , ܰ}. (7) 
According to (7), an individual obtains the highest power ݉௛௜௚௛ if s/he finds the best 
solution in the previous period, and low power ݉௟௢௪ if s/he is the worst performer. Since 
having zero power is neither meaningful nor realistic in organizational contexts, the minimum 
level of power is denoted with ݉௟௢௪ > 0. The rest of the group receives a mass between ݉௛௜௚௛  
and ݉௟௢௪ , which results in a moderate level of power disparity (Harrison and Klein, 2007).  
Chapter 4 
81 
In the bureaucratic model, ranking between high and low power is performed exogenously, and 
does not change over time. At period t = 0, we randomly rank the individuals, and assign power 
to each individual between ݉௛௜௚௛  and ݉௟௢௪  such that there is equal space between each 
individual. If an individual is appointed as the second most powerful individual at the beginning, 
s/he keeps this power status over time. This model is similar to Weber’s (1978) rational-based 
bureaucracy that can be exemplified by hierarchically stratified governmental or military offices. 
In the meritocratic model, the individual with the best solution in the previous period is 
assigned high power, while the rest of the group has low power. As a result of endogenous 
assignment of power, the disparity level remains high while the individual with high power may 
change from one period to another. Meritocracy can be found in firms where a CEO is 
succeeded internally by the ‘star’ performer. The meritocratic model implies the more competent 
(in the form of past performance) an individual becomes, the more influence s/he will exert on 
others. This implication is in line with the status characteristics theory which states that an 
individual who demonstrated high performance previously forms high performance expectation 
for the future and s/he will obtain more opportunities for participating in and influencing group 
decisions (Berger et al., 1972; 1977; Bunderson, 2003).   
Finally, the diarchic model denotes a hybrid model between the autocratic and the meritocratic 
model. In this model, there is still an exogenously assigned power holder whose rule does not 
change over time. However, there is another individual with high power who is endogenously 
assigned because s/he found the best solution in the previous period. The rest of the group 
members have low power. The disparity level of the diarchic model is slightly lower than that the 
autocratic and meritocratic models. Examples of diarchic model can be found in the firms where 
the founder and the CEO coexist or in the firms with strong a CEO and a chairman. 
Simulation Model 
Gathering empirical data for a detailed comparison of power models is a demanding task (see 
Harrison et al., 2007). First, such a comparison requires longitudinal and controlled observations. 
For example, to compare the evolutionary and meritocratic power models, we need to observe 
each individual’s power and ensure that individuals are assigned a power level that is a function 
of their performance. Second, nonlinear and complex interactions may emerge throughout the 
group process of finding the best solution. For such complex phenomena, agent-based 
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simulation methods are regularly applied as powerful theory building tools in the organization 
and strategy literature to study behavior of groups and systems (Davis et al., 2007). The essence 
of the agent based simulation method in this paper is to define the strategic decision making in 
terms of a search and group interaction with simple rules rather than directly imposing the 
outcome. The outcome of the process is then not self-evident, but emergent (Harrison et al., 
2007). Moreover, we draw the rules from extant literature to define group interaction and search. 
Despite the rich opportunities offered by simulation methodology, simulation studies 
investigating power differences confined their focus mostly to formal hierarchies, decision rights, 
and control over resources (e.g. Mihm et al. 2010, Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003, Siggelkow and 
Rivkin 2005). However, today’s organizations are increasingly characterized by formal and 
informal networks that surpass hierarchical layers, by transformational relationships replacing the 
carrot-and-stick coordination mechanisms and incentives, and by flatter organizational structures 
with capabilities and interconnected processes (Daft and Lewin, 1993; Siggelkow and Rivkin, 
2005). Hence, an investigation of power structures in contemporary organizations should go 
beyond the ‘formal design perspective’ and take evolutionary dynamics and informal power 
structures into account. The present study does so. 
The particle swarm optimizer 
Several simulation methods are applied in the literature, such as system dynamics, NK modeling, 
cellular automata, genetic algorithms, and customized stochastic processes (Davis et al., 2007). In 
this paper, we employed an agent-based simulation approach using an evolutionary computation 
technique called the particle swarm optimizer algorithm (PSO) introduced by a social 
psychologist Kennedy and an electrical engineer Eberhart (Kennedy and Eberhart, 1995). We 
chose the PSO as our agent-based simulation method because it first offers a formal 
representation of the group dynamics. Its representation of group search is in line with the three 
traditional paradigms of strategic decision making (i.e. the bounded rationality, politics and 
power, and garbage can paradigms) identified by Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992: 32) which are 
summarized as ‘[m]ost scholars believe that people are boundedly rational, that decision making 
is essentially political, and that chance matters’. Second, it models a group of individuals that are 
heterogeneous in terms of power, and forces of attraction and repulsion of these individuals via 
the law of gravitation. In this way, the interaction between individuals due to power differences 
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is embedded in the search process.  
The objective of the PSO is to search for the optimum of a fitness function over a D-
dimensional search space through a group of several individuals. Note that our aim is not to 
develop a superior optimization algorithm, but to simulate group interaction and to compare the 
performance of different power disparity models from a search perspective. See Mihm et al. 
(2010) for a discussion between optimization and search in organizational design. In the PSO, 
each individual moves with a velocity which is updated in each period, and remembers the best 
position s/he has ever visited. Individuals in the search space are attracted towards the best 
location they have found so far individually, and the best location found by any of the group 
members. The success of the PSO depends on the number of individuals enrolled in the search, 
the complexity of the landscape, and a few tuning parameters (Kennedy and Eberhart, 1995). 
Let us briefly formalize the PSO. The reader is referred to Clerc and Kennedy (2002) for 
further details. At time period (iteration) ݐ ∈ {1, … , ܶ}, the best performance reached by 
individual i so far due to her/his local search is defined as ݌ܾ݁ݏݐ௜௧ and the location of ݌ܾ݁ݏݐ௜௧  is 
࢖௜
௧. The value of the best performance found by the group so far is denoted as ܾ݃݁ݏݐ௧ at 
position gt. For the maximization of ߰(࢞) over x, ݌ܾ݁ݏݐ௜௧  and ܾ݃݁ݏݐ௧ are non-decreasing since 
they are updated only if a better solution is found. Individual i changes her/his position 
according to the velocity vector ࢜௜௧ = (ݒ௜ଵ௧ , ݒ௜ଶ௧ , … , ݒ௜஽௧ ). In the PSO, the velocity and location of 
each individual is updated at the time period t + 1 according to  
 ࢜௜௧ାଵ = ߶࢜௜௧ + ܿଵ߮ଵ(࢖௜௧ − ࢞௜௧) + ܿଶ߮ଶ(ࢍ௧ − ࢞௜௧),  (8) 
 ࢞௜௧ାଵ = ࢞௜௧ + ࢜௜௧ାଵ,  (9) 
where ߶ is the inertia weight set to some predefined value. The second term on the right hand 
side of (8) indicates the acceleration due to the local search by individual i, and the third term is 
the acceleration due to the global search. Parameters ܿଵ and ܿଶ are the acceleration constants for 
local and global search, respectively. To add randomness to the group search, ߮ଵ and ߮ଶ are 
independent uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Together with ܿଵ and ܿଶ, they govern the 
strength by which an individual is attracted to his/her best location ࢖௜௧, and to the overall best 
location ࢍ௧ found by the group so far. At iteration t, the velocity is updated according to its 
current velocity affected by the inertia and to the previously found best positions by the 
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individual and the group which is multiplied by the acceleration constants and random terms. 
The individual’s position is then updated using her/his current position and newly updated 
velocity. The selection of parameters is discussed in a later section. 
Equation (8) shows that the movement of an individual is determined by the current velocity 
and position, the best solution found due to his/her local search, and the best solution by the 
group. To include power and power differences to the search, we extend the standard PSO with 
a third element, which is the total gravitational force exerted on an individual due to power 
differences as formulated in (6). Hence, when (6) and (8) are inserted into (9), the displacement 
in the PSO algorithm becomes, 
 ࢞௜
௧ାଵ − ࢞௜
௧ = ߶࢜௜
௧ + ܿଵ߮ଵ(࢖௜
௧ − ࢞௜
௧) + ܿଶ߮ଶ൫ࢍ
௧ − ࢞௜
௧൯ + ܿଷ߮ଷ ∑
௠ೕ
ฮ࢞ೕି࢞೔ฮ
య ൫࢞௝ − ࢞௜൯
ே
௝ୀଵ
௝ஷ௜
, (10) 
 Displacement Inertia Attraction 
towards the 
personal best 
 Attraction 
towards the best 
found in the group 
Attraction due to 
the gravitational 
force exerted by 
others 
 
where ܿଷ is the acceleration constant of the acceleration due to the total gravitational force 
exerted on an individual, and ߮ଷ is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Parameters c1, c2 and c3 
have real behavioral interpretations such that they serve as weights for personal, social, and 
power cues. They affect the how much each cue affects individual search.  
Note that (10) is in line with the strategic decision making paradigms proposed by Eisenhardt 
and Zbaracki (1992): the movement of an individual is influenced by (a) the best solution s/he 
has found so far as a result of his/her personal search and the best solution found by any 
member of the group (i.e., the bounded rationality paradigm), (b) social influence due to power 
differences which is proportional to the power and disproportional to the distance (i.e., the 
politics and power paradigm), and (c) there is still room for pseudo-randomness in the search 
(i.e., the garbage can paradigm). We have argued that equation (6) resonates with Latane’s social 
impact theory. Similarly, (10) is in line with dynamic social impact theory (Nowak et al., 1990) 
where the social impact emerges through recursive and iterative group interactions. We extend 
this line of research such that an individual’s and thus the group’s strategic direction is not solely 
influenced by the sum of total forces but also by the individual and group search for the best 
strategic alternatives which together with power better captures strategic decision making process 
(Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992).   
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Fitness function and the landscape roughness 
Anderson and Brown (2010) emphasized that relative performances of different power 
distributions are contingent on the environmental complexity. Hence, we compare the power 
models under different complexity levels. Various meanings have been attributed to complexity 
in strategy and organization design literature (Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005: 103). We support the 
view that a complex problem is one which “has many plausible solutions although it is difficult at 
the outset to judge which approach will yield good results” (Lazer and Friedman, 2007: 673). For 
example, ‘complex’ problems with many plausible solutions include strategic management of a 
team or an organization, new drug or software development, and new product design.  
Figure 6: Example Landscapes Created Using the Gaussian Landscape Generator6 
a. b.
For each level of problem complexity, we need to “produce an arbitrarily large number of 
statistically identical problems for the simulated agents to solve” (Lazer and Friedman, 2007: 
673). A problem is then a fitness function ߰(࢞) representing, for example, performance, profit, 
or innovations that individuals maximize for collective group performance. For this task, we 
utilize the Gaussian landscape generator (Gallagher and Yuan, 2006). One of the advantages of 
using this landscape generator compared to classical test problems is that complexity is captured 
                                                          
6 The optimum is assigned to 1, and the highest local optimum is 0.75. Figure 6a (left) is created using γ =1 components, 
and the Figure 6b (right) is generated with γ =30 components. 
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by a single parameter (i.e., number of Gaussians). Another is that a large number of landscapes 
with similar structure can be generated. A third important advantage is that it allows the creation 
of a continuous problem space. For a more comprehensive discussion on the merits of the 
Gaussian landscape generator compared to other commonly employed generators such as the 
NK landscape generator and bit-string multimodal landscape generators, we refer to Gallagher & 
Yuan (2006).   
The landscape generator consists of a preselected number of multivariate normal 
distributions (i.e., Gaussian functions) with uniformly distributed means over a fixed D-
dimensional space and varying covariance matrices. The height of each Gaussian is also random 
except the best one, whose value is set to ߰∗ and the ratio r between the best and the second 
best is r߰∗. Then, this landscape generator is simply defined as the maximum value over all 
Gaussians. The main parameter of interest is the complexity level of each landscape γ defined as 
the number of Gaussians. Note that when γ = 1, a rather simple unimodal landscape (only one 
global optimum with no local optima) is created. The number of peaks, that is, the number of 
local optima, increases with γ such that the actual number of local optima will be less than or 
equal to γ due to the possibly overlapping Gaussian components. Figure 6a illustrates a landscape 
created with γ = 1 and Figure 6b with γ = 30 Gaussians in a two dimensional space within the 
range of [-2, 2]. Clearly, finding the optimum in Figure 6a is much easier than doing so in a 
complex landscape, such as the one depicted in Figure 6b where there are many local optima and 
irregular ridges.   
Experimental Setting 
To compare the six power models summarized in Table 5, we set up a main simulation 
experiment and three follow up experiments for robustness checks. We begin with explicating 
the setting in Experiment 1.  
Simulation experiment 1 compares power models under varying complexity levels with 
respect to two outcome variables: Performance and convergence. Performance of a power model 
is defined as the best function value ܾ݃݁ݏݐ் reached by the group at the final iteration T of a 
simulation run. We alternatively measured group performance as the mean and median of 
individual performances, and obtained qualitatively similar results. Similarly, the convergence t*, 
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is defined as the iteration number when the group converged to this performance level, ܾ݃݁ݏݐ் . 
To be able to see the whole trajectory of the individuals for each of the power models, we 
allowed the algorithm to continue after achieving convergence at t*, and only to stop when the 
maximum number iterations T is reached.  
A landscape was created for a given complexity level by using the Gaussian landscape 
generator between [-2, 2]. Complexity levels of the landscapes varied from low (γ = 1) to high (γ 
= 30). Global optimum ߰∗ and the highest second best ݎ߰∗ were set as 1 and 0.75 respectively. 
Then, individuals were randomly positioned in the landscape and random initial velocities drawn 
from the uniform distribution were assigned. Each power model was run on the same landscape, 
with the same initial positions and velocities. Hence, any observed difference in performance and 
convergence can be attributed to the power models only. To smooth out random variations, we 
created S = 2000 landscapes for each complexity level. 
Group size was set at 10 individuals. Regarding the values of power, ݉௛௜௚௛  was defined as a 
mass of 2, whereas low power individuals had ݉௟௢௪ of 0.1. The maximum number of iterations 
T was set to 1000. Additionally, we focused only on a D = 5 dimensional space. Note that in NK 
modeling, the dimensions of the landscape complement each other and thereby determine the 
roughness (complexity) of the landscape. In contrast, complexity in this paper is controlled 
through the number of components γ in the Gaussian landscape generator. Furthemore, in the 
PSO the relationship between dimensions of the landscape is sustained only through the 
objective function as the locations of the best solutions (Trelea, 2003). 
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PSO parameters are usually either determined empirically or set equal to widely used default 
values (Bartz–Beielstein et al., 2004). We employed the latter approach and followed the 
guidelines suggested by Clerc & Kennedy (2002) on how PSO parameters can be chosen (see 
also Trelea, 2003). These authors suggest taking acceleration coefficients for local, c1, and global 
search, c2, equal. Similarly, we set the acceleration coefficient for the gravitational attraction, c3, to 
be equal to the other two acceleration coefficients. The equal acceleration coefficients enable a 
balance between exploitation due to individual search, exploration due to group search, and 
movement due to gravitational forces.  
In addition to simulation experiment 1, we performed simulation experiments 2, 3 and 4 as 
robustness checks to investigate the effect of group size, difference between high and low power, 
and acceleration coefficient for gravitational attraction. See Table 6 for the full list of selected 
parameters used in each simulation experiment.  
Next section presents the results of simulation experiment 1. Robustness analyses performed 
in simulation experiments 2, 3, and 4 are presented in the appendix.  
Results 
The primary interest is to see whether the overall means between power models indicate 
differences on the two outcome variables: performance and convergence. Table 7 presents 
deviations from the overall mean and standard deviation of the means per power model. These 
descriptives show that the meritocratic and bureaucratic power models are the highest and 
lowest performers. Moreover, the evolutionary model on average requires the shortest time to 
converge whereas the meritocratic model takes the longest. To test whether these means 
statistically differ, and to study the differential effects for specific conditions or their interactions, 
we performed MANCOVA by using power models as factors and complexity levels as 
covariates. Under the assumption that the error terms of the two dependent variables 
(performance and convergence) are independent, each dependent variable could be analyzed 
separately by running two ANCOVAs. However, in this case the covariation of performance and 
convergence measures cannot be taken into account and the probability of making a Type I error 
becomes higher. Therefore, we preferred MANCOVA.  
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Wilk’s Lambda was significant for the main effects and the interaction effect (p < .001). 
Results showed that there are significant differences between power models, and complexity is a 
significant covariate on performance (F(5, 359998) = 184.27, p < .001; F(1, 359998) = 36.16, p < 
.001) and convergence (F(5, 359998) = 86.71, p < .001; F(1, 359998) = 1110.63, p < .001). We 
also found a significant interaction effect of the power model and complexity on performance 
(F(5, 359998) = 51.73, p < .001), and on convergence (F(5, 359998) = 4.27, p = .001.).  
Table 8 summarizes the results of multiple comparisons of the differences of the main effects 
of the power models. Similar to our observations in Table 7, the meritocratic model has a better 
performance than the others, however together with the autocratic model it takes the longest 
time to converge to a solution. Conversely, the bureaucratic and evolutionary models perform 
worse than the others, but the evolutionary model requires shorter time to converge compared 
to all the other models. 
One of the drawbacks of statistical approaches in randomly generated large data sets is that 
even the smallest effects can turn out to be significant as the standard error becomes very small 
due to the large number of points sampled (Harrison et al., 2007; Rardin and Uzsoy, 2001). To 
complement the statistical analyses and to provide further insights, the results are visually 
presented in terms of a modified version of performance profiles (Dolan and Moré, 2002). Let 
߰௦,ఠ be the performance for simulation run s and power model ω. Then, the performance ratio 
is defined as 
  
߬௦,ఠ =
߰௦,ఠ
max
ఠ
߰௦,ఠ
. (11) 
This ratio provides a comparison of each power model with respect to the best performing 
power model on a given simulation run. In case of comparison with respect to convergence, 
minimum expression is replaced by maximum. To get an overall comparison of each power 
model over all simulation runs, we define Φఠ as the proportion of power model ߱ of being 
within λ% range of the best performing power model, that is,   
   
Φఠ =
1
ܵ
#{߬௦,ఠ ≥ 1 − ߣ;  ݏ = 1, … , ܵ}, (12) 
where λ is the range to the best performing model and S is the total number of landscapes 
created, and thus is the number of simulation runs. In our case, we limit our focus to the 5% 
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range of the best performing model by setting λ to .05. For convergence, the term 1 − λ changes 
to 1 + λ, and direction of the inequality is reversed. Figure 7 shows the percentage of cases that a 
power model obtains the best performance, or if it is within the 5% range of the power model 
with the highest performance for all six power models under varying complexity levels. Power 
models with larger proportion Φఠ are preferred over the rest (Dolan and Moré, 2002). 
When power is assigned exogenously, in Figure 7 we observe a main effect of the power 
models and an interaction effect between the power models and complexity in terms of 
performance. The autocratic and egalitarian models outperform the bureaucratic model. The 
egalitarian model, having a low level of disparity, performs better than the autocratic model for 
low and moderate complexity levels; however, this difference disappears as the landscapes 
become more complex. The results suggest that the relationship between group performance and 
level of disparity is not linear in terms of the level of disparity. The relationship between 
complexity level and convergence of exogenous power models does not reveal any clear 
differences between the six power models.  
When power is assigned endogenously, we observe a large main effect of the power models 
and a slight interaction effect between the power models and complexity on performance, and a 
main effect on convergence. The diarchic and meritocratic models, which have a higher degree 
of power disparity, perform better than the evolutionary model for all complexity levels. 
However, the evolutionary model outperforms the other two models in terms of convergence. 
The meritocratic model, which has a higher degree of disparity than the diarchic model, has a 
better performance. The relationship is reversed with respect to convergence. 
Figure 7 also compares all the power models simultaneously. When the environmental 
complexity is low, the meritocratic model, which has endogenous power assignment and high 
power disparity, performs the same as the egalitarian model where power disparity is the lowest. 
However, the meritocratic model outperforms all the others as the landscape becomes more 
complex. Furthermore, the difference between the diarchic, autocratic, and egalitarian models 
disappears with complexity. In all cases, the models with moderate disparity levels (e.g., 
bureaucratic and evolutionary) performed the worst. Finally, the results do not show a clear 
distinction between the six models in terms of convergence.  
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Figure 7: Comparison of Power Models in Terms of Performance and Convergence 
a. Performance
 
b. Convergence 
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Let us reconsider the earlier example of a TMT searching the idea space for the optimal 
solutions. TMT members’ strategic search is affected by their past solutions, solutions found by 
the group, and power differences. Imagine that a TMT member, Mary, is located near the 
strategic solution that gives the global optimum. If Mary is the CEO, i.e. the most powerful, she 
can influence others in finding the optimal solution quickly. This is a very desirable situation for 
the group. However, no one is always right. There may be cases where Mary is located at a local 
optimum. In these cases, Mary will derail others from the right direction of finding the solution 
towards herself. In case of low and moderate complex landscapes where the optimum solution is 
easier to be discovered by the other group members, this is basically why the egalitarian model 
performs better than the autocratic model when power is assigned exogenously, i.e. Mary stays as 
the CEO throughout out the search.  
The meritocratic model avoids the cases in which incompetent individuals harness power. A 
meritocratic model ensures that at each decision moment powerful individual steers the TMT 
toward the right strategic direction. Although the merits of such a model are clear when the 
problem landscape is complex, the meritocratic model does not add value in case of low 
complexity. Because the problem space is simpler, Mary and every other group member can find 
the best strategy rather easily by themselves. Hence, there is no need to depend on the most 
competent group member. These results show that power can be both beneficial and detrimental 
depending on the competency of the powerholder. On the one hand, if power is concentrated in 
the hand of an incompetent group member, the results will be destructive to the group 
performance. On the other hand, a competent group member with power can enhance the group 
performance. Hence, it is important to recognize that meritocracy means not only giving all the 
power to the most competent, but also doing so dynamically.  
The main mechanism in our results is how much Mary and other group members are 
influenced by power differences. As the group size increases, relative power of the most 
powerful individual is reduced. Simulation experiment 2 compared power models with respect to 
varying group size. Results of simulation experiment 1 remained qualitatively similar except for 
the large groups. When groups were large, the egalitarian model provided superior results than 
the meritocratic model under low complexity, and performed equally well under high and 
moderate complexity. Furthermore, by definition, the difference between mhigh and mlow measures 
the relative power. The steepness of the power disparity was allowed vary in simulation 
experiment 3. In line with our expectations, as the steepness of the power disparity decreased the 
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differences between power models became smaller. Lastly, the weight of cue on power 
differences, c3, in relation to personal and group search cues, c1 and c2, determines how much an 
individual is influenced by the power differences. Simulation experiment 4 checked the 
robustness of the findings in simulation experiment 1 by varying c3. Since c3 affects all power 
models equally, we did not observe relative performance differences between power models. 
Detailed discussion of and results from these experiments are presented in the electronic 
companion.  
Discussion 
Despite the high consensus on the importance of power (Bunderson 2003, Fiske 1993, Keltner 
et al. 2003, Lammers and Galinsky 2009, Russell 1938, Winter 2009), there is less agreement on 
how to conceptualize it (Astley and Sachdeva 1984, Jasperson et al. 2002). Using the analogy 
between Newtonian mechanics and power, which was frequently mentioned by early scholars in 
power research, we conceptualized power as (1) a relational individual capacity (2) the behavior 
that emanates from this capacity, and (3) the exercise of this capacity in the form of influence on 
others (Göhler, 2009; Lawler and Proell, 2009). This conceptualization does not only bring 
together different dimensions of power (i.e., power as a capacity, behaviors emanating from this 
capacity and exercise of power as influence), but also widens up the avenues for comprehensive 
analytical investigations. We benefited from an agent-based simulation design which allowed for 
a longitudinal analysis and for the detection of complex interactions and nonlinearities. We were 
able to present a comparative investigation of power differences in terms of their disparity level 
and endogenous assignment of power.  
As a result of advancing power research through a multidimensional conceptualization of 
power and consideration of endogenous power assignment, this study has added further insights 
into the contradictory results in the literature proposed by functionalist and conflict theories of 
power (see Anderson and Brown 2010, Lammers and Galinsky 2009 for reviews). When 
exogenous power models are considered, our results provided further evidence against the 
functionalist theory which favors high power disparity over egalitarian distribution of power, and 
contributed to the growing literature in contingency theories of power (e.g., Anderson and 
Brown 2010). We found that low power disparity leads to better performance except in highly 
complex environments. Additionally, functionalist theory argues in favor of competency based 
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assignment of power. When power was assigned endogenously, we found support for the 
functionalist argument that high power disparity leads to high performance.  
When endogenous and exogenous power models are considered together, our results showed 
that under moderate and highly complex landscapes, the egalitarian model was outperformed by 
the meritocratic model which has high power disparity. However, we observed no significant 
differences when the complexity of landscape was low. These results advise concentration of 
power only if the organization is capable of successfully detecting the ‘stars’. If there is no such 
capability and the environment is not complex, our results show that the egalitarian power model 
yields similar outcomes as the meritocratic model. Another interesting result was that models 
with a moderate level of power disparity (i.e., evolutionary and bureaucratic models) led to the 
least performance, regardless of the problem’s complexity level and whether power was assigned 
endogenously or not. However, models with moderate power disparity demonstrated slight 
benefits in terms of faster convergence. All in all, this study suggests that research on distribution 
of power should consider both the level of power disparity and the evolutionary dynamics of 
power appointment. 
Our study has implications for formal approaches in organizational and strategic 
management research. Studies that implemented agent-based simulations were limited to a 
formal design perspective where power and power differences were only analyzed with respect to 
hierarchies. In today’s organizations, informal forms of power are pervasive, and an individual’s 
power may change from one period to another as a function of his/her past performance. Such 
an evolutionary understanding of power has not been sufficiently addressed in this body of 
research. We contribute by considering cases with static hierarchical structures as well as those 
where power is allowed to be informal and dynamic.  
Studies in formal organizational design perspective presented divergent findings in terms of 
convergence times of various power models. For instance, some studies using formal approaches 
in the organizational design noted that a fully centralized hierarchy converges to a solution faster 
than a decentralized hierarchy, in expense of lower performance (Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003, 
Siggelkow and Rivkin 2005). By contrast, Mihm et al. (2010) recently showed that a decentralized 
hierarchy, where decision making is delegated to the lowest levels in the hierarchy, yields faster 
convergence as well as better performance. Sting et al. (2011), on the other hand, did not find 
any significant differences in terms of convergence among leaders with varying knowledge under 
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a collaborative search setting. We found slight convergence differences between six power 
models with respect to complexity, only when power was endogenously assigned. In case of 
exogenous power assignment, the results did not reveal clear distinctions with regard to 
convergence. These results call for future research to further examine the relationship between 
convergence and organizational forms.  
Lastly, this paper contributes to formal approaches in organization and strategy research by 
proposing a novel agent-based simulation technique, namely the particle swarm optimizer (PSO). 
To our knowledge, this paper is one of the first studies that apply the PSO in strategy and 
organization literature (see Poli et al. 2007 for taxonomy of studies that use the PSO). We 
modified the original PSO technique, so that it formally presents strategic decision making. 
While doing so, the PSO takes into account three traditional strategic decision making paradigms 
(see, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992). Developing tools such as the PSO increases the alternatives 
readily available to the scholars in strategic management, organization design and power fields. 
Limitations 
Given the fact that this study utilizes agent-based simulation methodology, a natural limitation is 
the external validity of the findings. Inherent in this approach is the trade-off between parsimony 
and accuracy (Davis et al., 2007). That is, the endeavor of crafting a complex phenomenon like 
power into a rather simple model may cause deviations from the reality. For instance, we utilized 
the laws of nature to analyze power, which is a social phenomenon. The propositions of this 
study as well as the premise that the laws of nature are applicable to organizations need to be 
tested empirically in laboratory and field settings.  
Additionally, any simulation model is an abstraction, yet a useful tool to understand complex 
real-world phenomena such as power. Agent-based simulations are limited in providing a 
sterilized investigation of group interaction. For example, we did not consider acquiescence of 
individuals (Kelman, 1958) or commitment to or implementation of the found solutions. That is, 
we did not consider cases where a manager, for example, complies with a solution as a result of 
the influence of other managers, but does not identify with or internalize this choice to 
implement. Moreover, individuals may differ in their willingness to accept inequalities of power. 
Hofstede (1986) raised this point by arguing that power is a cultural element. Similarly, 
powerholders can vary in their attitudes towards individuals with low power (Halevy et al., 2011). 
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To sustain the parsimony of the simulation model, we overlooked these aspects. 
We considered a dynamic framework where individuals’ power can change with their past 
performance. We assume that performance is observable with certainty. First, an individual may 
have high power not necessarily only because s/he has been a ‘star’ performer, but because s/he 
has other competencies such as leadership and managerial skills. Nevertheless, the status 
characteristics theory, for instance, argues that power in a decision making group is distributed 
according to the ‘performance expectations’ that individuals hold about themselves and other 
members (Berger et al. 1972, Bunderson 2003). That is, in such groups, an individual’s influence 
in the group is derived from the group members’ belief that s/he is going to perform higher and 
to help achieve the group’s goals which is signaled by his/her past performance. Second, 
knowing the outcome and performance of a task with certainty may not be always true. 
Nevertheless, there is still a subset of tasks where the outcome and performance is known. For 
example, Laughlin (1980) defines a continuum of tasks ranging from intellective to judgmental 
tasks. In the former there is a demonstrably correct answer, whereas in the latter no such 
solution exists or is immediately available.  
Future studies can extend our model in various directions by relaxing some of its 
assumptions as well as by adding new futures in the model. For example, various network 
structures can be embedded in the group. The group interaction in our model assumes that once 
a better performance level is reached, this level and its location is common knowledge. However, 
in an organization which is organized in prototypical pyramidal hierarchy, information from 
lower levels needs to move to the top until it reaches the leader (Anderson and Brown, 2010; 
Mihm et al., 2010; Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005). Such a flow may cause information delays and 
distortions. Additionally, the friction and speed of transmission between bottom-up and top to 
bottom information flows is likely to differ. Various power models can be compared under 
different network structures varying in terms of the centrality of the leader, and where the speed 
of information flow is also manipulated. Moreover, individuals in our model are assumed to 
perfectly recall their past performance and the locations they visited. The model can be extended 
by introducing individuals with imperfect recall. Lastly, in this paper once a landscape is created, 
it does not change during the simulation runs and individuals are able to calculate the 
performance of a point on the landscape with certainty. However, in real organizational settings, 
external shocks may occur which in return change the landscape, and uncertainties in assessing 
the performance of a location exist. Therefore, the model in this paper can be further extended 
Power Structures and Adaptation 
100 
by introducing shocks, landscape changes and uncertainty. 
Last but not least, future research can investigate the applicability of the power models. For 
example, our results favored the meritocratic model in high and moderate complexity levels. Yet, 
Castilla and Benard (2010) showed that meritocracy in the workplace causes gender biases where 
male employees were unfairly rewarded compared to females. The authors concluded that 
implementation of meritocracy can be more difficult than expected, and unforeseen side effects 
may emerge. Therefore, in the light of the findings of this study, a potential avenue for future 
research is to investigate the conditions that are necessary to implement and to utilize the 
benefits of respective power models.  
Conclusion 
The present study provides further insights into the discussion of power in the context of degree 
of disparity and endogenous power assignment where informal power structures and 
evolutionary dynamics are present. This study clarifies the contingencies between functionalist 
and conflict theories of power such that the choice between different levels of power disparity 
depends on the ability to assign power according to past performance. Furthermore, the 
analytical and multidimensional conceptualization of power proposed here can help research 
break new ground in more fine-grained and extended analyses of power. 
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Appendix 
In this appendix, we investigate whether group size, the difference between high and low power, 
and magnitude of acceleration coefficient of attraction due to power difference influence the 
comparisons between the six power models. For parsimony, we narrowed our focus to three 
complexity levels, low, moderate and high, where landscapes were created by 5, 15, and 25 
number of Gaussian components.  
Experiment 2: The effect of group size 
We ran a MANOVA with 6 (power models) × 3 (low, moderate, and high complexity) × 4 
(group size of 5, 10, 25, and 40 individuals) where performance and convergence were the two 
outcome variables. Wilk’s Lambda for the main effect of group size, and two-way interactions of 
group size with power models and complexity was significant (p < .001), but not for the three-
way interaction (p = n.s.).  
Results revealed significant main effects of group size, our main variable of interest, both on 
performance and convergence (F(3, 143928) = 6253.03, p < .001; F(3, 143928) = 465.44, p < 
.001). Furthermore, the interaction effects between the power models and group size on 
performance (F(15, 143928) = 6.37, p < .001) and convergence (F(15, 143928) = 59.06, p < 
.001), and between complexity and group size on performance (F(6, 143928) = 11.00, p = < 
.001) were significant. We found non-significant effects for the three-way interaction between 
power model, group size, and complexity on performance and a slightly significant effect on 
convergence (F(30, 143928) = .59, p = n.s.; F(30, 143928) = 1.36, p < .1), the two-way 
interaction between the power models and complexity on convergence (F(15, 143928) = .92, p = 
n.s.), and the two-way interaction between complexity and group size on convergence (F(6, 
143928) = .55, p = n.s.). In Figure A. 1, the results are summarized using performance profile 
representation. We used only moderate complexity to investigate convergence since the 
interaction effect of complexity and group size on convergence was not significant. 
When power is assigned exogenously, under low complexity the egalitarian model performs 
better than the autocratic and bureaucratic models overall. However, in moderate and highly 
complex environments, the egalitarian and autocratic models perform similarly when group size 
is small. The difference in convergence between the power models is distinguishable only in 
Power Structures and Adaptation 
102 
small groups. When power is endogenously assigned, the meritocratic model leads to better 
performance than the evolutionary and diarchic models for all group sizes. The evolutionary 
model provides superior convergence except when the group size is large enough. 
Note that bigger groups span larger areas on the landscape, which is likely to increase 
performance as shown in Figure A. 1. Such dispersion of individuals on the landscape is likely to 
cause a decrease in the relative influence of high powered individuals on each of the low 
powered individuals, since the gravitational force is inversely proportional to the distance. 
Despite a reduction in the steepness of the power disparity due to the increasing group sizes, the 
meritocratic and egalitarian models are still better performers. When groups are large, the 
egalitarian model outperforms the meritocratic model under low complexity, and performs 
similarly under high and moderate complexity.   
Experiment 3: The effect of the difference between high and low power 
Here, we investigate the effect of the difference between high and low power by varying the 
magnitude of the high power, mhigh. We ran a MANOVA with 6 (power models) × 3 (low, 
moderate and high complexity) × 4 (mhigh of .2, .8, 1.4 and 2) where performance and 
convergence were the two outcome variables. Wilk’s Lambda was significant for the main effect 
of power magnitude and two-way interactions of group size with power models and complexity 
(p < .001), but not for the three-way interaction (p = n.s.).  
The results indicated a significant main effect of power size on performance and 
convergence (F(3, 143928) = 5.56, p = .001; F(3, 143928) = 11.25, p < .001), power size’s two-
way interactions with complexity (F(6, 143928) = 4.66, p < .001; F(6, 143928) = 2.07, p < .1), 
and power model (F(15, 143928) = 5.85, p < .001; F(15, 143928) = 8.48, p < .001) on 
performance and convergence respectively. The results are summarized below using 
performance profile representation for low, moderate, and high complexity levels. We used only 
moderate complexity to investigate convergence since we did not find strong support for the 
interaction effect of complexity and power size, and three-way interactions were not significant. 
Figure A. 2 compares the power models with respect to varying power size (mhigh). When 
power is assigned exogenously, there is an observable performance difference between the 
autocratic and egalitarian models only in low complexity conditions. As the magnitude of high 
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power decreases, the difference between the power models disappears. Furthermore, the 
bureaucratic model performs the least, but it outperforms the others in terms of convergence for 
moderate levels of power sizes. When power is endogenously assigned, the meritocratic model 
outperforms others when there is a moderate and high power difference between low and high 
powered individuals. The relationship is reversed in terms of convergence. As in the exogenous 
case, all models perform equally well when power size is low. Since differences are not observed 
in the case of low power size, this observation indicates the reliability of our results in comparing 
the six power models.  
Experiment 4: Weights of personal, social, and power cues 
In our analyses so far, we considered weights of personal, social, and power cues (c1, c2, and c3) to 
be equal. Studies in social decision schemes argue that individuals most often weight different 
cues equally  and group strategy is closest to the case when cue weights are equal (Dawes, 1979; 
Hastie and Kameda, 2005). Nevertheless, we performed additional analyses for the cases where 
the movement of an individual is governed (a) only by power differences (c1 = c2 = 0), and (b) by 
different levels of c3. The first case implies that only the gravitational forces are active in (10). 
This case resulted in lower overall performance for each power model. For example, the 
exogenous models consistently performed the worst since there was no movement affected by 
personal and group search, or by power differences fed by past performance as in evolutionary 
models. Although the model with only power differences is simpler, it lacks elaboration of 
strategic search, and thus diverges from reality.  
In the second case, we varied the levels of c3. We ran a MANOVA with 6 (power models) × 
3 (low, moderate, and high complexity) × 11 (c3 of 0, 0.4, 0.8, 1.2, 1.6, 2, 2.4, 2.8, 3.2, 3.6, 4) 
where performance and convergence were the two outcome variables. Wilk’s Lambda for the 
main effect of group size, and two-way interactions of c3 with power models and complexity was 
significant (p < .001), but not for the three-way interaction (p = n.s.).  
Both for performance and convergence, all main effects and two-way interactions were 
significant except the interaction between power models and complexity on convergence. 
Furthermore, as in Experiments 2 and 3, three-way interaction was not significant for 
performance or convergence. Figure A. 3 summarizes the results using performance profile 
representation. When c3 = 0, there is ‘no power’ influence in the group. Consequently, we 
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observed no performance difference between power models. Furthermore, we observed that the 
conclusions of the first experiment remain valid for performance. We found hardly any 
convergence differences between power models in terms of varying levels of c3.  
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Chapter 5 
 
NETWORK ORIENTATION AND 
OPPORTUNITY COSTS: SHOULD FIRMS 
BALANCE ARM’S LENGTH AND EMBEDDED 
TIES? 
 
Introduction 
 firm’s network structure can leverage benefits beyond the reach of its organizational 
capabilities. Although the majority of network scholars have associated those 
network benefits with structural network properties such as density (sparse vs. dense 
networks), tie strength (weak vs. strong) and position (centrality, brokering) (Burt, 1992; 
Coleman, 1988; e.g., Granovetter, 1973), others have extended the structural deterministic 
view of network theory and underscored the content of network ties (Ahuja, 2000; Jensen and 
Roy, 2008; e.g., Podolny and Baron, 1997). More recently, several authors have continued to 
transcend the structuralist view of network research and have emphasized actors’ behavioral 
characteristics as interacting with network structure and content- and shaping-related 
outcomes (Gulati et al., 2011; Kilduff and Brass, 2010; Obstfeld, 2005; e.g., Pettigrew and 
McNulty, 1995).  
Further extending this behavioral approach, we propose a new behavioral construct called 
network orientation. We define network orientation as the motives driving firms’ choices 
regarding their network partners and conceptualize it as a behavioral characteristic of firms. 
Research on the relational view of the firm provides the examples of General Motors and 
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Toyota, which are consistent with our contention that firms display distinct behavioral 
orientations in their motives for network partner selection (Dyer, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Dyer and Chu, 2000). For General Motors, competitive bidding was the fundamental driver of 
supplier selection, whereas Toyota valued past interactions and incumbents. Consequently, the 
content of the relationships of General Motors was more transactional and resource-based 
than was true for Toyota, which focused on relational, identity-based relationships with its 
exchange partners (Baker, 1990; Podolny and Baron, 1997). This example demonstrates that 
firms have different network orientations that can be more or less transactional or relational. 
On the one hand, a firm with a transactional network orientation chooses a network partner only if 
it offers more favorable trade terms; the decision is based solely on an economic assessment 
of costs and benefits. When another potential partner with a more beneficial offer becomes 
available, the firm switches partners to increase its economic benefits. On the other hand, a 
firm with a relational network orientation chooses a network partner based on ongoing 
relationships and the reputation of the partner in question, to which the firm has a relational 
attachment. 
The present study makes several contributions to social network theory in general and 
embeddedness theory in particular. First, we advance network theory, which has been 
predominantly confined to a structuralist view (Kilduff and Brass, 2010). Our results show 
that a firm’s network orientation directly affects organizational outcomes and is a contingency 
factor for network structure. Thereby, we fill the gap in the behavioral understanding of 
interfirm networks by considering firms’ network orientations. 
Second, we use the behavioral lens to revisit network embeddedness theory. We do so by 
removing the confounding assumption in the embeddedness research that a firm’s type of ties 
(arm’s-length or embedded) indicates the firm’s orientation in terms of partner selection 
(Shipilov, 2005; e.g., Uzzi, 1996; 1997; 1999). The most intriguing finding of our research is 
that embeddedness theory’s recommendation that firms should balance arm’s-length and 
embedded ties (Uzzi, 1996; 1997; 1999) is valid only for the firms with a transactional network 
orientation. In fact, a portfolio-like strategy is detrimental to firms with a relational network 
orientation. 
Third, in addition to assuming a behavioral perspective on interfirm networks, we shed 
Chapter 5 
111 
light on the tradeoffs of networks. The majority of network research have focused on the 
positive effects of interfirm networks (Zaheer et al., 2010). However, a firm’s network 
structure not only facilitates the flow of beneficial resources but also introduces additional 
constraints and risks (Kilduff and Brass, 2010). As Podolny and Page (1998: 73) emphasized, 
“researchers must counterbalance the focus on prevalence and functionality [of networks] 
with an equally strong focus on constraint and dysfunctionality”. Only a few researchers have 
done so (Kim et al., 2006). We show that although a close relationship may generate additional 
benefits and resources that are not readily available in the market, the same relationship may 
generate lock-in and create high opportunity costs where better outside options cannot be 
chosen. 
Transactional and Relational Network Orientation 
Firms encounter several potential network partners. The selection of partners from a set of 
available candidates is significant because it determines the resources to be accessed, the 
quality level signaled to the outside, and the success of the firm (Jensen and Roy, 2008; Uzzi, 
1996). We distinguish between firms based on their motives for choosing particular network 
partners, i.e., their network orientation. On the one hand, we posit that some firms have a 
more transactional network orientation. These firms search the market for alternatives and choose 
a partner based solely on economic expectations. On the other hand, other firms may have a 
relational network orientation. They select a particular network partner because they have a degree 
of relational attachment to the firm stemming from the latter’s reputation, past interactions, or 
referrals. 
Our conceptualization of network orientation stems from the fact that each potential 
partner firm exhibits certain cues, such as the trade terms it offers, its reputation, or its past 
interactions. For example, research in international joint ventures has identified several 
characteristics of potential partners, such as facilities, resources, partner status, and favorable 
past association, that firms use to choose their partners (Geringer, 1991; Tomlinson, 1970). 
Firms favor certain cues and ignore others when selecting their partners. This supposition is 
supported by status characteristics theory, which suggests that “different characteristics have 
different weights” (Berger et al., 1977: 116). Additionally, firms are likely to differ in terms of 
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the weight that they assign to a particular cue, as stated in behavioral decision theory (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1986). These weights, which differ among firms, constitute their network 
orientation. Some firms make transactional decisions, prioritizing cues related to trade terms, 
whereas others base their decisions on relational factors. Behavioral decision theory further 
argues that each decision maker has a “conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies 
associated with a particular choice [which] is controlled partly by the formulation of the 
problem and partly by … personal characteristics of the decision-maker” (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981: 453). Hence, we propose not only that firms differ in the weights that they 
assign to each partner characteristic (i.e., network orientation) but also that their network 
orientation is a behavioral characteristic. 
Our contention that reputation, referrals, and past interactions are emphasized in the 
relational network orientation distinguishes our approach from that of the extant research on 
network partner selection, which predominantly conceptualizes firms’ decisions as based on 
transactional motives. According to such research, firms choose only partners that possess 
complementary resources (e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati and Gargiulo, 
1999; Podolny, 2001), reduce uncertainty (e.g., Beckman et al., 2004), facilitate performance 
aspirations (Baum et al., 2005), or signal higher quality to others (e.g., Podolny, 2001). Yet, we 
know from the behavioral theory of the firm that firms are not purely profit maximizers 
(Gavetti, 2012; Powell et al., 2011); instead, they are “intendedly rational but imperfectly so” 
(Lawler, 2001: 324). Emotions, sentiment, and intrinsic attraction in social exchange between 
network partners also affect firms’ decisions (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961; Lawler and Yoon, 
1998; Lawler, 2001). Hence, we contend that the network partner selection problem is based 
not only on rational and economic concerns related to resource, informational and 
reputational benefits but also on relational motives. Indeed, recent research by Jensen and Roy 
(2008: 500) presented examples in which firms chose their exchange partners based on their 
level of business integrity, defined as “adherence to moral and ethical principles in conducting 
business”. 
Similarly, we conceptualize the relational orientation as motivated by relational attraction 
to partners without any immediate rational expectations or transactional cost/benefit analysis. 
For example, Dyer and Chu (2000) differentiated between U.S. and Japanese car makers. On 
the one hand, U.S. firms switch suppliers to capture short-term gains. On the other hand, the 
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primary motive of Japanese car makers is not to achieve such gains when they offer technical 
assistance to, facilitate information exchange among, and favor incumbent suppliers (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Dyer and Chu, 2000). Instead they intend to create a 
relationship interface (Baker, 1990: 594) conferred by identity-based content (Podolny and 
Baron, 1997). The relational orientation is coded in the institutional logic of Toyota as a 
behavioral characteristic to the degree that Toyota still employed a relational approach when it 
entered the U.S. market (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Dyer and Chu, 2000). This example 
illustrates that for relationally oriented firms, relational factors such as trust, familiarity and 
joint commitment are more important than the transactional gains from trade. Whereas a 
relationally oriented firm may choose to continue working with certain network partners 
because of relational attachments despite the more favorable economic benefits that it could 
accrue from another partner, firms with transactional orientation do not hesitate to switch 
partners to achieve such gains.  
Network orientation as a stable behavioral characteristic 
Various scholars who have focused on interpersonal relationships and interfirm research have 
discussed dichotomies similar to that between the transactional and relational network 
orientations and have provided evidence that network orientation is a stable firm 
characteristic. For example, research on social exchange theory has discussed commitment 
behavior (Lawler and Yoon, 1998; Lawler, 2001) and the distinction between exchange and 
communal relationships (Clark and Mills, 1979; Clark et al., 1987). An individual actor who is 
committed to a relationship is conceptualized as “staying with the focal relation despite good 
alternatives” (Lawler, 2001: 323; see also Seabright et al., 1992). In a communal relationship, 
the individual actor is committed and exhibits high “motivation to be responsive to the 
communal partner’s needs” (Mills et al., 2004: 214), whereas the behavior in an exchange 
relationship is based on the expectation of future returns or the need to make good on 
liabilities (Clark and Mills, 1979; Clark et al., 1987). Clark et al. (1987) argued that differences in 
relationship orientation are dispositional. 
Furthermore, research in relational marketing has distinguished between transactional and 
affective commitment (Ganesan et al., 2010). Transactionally committed firms perform cost-
benefit analyses, whereas affective commitment reflects social and psychological attachment to 
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an exchange partner based on feelings of “identification, loyalty, and affiliation” (Ganesan et 
al., 2010: 362). Additionally, psychological contract research has identified relational and 
transactional forms of psychological contracts. A psychological contract is defined as the 
beliefs regarding the terms of an exchange (Rousseau, 1995). In contrast to relational 
psychological contracts, transactional psychological contracts center on monetary assessment 
and entail limited relational attachment (Ho et al., 2006; Rousseau, 1995). In interpersonal 
network research, Obstfeld (2005: 102) has also proposed a similar dichotomy between tertius 
iungens and tertius gaudens as “a strategic, behavioral orientation toward connecting people in 
one’s social network”. The former refers to an individual’s inclination to serve the group to 
achieve its objectives, whereas the latter highlights rational control of the network structure 
for the sake of personal interest. After having explained network orientation and delineated its 
nomological network, in the following subsection we revisit embeddedness theory using 
network orientation’s behavioral lens. 
A Behavioral Extension of Embeddedness Theory 
In this section, we employ the behavioral perspective on network orientation and revisit 
embeddedness theory, a leading theory in network research (Kilduff and Brass, 2010). 
Embeddedness theory conceptualizes market transactions as a reflection of the social 
structure. Essentially, a transaction is considered to be both economic and social (Ahuja et al., 
2011). The concept of embeddedness distinguishes strong embedded ties from weak arm’s-length 
ties. A firm with embedded ties will concentrate its transactions among a small number of 
network partners with which it has strong ties, whereas in a set of arm’s-length relationships, 
the transactions are distributed among many network partners with which the firm has weak 
ties (Baker, 1990; Eccles and Crane, 1988; Uzzi, 1996; 1997). Whereas embedded relationships 
involve personal and social ties that are based on trust and reciprocity, arm’s-length 
relationships are weaker and more distant; they tend to be common in atomistic and 
competitive market settings (Shipilov, 2005; Uzzi, 1997). 
It is more common for empirical studies to discuss the mechanisms that best explain the 
positive association between embeddedness and organizational performance (Gulati and 
Sytch, 2007; e.g., McEvily and Marcus, 2005). Embedded relationships facilitate informal 
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mechanisms such as trust, joint problem-solving activities, and fine-grained information 
exchange (Gulati and Sytch, 2007; Uzzi, 1996; 1997). Furthermore, they equip firms with 
informational benefits that mitigate transaction uncertainty, ensuring favorable trade terms 
(Uzzi, 1996; 1997). Consequently, embedded relationships provide access to more benefits 
than are offered in the market by alternative partners outside of a firm’s network (Uzzi, 1996). 
Thus, as a firm becomes more embedded, the cost of overlooking outside alternatives (i.e., the 
opportunity cost) decreases. 
An increase in a firm’s proportion of embedded ties may not always be advantageous. The 
costs of maintaining a network with many embedded ties may exceed the potential benefits of 
such a network because of reciprocal expectations regarding trust and the risk of 
opportunism. For example, Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993: 1339) warned that over-
embeddedness may “turn promising enterprises into welfare hotels”. Alternatively, over time, 
the resources provided by the network partners may depreciate in value and become obsolete 
(Afuah, 2000; Lin et al., 2007). The more a firm is embedded in its respective network, the 
more it will complete transactions and maintain ties within its network (Kilduff & Brass, 
2010). Extensive embeddedness may lock the firm into an isomorphic network structure in 
which access to non-redundant information is limited (Burt, 1992; Hansen, 1999; Uzzi, 1997). 
Consequently, the firm may become confined to its network and not receive information on 
outside options, or it may not be feasible for the firm to end its existing relationships and 
switch to more advantageous ones. Over-reliance on certain network partners causes firms to 
overlook better outside alternatives (Ahuja et al., 2009), increasing the opportunity cost of 
embedded relationships. Hence, the very same relationship structure that initially provided 
significant competitive advantage can become a liability beyond a certain threshold of 
embeddedness. This phenomenon is called ‘the paradox of embeddedness’ by Uzzi (1996; 
1997). Embeddedness theory thus proposes that there is an optimal degree of embeddedness 
in which a firm cultivates a mix of arm’s-length and embedded ties. 
Embeddedness theory treats firms as rational actors that actively optimize portfolios of 
ties that include embedded and arm’s-length ties (Krippner and Alvarez, 2007). However, this 
perspective has been criticized for overlooking micro-level elements such as attributes and 
affect (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994; Krippner and Alvarez, 2007). More importantly, 
embeddedness research has confounded embeddedness as a network parameter (e.g., tie 
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strength) and embeddedness as a behavioral characteristic of firms (e.g., motives for partner 
selection). For instance, Shipilov (2005: 282) argued that “arm’s-length firms choose partners 
primarily based on the comparison of either prices or the quality of partners’ products with 
those offered by other market participants”. In his ethnographic investigation of firm-bank 
relationships, Uzzi (1999: 489) documented that “arm’s-length ties put a relationship out for 
bidding … it’s price oriented”, while an embedded relationship is “an emotion-based bond” 
(Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002: 600). It is unclear from these descriptions whether the outcomes of 
embeddedness are due to tie strength or network orientation in terms of the firm’s motives 
for partner selection. Moreover, a firm may have an embedded or arm’s-length relationship, 
but its motive for forming this relationship may be relational or transactional.  
Thus, we distinguish between embeddedness as a network property and a network 
orientation, determining the behavioral characteristics that firms display in choosing network 
partners. We argue that the strength of a network tie is different from the motives used to 
select a network partner. In the following subsection, we further hypothesize that firms’ 
network orientations directly influence their opportunity costs and moderate the relationship 
between embeddedness and opportunity costs.  
Hypotheses 
“Underlying all social exchanges is the norm of reciprocity” (Ho et al., 2006: 461). The 
network orientation that a firm employs in choosing its partners is therefore likely to be 
mirrored by its network partners. If a firm has a transactional network orientation, its 
network partners are more likely to respond with a more transactional approach than a 
relational approach. In contrast, firms with a relational orientation affectively commit to a 
relational psychological contract in their relationships (Ganesan et al., 2010; Rousseau, 
1995), which creates commitment and attachment to each relationship (Reagans and 
McEvily, 2003). Furthermore, the attachment and commitment of the firm within the 
relationship are likely to be reciprocated by the other party (Granovetter, 1973; Ho et al., 
2006; Rousseau, 1995). Such an attachment generates a close and communal relationship 
between the firms, one in which the partner attends to the firm’s well-being and offers 
extra benefits that are not readily available in the transactional market (Aron et al., 1991; 
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Clark and Mills, 1979; Clark et al., 1987). Thus, the relational orientation makes both 
network parties invest effort and mobilize resources to help each other (Reagans and 
McEvily, 2003). These attachments also generate trust between the network parties and 
confidence in the relationship.  
In contrast, transactional firms are less relationally attached to their network partners. 
These firms search the market for the best alternatives. They are ready to end a 
relationship and switch to another partner that provides more profitable trade terms. This 
tendency is reciprocated; the network partner reacts in the same way and does not offer 
favorable terms. For example, Eccles and Crane (1988) noted that some firms would like 
to work with multiple banks (i.e., in arm’s-length relationships) but also desire the 
advantages of an embedded relationship. This paradox among firms with a transactional 
orientation is difficult to resolve because the network partners respond transactionally as 
well due to reciprocity (Eccles and Crane, 1988), thus declining to offer favorable trade 
terms. Similarly, Helper (1991: 817) noted that some U.S. automakers continuously search 
for alternative bids and switch partners, which creates a ‘legacy of mistrust’. 
Consequently, whereas relationally oriented firms gain additional benefits that are not 
readily available in the market structure because of mutual commitment, firms that 
display a transactional orientation do not receive favorable terms and only receive market 
prices.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The more relational (transactional) a firm’s network 
orientation, the lower (higher) the opportunity costs it experiences. 
 
In addition to positing this main effect of network orientation, we propose that the 
relationship between the levels of embeddedness and opportunity cost differ for firms 
with different network orientations. Firms with a transactional orientation do not 
experience relational attachment and continuously scan the market for alternatives. They 
are more likely to switch network partners as soon as they identify a better alternative. 
Switching allows firms to avoid being locked into an embedded network, which, in turn, 
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reduces opportunity costs. Yet, if a firm becomes too embedded, switching becomes 
more difficult due to increased informational redundancy, which limits firms’ search 
capabilities. Additionally, given that they have a transactional network orientation, such 
firms may fail to obtain offers that are more favorable than those available in the market. 
Hence, we agree that, as predicted by the embeddedness paradox, there is a U-shaped 
relationship between embeddedness and opportunity costs for firms with a transactional 
orientation such that a firm has lower opportunity costs when it balances arm’s-length 
and embedded ties.  
However, we propose that this prediction from embeddedness theory is only accurate 
for firms with a transactional network orientation, whereas the relationship is reversed for 
firms with a relational network orientation. Whereas firms with a transactional orientation 
gain extra benefits only if they become more embedded, these benefits are already within 
reach of relationally oriented firms due to their network orientation (cf. Hypothesis 1). 
However, firms with a relational network orientation will find that increasing 
embeddedness makes them both relationally and structurally enmeshed in a network of 
few partners. The result is a lock-in situation in which the firm must forego favorable 
outside options due to information redundancy (Hansen, 1999; Uzzi, 1997) and simply 
because this type of relational and structural attachment is harder to end.  
Above a particular embeddedness threshold, the opportunity costs for relationally 
oriented firms are likely to decrease. Because the highly embedded relationships among 
relationally oriented firms are close and communal relationships in which the boundaries 
of the self fade away, the firm includes others in the self, and network partners experience 
“a sense of we-ness” (Aron et al., 1991: 242). Brewer (1991: 476) states that “when the 
definition of self changes, the meaning of self-interest and self-serving motivations also 
changes accordingly”. The partner firm identifies with the firm and internalizes and acts 
to further the interests and outcomes of the firm (Clark and Mills, 1979; Clark et al., 
1987). The reformulation of the self in intimate relationships (Aron et al., 1991; e.g., Clark 
and Mills, 1979; Clark et al., 1987) is quite similar to Uzzi’s (1999: 489) observation 
regarding bank representatives: “[A]fter he [the entrepreneur] becomes a friend, you want 
to see your friend’s success and that goes along many lines … So there’s a lot of things 
that you kind of from a moral standpoint take into effect”. The bank representative’s 
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internalization of the firm’s interests yields “relational rents” (Dyer and Singh, 1998) for 
the firm, reducing its opportunity costs because the partner is committed to investing in 
the relationship and perceives the firm’s successes and failures as his/her own. 
Conversely, transactionally oriented firms demonstrate a lack of commitment, switching 
tendency, and transactional concerns, all of which prevent the formation of close and 
communal relationships with network partners. Consequently, we argue that for 
relationally oriented firms, there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between 
embeddedness and opportunity costs in which opportunity costs are the highest when 
embedded and arm’s-length ties are balanced. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Network orientation moderates the relationship between 
embeddedness and the opportunity costs of a firm. For firms with a transactional 
orientation, there is a U-shaped relationship between embeddedness and the 
opportunity cost of the firm in which a mix of arm’s-length and embedded ties is 
associated with lower opportunity cost. In contrast for relationally network oriented 
firms, this relationship is reversed. 
 
This hypothesis is particularly important because it challenges the popular strategy 
recommendation associated with embeddedness theory: that firms should balance embedded 
and arm’s-length ties. Although we agree that a curvilinear relationship exists between 
embeddedness and opportunity costs, as proposed by the embeddedness theory, we argue that 
a mix of arm’s-length and embedded ties is beneficial only to firms with a transactional 
orientation; rather, it is detrimental for relationally oriented firms.  
Data and Methods 
The hypotheses were tested using a data set obtained from the 2003 National Survey of Small 
Business Finances (“NSSBF” hereafter) administered by the Federal Reserve Bank. We chose 
this context and dataset for two reasons. First, the survey provided extensive information 
about firm and owner characteristics, financial service inventories and detailed information on 
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firm-bank relationships. Second, similar NSSBF surveys were conducted earlier, in 1987, 1993 
and 1998. The resulting datasets were highly similar to those of the later survey, and these 
earlier versions were used by other researchers who investigated the embeddedness of firm-
bank interactions (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002). 
Hence, using this dataset enabled us to compare our results directly with those of previous 
studies of embeddedness.  
The target population of the NSSBF survey was all for-profit, non-financial, non-farm, 
non-subsidiary U.S. firms that had fewer than 500 employees and were in operation as of year-
end 2003. The data included information on 4240 firms that were sampled from 6.3 million 
small businesses via a stratified random sampling procedure based on the number of 
employees, urban/rural status, and census divisions (see Federal Reserve Board, 2008). Sixty 
percent of the responding firms were corporations, 83 percent were family owned, and 19 
percent were owned by women. In the sample, 41 percent of the firms were operating in the 
service industry, 19 percent in retail and 12 percent in manufacturing. Note that the NSSBF 
data sample is stratified random rather than simple random. Therefore, in our analyses, we use 
the sampling weights contained in the NSSBF data to estimate the population statistics. 
The survey was completed in two stages: a screener interview used to verify each firm’s 
eligibility and a main phone interview prior to which pre-mailed worksheets were completed. 
The phone interviews lasted 59 minutes on average. A firm was considered ineligible if the 
respondent was not the owner. A survey was considered completed if the overall item 
response rate was at least 75 percent. Note that 1.8 percent of the observations were imputed 
with 5 implicates. Our results were consistent for all of the implicates. Thus, we report only 
the results using the first implicate. 
Dependent variable 
The context is ego networks of firms with banks. A firm-bank relationship is formed if the 
firm accesses credit from the bank. To investigate the opportunity cost of such a relationship, we 
focused on the most recent loan received by the firm. In this context, the outside option for 
the firm would be the opportunity to acquire the same type of the credit from another bank. 
Thus, a firm accrues an opportunity cost if it could have received the same loan from another 
bank at a lower interest rate.  
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To calculate the opportunity cost of the bank-firm relationship, we subtracted the interest 
rate received from the current bank from the average interest rate that was available outside of 
the network for the same type of loan and multiplied it by the amount of credit requested. We 
took the log of the opportunity cost to account for right skewness. Note that the amount of 
the loan requested applied for was different from the amount granted for 246 of 1761 firms 
that received loans. The results remained qualitatively similar when the opportunity cost was 
calculated using the amount of credit sought instead of the amount granted (correlation = 
0.99, p < 0.001).   
Independent variables 
Our main independent variables are embeddedness and network orientation. We followed Uzzi 
(1999) and Shipilov (2005) in operationalizing the degree of a firm’s use of embedded ties and 
arm’s-length relationships. We operationalized embeddedness using the Herfindahl index as 
∑ ௝ܲ
ଶே
௝ୀଵ , where j varies from 1 to N banks and ௝ܲ is the proportion of the banking business 
that the firm had conducted with bank j. As in Uzzi (1999), we defined ௝ܲ with reference to 
the savings, checking, and line-of-credit accounts that had been identified by earlier 
researchers as the fundamental accounts in the firm-bank relationship. This index varies 
between 0, which indicates arm’s-length relationships (i.e., that the firm’s banking business is 
dispersed among many banks), and 1, which indicates an embedded relationship (i.e., that the 
firm’s entire banking business is concentrated on one bank).  
We chose this measure of embeddedness for two reasons. First, this measure was used in 
earlier research to describe the embeddedness paradox (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Shipilov, 2005; Uzzi, 1996; 1997). Second, these studies exhibited construct and face validity. 
This operationalization of embeddedness called ‘first order network coupling’ (Shipilov, 2005; 
e.g., Uzzi, 1996) and ‘network complementarity’ (e.g., Uzzi, 1999). There are other measures 
used in network research, such as duration and multiplexity, that measure the relational aspect of 
embeddedness; network size has been used to measure the structural aspect of embeddedness 
(e.g., Uzzi, 1999). We controlled for those relational and structural measures of embeddedness 
but used first-order network coupling as our main embeddedness measure to directly address 
the earlier research on the embeddedness paradox (Baum et al., 2005; e.g., Uzzi, 1996; 1999).  
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Our second main independent variable is network orientation. The NSSBF survey asked each 
firm to state up to three reasons why it chose to apply for a loan from a particular bank. On 
average, each firm provided 1.36 reasons. The open-ended responses were then recoded as 
responses within 54 categories (Federal Reserve Board, 2008). These categories included credit 
policies or experience, institution characteristics and offerings, account terms, relationships 
and referrals, miscellaneous reasons, and other.  
Two PhD students in strategic management who were not otherwise involved in the 
present study coded each of these 54 categories as transactional, relational, or other. 
Transactional and relational reasons were coded as 0 and 1, respectively. The two coders were 
in agreement regarding the coding (Cohen’s kappa = 0.90) 94 percent of the time. Mismatches 
were resolved by the authors. To allow the replication of our results by other researchers, we 
provide the final coding of the reasons in the appendix. 
Thirty-three percent of the reasons mentioned were transactional, 60 percent were 
relational, and 7 percent were coded as ‘other.’ For instance, reason 57 in the NSSBF survey is 
‘long-term relationship/ ongoing relationship/ prior relationship’, which highlights that the 
bank was chosen to refine an embedded relationship. In contrast, reason 43, which is ‘low 
interest rate and/or low loan (origination) fees’, is an example of a transactional motive. 
Reasons categorized as other were discarded. There were 149 firms whose only identified 
reason was in the ‘other’ category. These observations were coded as missing.  
A firm’s network orientation was measured as the average of the category scores for its 
reasons. Network orientation in this study varies between 0 (i.e., the firm has a transactional 
network orientation) and 1 (i.e., the firm is relationally oriented). Values between 0 and 1 
indicate a mixed orientation.   
Control variables 
To better test our hypotheses and rule out alternative explanations for our findings, we 
controlled for relational and structural embeddedness and for several organizational, market 
and loan characteristics that may affect opportunity costs and access to loans. We selected 
control variables following previous empirical research in finance and economics and based 
on the embeddedness research that has utilized NSSBF data (Berger and Udell, 1995; Berger et 
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al., 2007; Blanchflower et al., 1998; Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; 
e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002; Vickery, 2008).  
The economic perspective regarding firm-bank relationships holds that banks accrue 
private information regarding firms’ financial situations as the duration and multitude of each 
relationship increases (Berger and Udell, 1995). In addition, according to the embeddedness 
theory, duration and multiplexity reinforce the strength of the relationship (Uzzi, 1999). We 
therefore included relational embeddedness controls, the duration of the firm’s relationship 
with the bank that granted the loan (in years) (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Uzzi, 1999) and the 
multiplexity of the relationship with the bank (i.e., the number of financial services used by the 
firm, including credit-related services, cash management services, pension services, brokerage 
services, and card processing services, checking, savings, lines of credit, capital leases, business 
mortgages, equipment loans, motor vehicle loans, other loans, transactions services (Seabright 
et al., 1992; Uzzi, 1999). The size of a firm’s bank network also affects its ability to seek 
alternatives and both signals and determine its dependence on its current partner(s) (Gulati 
and Sytch, 2007; Hansen, 1999). We controlled for structural embeddedness via network size, 
measured as the number of banks with which the firm had worked. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) found that organizational characteristics such as size and age 
influence interest rates. Hence, we controlled for organizational characteristics such as 
organization age, number of employees, log of total sales, corporate status (coded 1 if yes), debt ratio (total 
liabilities/total assets) and acid ratio (current assets minus inventory/current liabilities). Note 
that we observed some outliers in determining the debt and acid ratios. We retained those 
outliers because the NSSBF manual indicated that the financial data were already reviewed and 
because the survey weights were tuned to account for influential observations (Federal 
Reserve Board, 2008). Additionally, several studies documented evidence of discrimination 
against minority-owned businesses with regard to loan access within the NSSBF data set (e.g., 
Blanchflower et al., 1998; Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002). We thus 
controlled for gender and minority status in examining firm ownership and considered 
whether each firm was a family firm. A firm was defined as female-owned, minority-owned, or 
family-owned if more than 50 percent of the shares were owned by females, minorities, or a 
single family, respectively. We also controlled for whether the owner or the firm had declared 
bankruptcy in the last seven years (coded 1 if yes).  
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Vickery’s (2008) finding indicating that small firms manage their interest rate risk by 
choosing between fixed-rate and variable-rate loans highlights the influence of loan 
characteristics on the interest rates received. To control for loan characteristics, we measured 
loan maturity, determined whether the loan was fixed (1 if yes) and whether collateral was 
required (1 if yes), and identified the loan type (e.g., a new line of credit, a capital lease, a 
mortgage for business purposes, a vehicle loan for business purposes, an equipment loan, or 
another type of loan). The NSSBF survey recorded loans accessed at different periods. 
Therefore, we controlled for the prime rate as of the date of the loan application. Moreover, we 
controlled for the ratio of the amount sought to the firm’s total assets (loan/asset ratio) and the 
bond spread (the yield of corporate bonds rated BAA minus the yield of 10-year government 
bonds at the time of the loan application).  
How competitive the lending market is may also affect access to loans and interest rates 
(Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Similarly, interest rates may be 
geographically differentiated. Therefore, we controlled for market characteristics via a bank 
competition index in the firm’s locale (1 = low, 2 = moderate, 3 = high competition), industry 
using two-digit SIC codes, and region using census divisions. Table 9 reports the correlations 
among the variables. 
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Results 
In the NSSBF dataset, only 41 percent of the firms acquired loans or provided information on 
recently approved loans. Receiving credit requires an endogenous process; a firm’s access to 
credits is not random (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Uzzi, 1999). This fact causes sample selection 
bias. Therefore, we performed the Heckman correction using a two-step approach to account 
for sample selection bias. In the first step, we ran a probit model to estimate whether credit was 
accessed (coded 1). The Inverse Mills ratio obtained in the first step was then entered in the 
second step, which required the use of ordinary least-squares estimation for the model of interest 
(Greene, 2003). 
Table 10 presents the estimation results for loan application success, i.e., the selection model, 
and the opportunity cost of each relationship. As previously discussed, the dependent variable of 
opportunity cost was observable only if the firm in question received a loan. The selection model 
used in the first step of the Heckman two-stage procedure estimated the determinants of access 
to credit. The results showed that family firms and larger firms (in terms of both the number of 
employees and total sales) were more likely to obtain loans. In addition, if the owner or the firm 
had declared bankruptcy in the past seven years, the firm was less likely to receive a loan. The 
control variables in the model used to estimate the opportunity costs indicated that loan 
characteristics such as maturity, a fixed rate loan, collateral requirement and loan types influenced 
the opportunity costs. The bound spread at the time of the loan application was positively 
associated with opportunity costs. We did not find any significant effects of the duration of the 
bank-firm relationship or of network size. However, we found a marginal effect of network 
multiplexity: as the multiplexity of the firm-bank relationship increased, the opportunity cost of 
the relationship became higher.  
Hypothesis 1 argues that firms with a more relational network orientation have lower 
opportunity costs. The results showed that as the network orientation of a firm became more 
relational, the opportunity cost of the loan decreased. This result supported Hypothesis 1. 
Relationally oriented firms can leverage the reciprocity of their orientation and obtain interest 
rates that are lower than they would otherwise obtain. As a result, although a transactional 
network orientation allows a firm to search for better alternatives in the market, a relational 
orientation will allow that firm to beat market prices, which in turn will lower the opportunity 
cost of the loan.  
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Table 10: Results of Heckman’s two-step procedure regression analyses 
  Loan Accessed 
(Selection Model) 
  
Opportunity Cost     
Independent Variable Coefficient S.E.   Coefficient S.E. 
Constant -5.351** (1.871)    16.046** (1.328) 
Network orientation         -4.384* (1.872) 
Embeddedness  4.705** (1.234)     -7.620* (3.444) 
(Embeddedness)2 -3.129** (.819)      4.708* (2.338) 
Network orientation*Embeddedness        12.550* (5.314) 
Network orientation*(Embeddedness)2         -8.303* (3.528) 
Control variables           
Duration of the firm-bank relationship           -.005  (.007) 
Multiplexity of the firm-bank relationship       .034† (.020) 
Network size .188** (.019)       -.062  (.046) 
Loan maturity         .081** (.016) 
Fixed-rate loan       -.355** (.119) 
Collateral on loan            .303** (.109) 
Loan type: New line of credit          -.647** (.164) 
Loan type: Capital lease        -1.833** (.487) 
Loan type: Mortgage          -.396  (.253) 
Loan type: Vehicle        -1.015** (.193) 
Loan type: Equipment        -1.372** (.194) 
Loan type: Line of credit renewal          -.626** (.208) 
Bond spread            .265* (.122) 
Loan prime rate            .014  (.067) 
Loan/Asset ratio            .020  (.017) 
Debt ratio          -.001   .000 
Acid ratio            .000  .000 
Corporation     -.149** (.056)        .034  (.142) 
Age of firm   .000  (.002)        .002  (.006) 
Family-owned firm     .162* (.068)       
Female-owned firm .095  (.059)       
Minority-owned firm  .102  (.080)       
Number of employees      .006** (.001)       
Total sales (log)      .186** (.018)       
Bankruptcy   -.129* (.054)       
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Bank competition index  .016  (.037)       
Industry: Mining .248  (1.813)       
Industry: Construction      1.725  (1.857)       
Industry: Manufacturing  .230  (1.812)       
Industry: Transportation/Public utilities  .288  (1.812)       
Industry: Retail trade .077  (1.814)       
Industry: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate .030  (1.812)       
Industry: Services .016  (1.813)       
Industry: Public administration .038  (1.811)       
Region:  New England           -.391  (.276) 
Region:  Middle Atlantic           -.332  (.233) 
Region:  East North Central           -.425* (.199) 
Region:  West North Central           -.363† (.220) 
Region:  South Atlantic           -.209  (.197) 
Region:  East South Central           -.524† (.268) 
Region:  West South Central           -.628** (.225) 
Region:  Mountain           -.679** (.239) 
            
Sigma         2.082**   
Log likelihood         -3086   
Rho          -.825**   
† p < .1, * p < .05,   ** p < .01 (two-tailed)           
N = 3793, Missing values: 447           
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Figure 8: Visualization of the interaction between network embeddedness and 
network orientation 
In Hypothesis 2, we propose that the effect of embeddedness on the opportunity cost of a 
loan is moderated by network orientation. The results presented in Table 10 show the significant 
interaction effect of network orientation with both the linear and squared embeddedness terms, 
which supports Hypothesis 2. Figure 8 depicts the interaction between embeddedness and 
network orientation. For firms with a transactional orientation, a mix of arm’s-length and 
embedded relationships was optimal. These firms had higher opportunity costs when they 
concentrated their banking business in only one bank via embedded ties or distributed it among 
many banks with arm’s-length ties; having a mix of arm’s-length and embedded ties was not 
favorable. In contrast, for firms with a relational network orientation, the curvilinear relationship 
was reversed; a mixed portfolio strategy generated the highest opportunity costs. One interesting 
finding was that in cases of low embeddedness, relationally oriented firms had lower opportunity 
costs for loans than did the firms with a transactional orientation. These results imply that firms 
achieve lower opportunity costs when they diversify their banking business among many banks 
with arm’s-length relationships if they have a relational network orientation. In contrast, 
transactionally oriented firms over-value short-term trade gains. However, the relational 
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orientation should be treated with caution because opportunity costs for these firms increase 
with the level of embeddedness.  
Embeddedness and the squared term of embeddedness have significant effects according to 
this study. We found a curvilinear relationship between a firm’s embeddedness and its 
opportunity costs: the opportunity cost of embeddedness was the lowest when the firm had a 
mix of arm’s-length and embedded ties. This result validated the findings of the earlier studies on 
the embeddedness paradox, which in turn reinforced the reliability of the findings of the present 
study.  
Discussion 
We assumed a behavioral perspective on social network theory and reformulated embeddedness 
theory accordingly. We argued that firms differ in terms of their motives for choosing their 
network partners. Some firms select network partners based on a purely economic rationale, 
whereas for others partnering decisions have a more relational basis. 
The results supported our conceptualization of network orientation as a behavioral firm 
characteristic that is independent of embeddedness. We found that the opportunity cost of a 
relationship was lower when firms were more relationally oriented. These firms obtained benefits 
from their network partners that were not available under market conditions, which lowered the 
cost of foregoing outside alternative partners. Our results also demonstrated that a balance of 
arm’s-length and embedded ties is in fact not optimal for relationally oriented firms. Indeed, we 
found that such a strategy was detrimental to these firms.  
These results have important implications for social network and embeddedness theory. 
First, the present study highlights the importance of extending the structuralist view of social 
network theory to consider firms’ behavioral characteristics. Second, the strategy 
recommendations regarding the balance of arm’s-length and embeddedness ties should vary 
based on the firm’s network orientation. Third, when a firm forms a network relationship with 
another firm, both firms access to benefits and opportunity costs accrue – the latter due to the 
relationships the firm has resultantly forgone. In the following subsections, we further elaborate 
on these contributions of our study. 
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Behavioral understanding of social network theory 
The social network and embeddedness theories characterize economic activities as related to 
social relationships rather than as purely focused on utility maximization among atomistic, 
autonomous market players (Zaheer et al., 2010). Despite the accomplishments of these theories 
in altering the pure economic paradigm of firms, they have been criticized for their overemphasis 
on the structural properties of networks: for overlooking behavioral considerations (Gulati et al., 
2011; Kilduff and Brass, 2010; e.g., Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). For instance, one would 
expect two firms with the same network size, position in the network and tie strength to exhibit 
similar organizational outcomes (Kilduff and Brass, 2010; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). 
However, these firms may differ in their way of approaching and using their network 
relationships, which may result in differences between their organizational outcomes (Gulati et 
al., 2011). Only recently have studies begun to challenge the dominant structuralist view of 
network theory by considering firm characteristics (e.g., absorptive capacity, bargaining power, 
the ability to check non-cooperativeness) as a component of the network structure-performance 
relationship (e.g., Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Shipilov, 2006; 2009). To focus solely on network 
structures or tie strength rather than also considering behavioral attributes will yield a less fine-
grained understanding of networks (Gulati et al., 2011). 
The present paper has demonstrated that firms’ network orientations, as behavioral 
characteristics, also play a significant role. We considered why firms chose their network partners 
in firm-bank relationships and showed that firms that selected their network partners based on 
relational motives obtained more favorable trade terms than they would have from outside 
options. As Kanter (1994: 100) notes, “[interfirm relationships] seem to work best when they are 
more familylike and less rational”. In addition to the direct effect of network orientation, we 
found that network orientation moderated the relationship between the level of embeddedness 
and opportunity costs.  
Balancing arm’s length and embedded ties 
Working from our conclusion regarding the behavioral approach to network theory, the present 
study extended embeddedness theory and emphasized behavior in network partner selection. We 
observed that embeddedness theory confounded tie strength, which is a network property, with 
the behaviors attributed to tie strength (Shipilov, 2005; e.g., Uzzi, 1996; 1997; 1999). The present 
Network Orientation and Opportunity Costs 
132 
paper separated these two qualities. We have thereby introduced firms’ network orientation as a 
behavioral characteristic.  
We investigated a popular strategy recommendation of embeddedness theory: that firms 
balance arm’s-length and embedded ties. Our results revealed that a mixed portfolio strategy in 
this regard is beneficial only if firms select their network partners based on transactional motives. 
More importantly, this strategy was less beneficial for relationally oriented firms. Thus, our 
results indicated that the correctness of this strategy recommendation is contingent on firms’ 
behavioral characteristics, i.e., whether the firms in question are transactionally or relationally 
oriented. This finding is in line with the results of Shipilov (2005), who attributed his findings to 
the horizontal nature of the network context he was studying rather than to the behavioral 
characteristics of the firms that he examined. 
It is significant that the present study employed a newer version of the data set used by the 
earlier studies that investigated the embeddedness paradox (e.g., Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi and Gillespie, 
2002). We confirmed the findings of these studies that show that there is a curvilinear 
relationship between opportunity costs and embeddedness, but we also found support for the 
moderating role of network orientation. Our ability to validate the earlier research by using a 
similar data set further strengthens the reliability of our findings. 
Opportunity costs of network relationships 
In addition to examining network orientation, the present study focused on the tradeoffs of 
networks. The extant research on social network theory is dominated by a focus on the positive 
outcomes of network characteristics (Kim et al., 2006; Zaheer et al., 2010). For instance, the ties 
that a firm forms with other firms provide access to critical resources, such as tacit and explicit 
knowledge (Ahuja, 2000; Burt, 2004; Rowley et al., 2000). Such ties also provide information 
about new capabilities (McEvily and Marcus, 2005), establish trust (Ingram and Roberts, 2000), 
increase the firm’s bargaining power (Burt, 1992); and signal quality (Jensen, 2008; Podolny, 
2001). However, embeddedness research has also suggested that over-embedded ties can 
generate redundant information sources (Burt, 1992; Hansen, 1999; Uzzi, 1997), encourage the 
formation of rigid routines and resources that hamper growth and change (Lavie et al., 2011), and 
create vulnerability when network partners’ resources become obsolete (Afuah, 2000; Shipilov, 
2005). 
We extended this research on the negative aspects of networks in two ways. First, consistent 
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with the earlier research, we focused on the opportunity costs associated with embedded 
networks. We showed that when firms with a relational network orientation became more 
embedded, they were locked into a set of relationships that were fortified by the level of 
embeddedness and relational attachment. An increase in the level of embeddedness resulted in 
higher opportunity costs for these firms by making it necessary for them to forego better outside 
options. Second, we demonstrated that the trade-off between embeddedness and opportunity 
costs was contingent on the behavioral characteristics of the firms we examined.  
Limitations 
The nature of the data in the present paper only allowed a cross-sectional investigation of the 
hypothesized relationships. Although we justified the directionality of the relationships between 
our variables on theoretical grounds, longitudinal research should be conducted to validate our 
theories. Future research should also employ longitudinal data to further examine network 
dynamics. As Ahuja et al. (2011) rightly stated, “most of our theorizing often suggests a curiously 
static and passive approach on the part of these actors with respect to the network itself.” Porac 
et al. (1989) found that the strategic choices of Scottish knitwear firms influenced their network 
structure. This structure filtered the information to which the firms had access and shaped their 
cognition, which in turn affected their strategic choices. In analyzing the dynamics of networks, 
future research can also uncover these types of endogenous loops among networks, behaviors, 
and cognition. Another limitation of the present study is that it only considers vertical network 
structures of firms and banks. For example, in his study of the horizontal networks of Canadian 
syndicates, Shipilov (2005) also noted findings that were contrary to mainstream embeddedness 
research. Hence, future research needs to account for the difference between horizontal and 
vertical networks.  
Conclusion 
The present study employed firms’ network orientation as a behavioral characteristic that 
influenced their choice of network partners. We demonstrated evidence that the motives for 
partner selection are important; as firms become more relationally oriented, they experience 
lower opportunity costs. Furthermore, we revisited a suggestion from network embeddedness 
theory – that firms cultivate a mix of arm’s length and embedded ties – and investigated the 
potential detrimental effects of embeddedness. Our results showed that this type of strategy was 
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harmful for firms that chose their network partners based on relational motives. The present 
study contributes to social network theory by introducing network orientation as a behavioral 
characteristic of firms and furthers embeddedness theory by demonstrating that a balance of 
embedded and arm’s-length ties may be either beneficial or detrimental based on a firm’s 
network orientation.  
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Appendix 
Table A3. Reasons to apply for a loan from a particular bank 
 
 
ID Reason ID Reason
Relational network orientation Calculative network orientation
11 Previous loan, loan when starting business 10 Credit availability
17 Credit availability contingent on use of other services 13 Turned down by other institutions
25 Reputation, soundness, aggressiveness, progressivity 14 No or less collateral, no personal guarantees
32 Local Bank 15 SBA loan availability or assistance
50 Captive finance(e.g. used financial institution owned  by seller) 16 Lending policies or terms
51 Seller referral (e.g. car dealer suggested loan company) 18 Large loan capability
52 Obtained from supplier of equipment &/or automobile  company 20 Service availability
53 Other referral 21 Quality of service or of services
54 Owner has personal/other business with institution 22 Location, proximity
55 Owner knows (an) officer(s) or employee(s), relative, or bank owner(s) 23 Convenience/ease of use 
56 Friendly, knowledgeable employees or management 24 Hours 
57 Long-term relationship/ ongoing relationship 26 Small size of institution
58 Reciprocity, institution does business with firm 27 Large size of institution
59 Primary Bank 28 Size of institution (small/large not ascertainable)
71 Institution or salesman solicited firm 29
72 Original institution taken over by current one
73 Loan assumption, old institution sold loan 30 Internet, electronic services
75 Minority ownership in institution 31 Knowledge of industry
76 Other requirements of institution 33 Willing to work in/specialize in Small business  services
34 Availability
Other reasons 40 Good prices/terms
12 Only institution to grant credit 41 Low fees or prices
70 Only institution in town, limited choice 42 High interest rate (savings or checking)
90 No Reason 43 Low interest rate and/or low loan (origination) fees
91 Gave unfavorable response 44 Interest rate (high or low not ascertainable)
92 Denied loan Institution; do not use institution 45 Good credit-card processing terms
93 No longer use institution and/or reacted negatively to institution 74 Diversification, convenient to have multiple institutions
94 Other encoded 77 Dissatisfaction with previous institution
95 Credit needed, no other response given
99 Non-ascertainable mentioned.
One-stop shopping, able to obtain multiple services at same 
institution
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THE ROAD AHEAD 
 
rganizations’ directions are determined by the members who constitute them. For 
example, Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Finkelstein et al. (2008:4) ascertain the 
executives’ “characteristics, what they do, how they do it, and particularly, how they 
affect organizational outcomes”. Behavioral strategy emphasizes right on this human factor in 
strategic management with an ambitious aim to “enrich strategy theory … [through] realistic 
assumptions about human … and social behavior” (Powell et al., 2011: 1371). The present 
dissertation contributes to the growing body of research in behavioral strategy.  
The collection of the studies presented in the previous chapters provided further insights 
into measurement of cognition, consensus formation process, optimal power differences, and 
social network theory with assumptions grounded on social cognition, behavioral decision 
theory, psychology and organizational behavior. These studies offered a new method to 
measure, visualize and aggregate individual cognition to group and between group level with a 
strong emphasis on multiple dimensions of cognition, shed light on micro-processes on 
consensus formation in relation to within-group power differences and psychological safety, a 
novel model of strategic decision making, and a new behavioral construct that refined existing 
theories from a behavioral perspective. Consequently, each study on its own laid down 
responses to core research questions of behavioral strategy identified by Powell and his 
colleagues (2011). 
While the present dissertation addressed and contributed to existing core research problems 
of behavioral strategy, several important challenges are still waiting to be resolved. First, 
behavioral strategy needs to produce a set of integrative theories. Second, it should continue 
building links between so far disconnected disciplines and literatures to advance strategic 
management. Third, behavioral strategy should come up with prescriptive tools to help 
practitioners to cope with their cognitive and behavioral biases. In the following sections, we 
O 
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elaborate more on the road ahead for behavioral strategy. 
Integrate 
“There is nothing so practical as a good theory” as put beautifully by Kurt Lewin (quoted in van 
Knippenberg, 2011:3). A good theory explains why (Sutton and Staw, 1995). It provides a story 
that sets up causal connections between acts, events, structure and thoughts by going deeper 
into the processes (Sutton and Staw, 1995). As a result of offering a wider perspective that 
embraces and advances earlier theoretical perspectives, an integrative theory creates an 
ecosystem of new discussions, lights up new ideas, and leads to new research questions.  
Salancik (1995) raised the critique against network theory that answers provided by network 
theory usually come from other theories. A similar critique can be posed for behavioral strategy 
that it repackages explanations provided by social and cognitive psychological theories and 
applies them into strategic management. Due to the lack of integrative and overarching theories 
of its own, behavioral strategy has so far remained as “a patchwork of theories and findings” 
(Powell et al., 2011:1370). However, there is hope. Much of behavioral strategy’s promise has yet 
to be realized.  
Exploiting the analogy between management and medicine, Weick (1995a) argues that the 
best management scholars interpret, speculate, propose and hypothesize observed phenomena 
before they explain, model and theorize as the best doctors first treat the symptoms before 
relying on a diagnosis. That is, theories come out at a later stage to summarize observations, 
form causal relationships between variables, integrate accumulated research to explain why the 
observed phenomenon occur. Research in behavioral strategy has been quite successful in 
challenging strategic management’s dominant views of efficient markets and rational agents by 
highlighting cognitive biases and behavioral failures (Gavetti, 2012). To move strategic 
management forward, it is about the time to produce overarching and integrative theories. 
The evolution of studies in the present dissertation is a good reflection of the expected 
development of behavioral strategy. While studies in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 heavily used 
theories of strategic decision making and cognitive and social psychology to answer questions 
related to consensus formation and distribution of power, the last and most recent study 
achieved constructing a behavioral theory of network embeddedness where it explained why firms 
choose certain network partners. It addressed the theoretical problem of network partner 
selection, provided a novel explanation using the lenses of behavioral strategy, and consequently 
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reformulated the strategy recommendations of embeddedness theory. That study exemplifies the 
prospects of behavioral strategy and underscores the importance of creating integrative theories 
of behavioral strategy that can enrich accumulated knowledge in strategic management. 
Build Bridges and Expand 
By its definition, behavioral strategy positions itself as a bridge between strategic management 
and cognitive and social psychology. This positioning has equipped behavioral strategy with 
realistic assumptions and unique insights about cognition, emotions and behavior within 
strategic management context. To preserve its distinguishing characteristic as an 
multidisciplinary research field, behavioral strategy needs to continue bridging across hitherto 
unconnected fields and expand to new research areas in order to stay at the forefront of 
strategic management. 
One avenue for bridging has been already happening in terms of research methods used. 
For example, NK models simulation model was borrowed from evolutionary biology and often 
employed in relating cognition with strategy (see Ganco and Hoetker, 2009 for a review; e.g., 
Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti et al., 2005). In a similar vein, in Chapter 4, I provided a 
computer simulation that I adapted from engineering. In addition to computer simulations, 
behavioral strategy can also utilize highly useful research tools such as neuroimaging, genetics 
and hormones, ethnographic field studies, discourse analysis, mathematical modeling, textual 
analysis, and experiments.  
However, it is important to recognize the advantages and limitations of each research tool 
which requires using multiple methods to create convergent knowledge (Burton and Obel, 
2011). More importantly, use of multiple methods can facilitate creating integrative theories. 
Van Knippenberg (2011) argues that single method studies are limited to a small set of 
relationships in a single empirical setting, hampering comprehensive understanding of the issue 
at hand. Complementary use of methods might avoid it. For example, surveys and archival data 
can reveal the description and explanation, i.e. “what-is”, of the observed phenomenon, 
employing computer simulations can then support theory building by going beyond the existing 
empirical setting and exploring wider context of alternatives, possibilities and boundaries, i.e. 
“what-might-be” (Burton and Obel, 2011).  
Another direction for behavioral strategy is to expand its scope to various research areas 
closed to strategic management in order to discover the boundaries of behavioral strategy’s 
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applicability. For example, innovation management stands out as a particular area open for 
expansion.  Innovation process is highly complex and surrounded by uncertainties where 
employees mostly rely on their cognitive skills to make sense of the business environment 
(Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). Additionally, once a new idea is discovered, social interactions 
among peers and higher levels takes place to make others buy into the idea and implement it. It 
is therefore essential to enlarge behavioral strategy’s scope to fields like innovation management 
and apply the findings of behavioral strategy. Such an endeavor will also demarcate the 
boundaries of behavioral strategy enabling it to take stock of its value propositions and focus on 
the fields to which it can contribute the most.  
Help the Strategists 
Extending Weick’s (1995b) analogy between medical doctors and management scholars, if 
medical doctors’ goal is to remedy the health of theirs patients, the purpose of management 
scholars is then to help businesses prosper. Contrary to the conceptualizations of organizations 
and their constituencies as rational agents, burgeoning research stream of behavioral strategy 
recognizes emotions, cognitive limitations, behavioral failures and irrationalities (Gavetti, 2012; 
Huy, 2012; Powell et al., 2011). Therefore, the onus is on behavioral strategy to develop 
methods and recommendations supported by integrative theories that can support practitioners 
in realizing and managing their cognitive and behavioral boundaries.  
The present dissertation has proposed a novel method namely strategic consensus mapping 
(SCM) for a comprehensive understanding of strategic consensus. SCM allows practitioners to 
extract what individuals and groups think about the strategy and to detect where and on which 
strategic goals there is alignment. Using these insights practitioners can decide on whether to 
carry out a strategic intervention to influence consensus and alignment in the organization. 
Later, SCM can also be utilized to test effectiveness of this intervention. Furthermore, Chapter 
3 highlighted that practitioners should not overlook the power differences and psychological 
safety within a group when they organize interventions to increase consensus. Chapter 4 
provided insights regarding the conditions such that steep or even power differences are 
preferred. More specifically, Chapter 4 warned firms to consider their abilities to detect most 
competent employees before implementing a merit based distribution of power. Chapter 5 
represented important managerial implications as well. It revisited the popular strategy 
recommendation of network embeddedness theory to balance embedded and arms’ length ties. 
Chapter 6 
141 
I demonstrated that such policy is beneficial only for the firms that select their network partners 
based on transactional motives. However, at firms with relational motives such a policy is 
detrimental. While this study underscored network orientation as a behavioral characteristic of 
firms, it also proposed practitioners to take their network orientation into account before 
applying popular strategy recommendations, e.g. of network embeddedness theory.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES 
 
Summary in English 
Organizations are embedded in a network of relationships and make sense of their business 
environment through the cognitive frames of their employees and executives who constantly 
experience battles for power. This dissertation integrates strategic management research with 
organizational behavior to illuminate managerial cognition, intra-organizational power and 
interfirm networks.   
The collection of the studies presented in the present dissertation provides further insights 
into measurement of cognition, consensus formation process, optimal power differences, and 
social network theory with assumptions grounded on social cognition, behavioral decision 
theory, psychology and organizational behavior. These studies offered a new method to measure, 
visualize and aggregate individual cognition to group and between group level with a strong 
emphasis on multiple dimensions of cognition, shed light on micro-processes on consensus 
formation in relation to within-group power differences and psychological safety, a novel model 
of strategic decision making, and a new behavioral construct that refined existing theories from a 
behavioral perspective. Each study on its own laid down responses to core research questions of 
behavioral strategy. Consequently, this dissertation extends strategic management along 
behavioral lines and equips scholars and practitioners with novel methods and theoretical insights 
with respect to cognition, power and networks.  
 
 
  
Executive Summaries 
 
162 
Summary in Dutch 
Organisaties zijn onderdeel van een netwerk van verbindingen. Organisaties zien hun zakelijke 
omgeving door de cognitieve kaders van hun werknemers, die constant strijden om macht. In dit 
proefschrift wordt onderzoek gedaan naar strategisch management en het gedrag van 
organisaties. De verzameling van studies gepresenteerd in dit proefschrift geeft inzicht in het 
meten van cognition, het proces tot het komen van consensus, optimale machtsverschillen en de 
theorie van het sociale netwerk. Dit proefschrift geeft onderzoekers en managers nieuwe 
methodes en theoretische inzichten in cognition, macht en netwerken.  
Executive Summaries 
 
163 
Summary in Turkish 
Organizasyonlar bir ilişkiler ağına yerleşmiştir, ve güç çekişmeleri içinde bulunduğu çevreye kendi 
bakış açısından anlam vermeye çalışan yönetici ve çalışanlardan oluşur. Bu doktora tezinde yer 
alan makaleler yöneticilerin biliş ve anlayışlarının ölçen bir teknik sunmaya ek olarak şirket içinde 
fikir birliğinin oluşma sürecini, gücün nasıl dağıtılması gerektiğini ve sosyal ağlarda şirketlerin 
nasıl davrandığını açıklar. Bu tez çalışması stratejik yönetim ve organizasyonel davranış 
literatürlerini birleştirerek araştırmacılara ve yöneticilere katkıda bulunmayı amaçlar. 
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STRATEGIC CONSENSUS, POWER AND NETWORKS
Organizations are embedded in a network of relationships and make sense of their
business environment through the cognitive frames of their employees and executives who
constantly experience battles for power. This dissertation integrates strategic management
research with organizational behavior to illuminate managerial cognition, intra-organizational
power and interfirm networks.  
The collection of the studies presented in the present dissertation provides further
insights into measurement of cognition, consensus formation process, optimal power
differences, and social network theory with assumptions grounded on social cognition,
behavioral decision theory, psychology and organizational behavior. These studies offered
a new method to measure, visualize and aggregate individual cognition to group and
between group level with a strong emphasis on multiple dimensions of cognition, shed
light on micro-processes on consensus formation in relation to within-group power
differences and psychological safety, a novel model of strategic decision making, and a
new behavioral construct that refined existing theories from a behavioral perspective.
Each study on its own laid down responses to core research questions of behavioral
strategy. Consequently, this dissertation extends strategic management along behavioral
lines and equips scholars and practitioners with novel methods and theoretical insights
with respect to cognition, power and networks.
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